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Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Conservative Party and Electoral Failure 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the actions, perceptions and strategies of the Conservative 
Party elite leadership in opposition, between 1997 and 2005. At the heart of this research 
lies a simply stated question. Why has it taken the Conservative Party so long to get back 
into a position to challenge for power? After landslide defeat in 1997, why has it 
(apparently) been so slow to adapt, reposition itself and begin rebuilding its support? This 
becomes all the more puzzling when the adaptive record of the party is considered. It is the 
most successful electoral organisation in democratic European history, having governed 
(either independently or in coalition) for 91 of the 111 years of the 'long Conservative 
century' between 1886 and 1997 (Seldon and Snowdon, 2001: 27). Such was its 
dominance the party became known, and regarded itself, as 'the natural party of 
government'. Yet, on any measure, the Conservatives' performance since 1997 has been 
one of abject electoral failure. Having suffered a crushing defeat in 1997, they made little 
discernible progress in 2001 (and on some measures retreated further) and managed only a 
marginal advance in 2005. After three different leaders and eight years of opposition, the 
Conservatives still returned fewer MPs than Labour at their nadir in 1983. 
Further to this, the 1997-2005 period is particularly unusual when compared to the other 
lengthy spells of opposition the party endured in the twentieth century. After the 1906 
Liberal landslide the Conservatives were out of office for nearly a decade, but had 
recovered sufficiently to restore parity with the Liberals in the two general elections of 
1910 (Coetzee, 2005: 103-6). Similarly after Labour's landslide victory in 1945, the 
Conservatives recovered to cut the government majority to just five in 1950, and returned 
to office in 1951. The 1997 defeat followed eighteen years of Conservative government -
an unprecedented period of electoral success built on Thatcherite statecraft. An 
appreciation of the ideological legacy of Thatcherism is important for understanding the 
party in the years of opposition that have followed: paradoxically, as this thesis explores, 
this legacy may partly account for the failure of Conservative statecraft since. 
This conundrum could be approached in a number of different ways. For example, one 
major external factor that clearly affected the Conservatives' electoral fortunes in the 
1990s was the revitalisation of the Labour Party, particularly under the leadership of Tony 
Blair. By repositioning his party and changing its image Blair redrew the political map, 
leaving it barely recognisable compared to that of the 1980s. An explanation of 
Conservative Party failure could therefore be based around an examination of the creation 
of New Labour and how this altered the political terrain in which the Conservatives must 
operate. As one of the key architects of New Labour argued, 'without Labour as a demonic 
enemy, Conservatism lacks bearing and purpose' (Gould, 1999: xii).l An old adage of 
British politics is that oppositions do not win elections, governments lose them. Blair's 
electoral success can be partly attributed to the fact that he presented the electorate with a 
credible and attractive alternative to the dilapidated Major administration. Cameron may 
yet similarly benefit from the degeneration of the Brown government. Conversely, the 
electoral failure of the Conservative opposition between 1997 and 2005 must surely be 
assigned in part to the effectiveness of Blair's 'Third Way' as an electoral strategy, but this 
is not the focus of this research. 
Building on the work of authors such as Ivor Crewe (1994), another approach could be to 
focus on external factors such as the behaviour of the electorate, and consider how class 
and party dealignment may affect Conservative Party support. An alternative external 
factor that could be made central to the analysis is the media, and how it has affected party 
image and voter choices. Linked to this is the question of political marketing, and how 
political parties should seek to effectively sell themselves in the media age.2 A further 
alternative method, exemplified by McIlveen (2008), would be to focus on the internal 
difficulties the party has experienced in terms of formulating and implementing effective 
election campaigns. This approach highlights how tactical errors, poor planning, and even 
I For a useful summary and review of much of the literature on New Labour, see Ludlam (2000). 
2 A burgeoning literature exists in this area. See for example. Lees-Marshment (2001); Kuhn (2007): Savigny 
(2003; 2008). 
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the very structure of the party organisation undermined efforts to Improve the 
Conservatives' general election performance. 
The choice of research focus therefore inevitably influences the explanation that results 
from it. Research into internal party organisation and dynamics will point to the affect 
these have on party performance. Studies of New Labour will explain how it has impacted 
upon the political landscape. This is unsurprising (it would be odd if it were not the case), 
but is worth highlighting. Nor need this be problematic, as long as it is clear where the 
focus of each particular study lies, and if we recognise that each necessarily represents a 
partial and to some extent value-laden interpretation.3 No explanation can hope to account 
for every possible variable to the exact degree. Indeed, the value of different research 
projects is often situated in the particular angle or emphasis that they take. 
The focus of this thesis is the leadership of the Conservative Party between 1997 and 2005, 
and how the key strategic actors (namely the successive leaders of the party and other 
senior politicians) understood, and sought to address, the party's electoral failure. Through 
documentary analysis and elite interviews, it seeks to expose competing interpretations of 
this problem, and explain how these were translated into party strategy. A premise of this 
research is that the legacy of Thatcherite conservatism constituted an important aspect of 
this process. By exploring several notable sites of ideological dispute for Conservatives 
(Europe, national identity, and moral issues) the thesis seeks to uncover how party leaders 
were both ideologically influenced, and how they sought to manage competing ideological 
pressures. As such, this research is concerned primarily with internal party dynamics. and 
is not an all-encompassing explanation Conservative electoral failure. It considers how 
party strategy was devised and implemented, and whether (and why) sub-optimal electoral 
strategies were pursued. External, contextual factors - most obviously the electorate - are 
of course important, but the focus is not on these independently, but on how the key 
strategic actors interpreted and understood them, and sought to orientate strategy towards 
them. 
3 For a more detailed discussion, see the methodology section in Chapter 2 (2.8). 
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This approach locates the research within a body of academic work which has documented 
the history and strategy of the Conservative Party. However, as the remainder of this 
chapter explains, this existing literature struggles to provide a satisfying answer to the 
puzzle of how such a successful electoral organisation, feted for its adaptive capacity, 
apparently lost its traditional strengths. In part, this is because there is not much of it: with 
the exception of the various sustained analyses of Thatcherism,4 academic attention has 
tended towards Labour rather than the Conservatives. This propensity was understandably 
amplified in the 1990s by the rise of New Labour and the commensurate collapse of the 
Conservative Party as a governing force, although this academic trend is beginning to be 
rebalanced. This difficulty is compounded because for many years the primary task of 
students of the Conservative Party, whether working in a historical or political science 
tradition, was to explain its enduring success. Studies that did consider its periodic spells 
of opposition were, in the main, preoccupied with demonstrating how these were used to 
refresh Conservative ideas and organisation in preparation once again for government (for 
example, Ball and Seldon, 2005; Seldon and Snowdon, 2001). 
This chapter provides an overVIew of the literature on the Conservative Party, with 
particular emphasis on how it has understood, and sought to account for, its electoral 
success and failure. It is grouped into two broad categories: a historical tradition which has 
emphasised the role of pragmatic elite leadership, and a Marxist-inspired analytical 
tradition which has emphasised the institutionalised sources of Conservative power. This 
characterisation is something of an academic conceit, for as we shall see, there is 
substantial crossover between these two clusters. However, it is useful as a means to 
highlight both the many positive aspects of the literature, and some of its limitations with 
regard to understanding contemporary Conservative politics. 
4 Notably, Bevir and Rhodes (1998); Bulpitt (1986); Evans (1997 & 2004); Gamble (1994a); ?ray (1994); 
Hall (1983); Hall and Jacques (1983); Jenkins (1989); Jessop etal. (1988); Kavanagh (19~0); Kneger (1986): 
Letwin (1992); Riddell (1991). For an overview of much of the literature on Thatchen.sm, see Ev~ns and 
Taylor (1996: 219-246), and Marsh (1995). Also see Chapter 3 for different Conservative perspectIves on 
Thatcherism and its legacy. 
1.2 The historical tradition 
As Addison notes, despite the Conservative Party's status as the oldest surviving political 
party in Britain, for much of the twentieth century it was a neglected area of historical 
study: it was, quite simply, 'out of fashion' (1999: 289). This began to change in the 1970s 
when a number of historians, led by Robert Blake, subjected the Conservatives to serious 
academic study. There now exists a distinguished scholarly tradition, which has recorded 
Conservative Party history, with definitive works by Robert Blake (1970; 1998) and John 
Ramsden (1995, 1996, and 1998) at the forefront. Substantial contributions have also been 
made by Stuart Ball (1998), John Charmley (1996), Alan Clark (1998), Andrew Davies 
(1996), Brendan Evans and Andrew Taylor (1996), Anthony Seldon (1996), and Seldon 
and Ball (1994). It is not the intention of this chapter to systematically review this oeuvre, 
nevertheless, important themes (which recur in studies of the contemporary era) can be 
identified.5 
Emblematic of this body of work is the title of Davies' We, The Nation: The Conservative 
Party and the Pursuit of Power (1996). The recurring theme is a fascination with the 
political success of the Conservative Party: its quest for power, and its aptitude for 
modifying itself in pursuit of that objective. As Addison comments, the Conservatives 
'have long been renowned for their ability to adapt to new conditions while retaining 
something of their old identity' (1999: 289). This capacity for reform and reinvention is 
viewed with awe, not least because it has often revealed itself in unpropitious 
circumstances. In a typical account, for example that by Seldon and Snowdon, this takes on 
a cyclical character: after a lengthy period of government (they point to those that ended in 
1905, 1945 and 1964) and facing an increasingly hostile climate, the party would be 
propelled into opposition. Once there, however, the Conservatives typically installed a new 
leader, renewed their popular appeal, and the party's 'organisation, membership, morale 
and funding all recovered'. At the heart of this was adaptability: 'the party's reconciliation 
to political, economic and social change often helped its return to power' (Seldon and 
Snowdon, 2001: 27). 
5 See Addison (1999) and Turner (1999) for reviews of much of this historical literature. 
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Flexibility in the face of change was thus trumpeted as the key to Conservative electoral 
success, derived in substantial part from the party's willingness to change its leadership 
(Clark, 1998: 491). As the title of Ramsden's single-volume history would have it. the 
Conservatives had An Appetite for Power (1998). In this respect loyalty to the party and 
the resultant public unity was their 'secret weapon', the periodic absence of which led to 
defeat. Loyalty to the leadership was not unconditional, however, and on occasion was 
withheld from unsuccessful leaders. Reflecting on his own time at the helm lain Duncan 
Smith wryly observed that: 'It's still the secret weapon of the Conservative Party, the 
trouble is it's just got so very secret, nobody can find it anymore!' (Duncan Smith 
Interview). Conservative leaders embody the party and its course, and failure is not treated 
kindly. As Bercow comments, the Conservative Party 'wants and expects to be led' 
(Bercow Interview). 
Allied to this proclivity was the widespread idea, popular amongst Conservatives 
themselves, that theirs was a non-ideological party. Ramsden typifies Conservative history 
when he argues that where the party faced a choice between power and doctrinal goals, it 
generally favoured power (cited in Addison, 1999: 296). A weakness of Ramsden's work, 
Addison argues, is that the role of ideology 'deserves more systematic treatment' than he 
provides (1999: 295). However, in most Conservative history ideology only plays a 
secondary role and, where it is acknowledged, it is subservient to adaptability. 
Conservatism, if it is indeed an 'ideology', must itself be flexible. The primary function of 
ideology is as a tool, often used in opposition, to refresh and revive the Conservative 
appeal. For Barnes the fact that the Conservatives, unlike their opponents, were 'non-
ideological' was the source of their adaptable nature and consequent success (Barnes, 
1994). 
The difficulty for contemporary work in this tradition is in explaining prolonged 
Conservative electoral failure. As it measures leadership against the criteria of electoral 
success, the conclusion has to be that since 1997 (or indeed since the last Conservative 
general election victory in 1992) the party has been condemned by devastatingly poor 
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leadership. In this respect, the Major premiership has been lambasted by a number of 
Conservatives who have compared it unfavourably with Thatcher's (Ridley, 1992; Tebbit. 
2005). The agency-centred analysis of the historical tradition means that Hague, Duncan 
Smith and Howard must also be blameworthy. For example, for Collings and Seldon, 
Hague's leadership represented the 'most futile period in Opposition in the last one 
hundred years. It was an utterly bleak period that could have been largely avoided with a 
steadier hand and a clearer strategic direction' (2001: 624). If anything, the party's efforts 
between 2001 and 2005 were, given the more favourable circumstances of Labour's 
waning popularity, even less impressive. Having conceded that Hague had 'little room for 
manoeuvre', no such allowance is granted to his successors: 
The finger of blame can be pointed far more clearly at Duncan Smith, and above all 
Howard. Had Duncan Smith stuck to his centrists beliefs, and had the personality to impose 
his will on the party, real progress would have been made. But the real culprit is Howard, 
who managed to be so tactically and strategically inept. Blair and New Labour were no 
longer the forces in 2003-5 they had been. Howard's singular achievement was to let them 
off the hook, and hand them victory. (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005c: 741). 
Howard's contribution to Conservative Party fortunes may yet be reassessed by 
contemporary historians, not least if events unfold in such a way that his tenure becomes 
seen as a precursor for a lengthy Cameron premiership. However, a more general problem 
for such agency-focused historical analyses is that the mechanism previously utilised to 
ensure Conservative success, namely the willingness to eject ineffective leaders, has been 
in regular (if ineffective) use since 1997. In a little over eight years the party changed 
leader on four occasions, but its general election performance remained historically pOOL 
and only under Cameron has a substantial upward and sustained shift in the opinion polls 
been recorded. It also tends to overlook the fact that in certain respects and against some 
measures Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard were successful: Hague in reforming the 
party organisation reducing internal tensions over Europe, Duncan Smith in renewing 
policy, and Howard in uniting the party. 
In 2005, Seldon argued that 'considering the poor choices the party has made since 1997, it 
must now muster the courage to elect the leader with the best chance of winning the next 
8 
election' (Seldon, 2005). This raises the obvious questions of why the party failed to do so 
in 1997, 2001 and 2003, and why doing so should require courage, rather than 
commonsense or self-interest. One answer could be the influence of ideoloGY. From a b. 
political analyst's perspective, Heppell has persuasively demonstrated that ideology has 
been a key determinant of voting behaviour in elections to the Conservative leadership 
(Heppell, 2008; Heppell and Hill, 2008). However, for agency-centred historiographers. 
the ideational dimension is less easily accommodated. One way out of this difficulty is to 
claim, as Gilmour does, that since Thatcher the Conservative Party has not really been 
Conservative (or indeed small-c conservative) at all, but has fallen victim to al ien dogma 
(Chapter 3: 60-65). Mark Garnett's contemporary history sits broadly within this 
perspective: whilst he does not go as far to claim that pre-Thatcher the Conservatives were 
un-ideological, he does imply that there is something particularly virulent and pernicious 
about the neo-liberalism which took hold in the party in the 1970s and 1980s (Garnett, 
2003; 2004; Denham and Garnett, 2001; 2002; Gilmour and Garnett, 1997). Garnett's 
work represents a valuable contribution in no small part because of its sensitivity to and 
appreciation of the role of political ideas, and in this respect draws inspiration from the 
'ideological turn' witnessed in relation to studies of the Conservative Party in the 1980s. 
The move towards greater consideration of Conservative ideology was a response to the 
limitations of the historical tradition in accounting for the rise and nature of Thatcherism. 
In Turner's view, the result has been two sets of literature running in parallel - one 
emphasising the structural and societal changes that drove the emergence of the New Right 
in the UK and elsewhere, and an agency-focused historical interpretation. The latter 
'concentrates on the disappointment felt in the party and in the electorate at the ineptitude 
of Labour government and the failure of Heath's Conservative Party to win elections, to 
oppose effectively after it had lost them, or to tackle the non-parliamentary resistance of 
the over mighty trade unions' (Turner, 1999: 286). In other words, this literature explains 
the emergence of Thatcher and her policy programme by reference to Heath's ineffective 
(or even incompetent) leadership, rather than as part of a broader ideological or political 
shift. For observers in the historical tradition, these events were essentially contingent and 
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agency-driven. However, the upsurge in interest from political analysts in Thatcherism 
prompted a search for a more encompassing interpretation, as discussed below. 
1.3 Thatcherism and the political analytical tradition 
The transformative effect of Thatcherism reached even into the realm of Conservative 
Party studies. Previously, Turner suggests, this field had suffered somewhat 'from an 
excess of "engagement" among its historians', who tended to be 'active sympathisers' if 
not actual party activists (1999: 276).6 Thatcherism (itself a term first coined by the Left) 
brought rigorous academic study of the party from some of its fiercest ideological 
antagonists. 
As the historical tradition had been concerned with accounting for long-term Conservative 
electoral success, analysts of Thatcherism sought to explain its capture of economic, 
political and ideological debate. Pioneering work by Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (1983) 
employed Gramscian Marxism to characterise Thatcherism as a hegemonic project. This 
'authoritarian populism,' Hall argued, was a dangerous combination of 'the resonant 
themes of organic Toryism,' such as the nation, authority and the family, with the 
'aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism,' primarily anti-statist competitive 
individualism (Hall, 1983: 29). 
For Andrew Gamble, Thatcherism was an attempt to restore the conditions for 
Conservative hegemony. He argues that as a political project, Thatcherism had three key 
objectives: the restoration of the Conservative Party to electoral dominance; the revival of 
'market liberalism as the dominant public philosophy'; and the rejuvenation of state 
authority combined with a freeing-up of the market economy (Gamble, 1994a: 4). Jessop et 
al. (1988) also viewed Thatcherism as a hegemonic project: for them it was an attempt to 
'reconstitute the electoral base' of the Conservative Party which was in long-term 
structural decline (1988: 86). They argue that Thatcher sought to reconstitute both the 
6 The Conservative peer Lord Blake being foremost among them (Turner, 1999: 276; Blake, 1970). 
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economy (in the interests of international capital) and ideological discourse to sustain such 
a shift. 
Evans and Taylor highlight the curious similarity of the critiques of Thatcherism offered 
by 'One Nation' Conservatives such as Gilmour (1992), and those from the Marxist-left 
such as Jessop, Gamble, and Hall, who share the opinion that Thatcherism was a clear 
ideological 'project' which divided the nation. Such critiques, they argue, are 'underpinned 
by their main mistaken judgement, that Thatcherism was a dogmatic ideological project 
which represented a departure from the party's traditions' (Evans & Taylor, 1996: 230). A 
more accurate interpretation, they suggest, is to see Thatcherism as simply the latest 
episode in the history of a party that has long-been ideologically conscious in its resistance 
to statism and socialism (1996: 240). 
Evans and Taylor are right to stress the continuities of Thatcherism with Conservative 
Party history in terms of both its desire for electoral success, and its ideological unease 
with high levels of state intervention. However, it is possible to analyse Thatcherism as a 
'project' whilst also recognising that it is part of a broadly defined Conservative tradition. 
There is a particularity to Thatcherism, as an interpretation of and response to the context 
of the late-1970s. The concern with that context, and the character of the response to it, are 
both derived from longstanding Conservative tradition. However, that response manifested 
itself as a more coherent and strategic political project than had previously been seen under 
a Conservative government. Gamble is therefore correct when he suggests that 
Thatcherism is best understood as a political project, the primary objective of which was 
the reversal of British national decline (1994a: 4). 
These Marxist-inspired analyses share an interest (absent, as Turner noted, from much of 
the agency-focused historical literature) in locating Conservative electoral success in the 
wider social, economic, and political context. Consequently, they tend to exhibit a greater 
theoretical self-awareness and reflectivity. Like the historical analyses, they seek to 
account for the party's adaptive capacity, but they focus less on internal party 
machinations and attempt to situate this in relation to society as a whole. In this way they 
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are, broadly, much more structuralist than the historical tradition: party change is prompted 
mainly by external structural crises of the economy, state and society. Only through a 
consideration of these factors can the emergence and success of Thatcherism be 
understood. 
As Bevir and Rhodes note, 'there is no monolithic, unified notion of Thatcherism', but 
various competing 'narratives', each of which is embedded in a wider 'tradition' (1998: 
97-111 ).7 They are correct in their assertion that there is no essentialist account of 
Thatcherism: rather a variety of interpretations exist. However, we can identify a shift in 
the way the Conservative Party was studied in the light of Thatcherism, bringing political 
science concerns to bear on the historical tradition. It would be wrong also to dismiss this 
turn as merely 'structuralist' because many of these accounts do consider agential factors 
and highlight the contingent nature of Thatcher's electoral success. The Gramscian 
leanings of some also provide a welcome sensitivity to the importance of ideas. However, 
the concern of this mode of analysis is largely with explaining how ideology is used to 
provoke, explain, or sustain wider socio-economic shifts. It is useful, therefore, to 
characterise the dominant turn of the literature on Thatcherism as one of movement 
towards more structurally inclined modes of explanation, in contrast to the agency-focused 
historical narratives that preceded them. In many ways this was a welcome corrective, but 
brought with it the risk of underplaying the vital role of strategic actors and leadership. 
This concern prompted arguably the most influential single contribution to the debate 
about Thatcherism, Jim Bulpitt's statecraft thesis. Bulpitt reasserted the importance of 
leadership strategy for understanding Conservative Party politics. His approach 'stresses 
the need to examine the activities of party leaders in terms of their statecraft - namely the 
art of winning elections and, above all, achieving a necessary degree of governing 
competence in office' (1986: 19). Less emphasis is placed on the ideological particularity 
of Thatcherism: its distinctiveness lies in its statecraft (Bevir & Rhodes, 1999: 101-2). In 
short, Bulpitt viewed the historical concern of Conservative Party statecraft as the 
7 See Bevir (1999) for a discussion of the concepts of 'traditions' and 'narratives'. 
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preservation of an autonomous, centralised government with sole control over issues of 
'high politics' (1986: 21-2). 
The statecraft approach has much to commend it, and has been successfully applied by 
Buller (2000). It can be seen as an attempt to balance structure and agency, but has a 
number of limitations. It is somewhat imprecise, with a rather narrow conception of 
leadership motives, and has a tendency to underplay the important role of political ideas. 
This stems from Bulpitt's juxtaposition of statecraft against modes of analysis that favour 
either ideology or policy (1986: 19). As Buller and James concede, 'at times, Bulpitt's 
language betrays an almost instrumental view of the role of ideas in politics' which are 
'employed by politicians to put a "positive gloss" on the cruder notion of winning 
elections' (2008: 23). Nonetheless, they maintain that a 'careful reading' of BUlpitt reveals 
a willingness to ascribe more importance to ideology than this would initially suggest, as 
'the implementation of ideas must be crucial to the task of [achieving] governing 
competence and political success' (2008: 23). However, even on this reading, ideology 
effectively remains a means to an end and subservient to the statecraft imperative. Perhaps 
the most beneficial lesson we can take from considering the statecraft approach (aside from 
the importance of leadership itself) is that political leaders have multiple objectives against 
which to measure their achievements, but central to these is political success in terms of 
holding power. 
Bulpitt's work is best appreciated as a valuable corrective to the tendency, prevalent at the 
time it was published, to emphasise the particularity and novelty of Thatcherism. This was 
not only a feature of some Marxist analyses but was common amongst Conservative critics 
who denounced the new creed as foreign to conservatism (Gilmour, 1992). It is within this 
debate about Thatcherism that statecraft is most useful. It also highlights the value of 
explicitly incorporating both conduct and context into our analysis, which the strategic-
relational approach (SRA) utilised in this thesis brings to the fore. Before the SRA is 
outlined in Chapter 2, however, it is worth considering the academic work that has focused 
on the Conservative Party in opposition since 1997. 
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1.4 Contemporary analyses 
With the fall of communism, Marxist political analysis waned. Aligned with a general 
decline of interest in the Conservatives following their ejection from office, the relatively 
sparse literature examining the party has lent more heavily on the historical tradition. As 
discussed above, much of this is agential in its approach and the focus of its analysis has 
consequently been on the (in)adequacy of Conservative Party leadership strategies, tactics 
and personnel since 1997. 
Seldon and Snowdon use their historical perspective to draw parallels between the 
Conservative predicament in 1997 and that faced by the party in the mid-nineteenth 
century, after the repeal of the Corn Laws (2005b: 244). Paradoxically, a period of 
immense electoral success (1979-97) saw the Conservative Party lose its hunger for power 
and its adaptability: 'the two keys' which accounted for its hegemony. In this respect, Mrs 
Thatcher is personally liable: whilst she achieved 'much of lasting benefit for Britain', she 
also damaged the party by making it 'more of a right-wing, ideological force than it had 
traditionally been' (2005b: 245). In their explanation of Conservative failure, Seldon and 
Snowdon seek to combine internal factors such as 'ill-considered' organisational reform 
(p. 251) and confused policy-making and marketing (p. 252-5, 262) with external factors 
such as Labour's reputation for competence and effective opposition from the Liberal 
Democrats (p. 256, 263). However, beyond a stinging critique of strategic decision making 
by Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard, they struggle to link these together into a 
convincing explanation as to why such strategic errors were repeatedly made. 
The edited collection by Garnett and Lynch (2003) provides the most comprehensive 
academic overview of the 1997-2001 period. To date, no equivalent text exists for the 2001 
parliament. Quadrennial reviews are also provided by chapters in the various general 
election series texts, for example Butler and Kavanagh (2002); Cooper (2001); Cowley and 
Quayle (2002); Cowley and Green (2005); and Lansley (2001). These works provide 
useful overviews and insights into certain aspects of the period, such as the party's election 
campaigns. Other political scientists have turned their attention to particular issues and 
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areas of interest: notably Bale on Euroscepticism and the Conservative Party (2006a); 
Heppell and Hill on the ideological composition of the parliamentary party and its impact 
on leader selection (2005; 2008); Kelly on strategy under Hague (2001); Harris on the 
politics of nationhood under Hague (2005); Taylor on the failure to develop a new 
narrative (2005); and Quinn on the need to change party-image in order to regain the 
centre-ground (2008). These and other works are drawn on throughout this dissertation. 
This research complements and builds on the existing literature by considering party 
strategy over eight years of opposition and in relation to particular dilemmas for 
conservatism (see chapter outlines below). 
As well as the academic studies, the Conservatives' troubles have been the subject of much 
journalistic comment. Newspaper sources are drawn upon throughout this thesis, both to 
trace particular events and as a barometer of the party's success or failure in winning-
round public opinion. One book length study worth mentioning at this juncture is Simon 
Walters' Tory Wars (2001). Based on an extensive range of interviews and his insider 
access as a Westminster correspondent, Walters explores the fratricidal conflict between 
modernisers and traditionalists during the 1997-2001 parliament. He provides a fascinating 
account of internal party politics, up to and including the extraordinary series of events that 
led to the election of lain Duncan Smith as leader in September 2001. Whilst the drama is 
worthy of a Brazilian soap opera, Walters' attention is almost exclusively on the 
personalities of those involved, limiting his analytical purchase and appreciation of wider 
contextual factors. lo-Anne Nadler's biography of William Hague (2000) is similarly 
insightful about the persona of her subject, but again does not seek to locate this within a 
broader political context. 
To this can be added a voluminous outpouring by Conservatives themselves. 8 David 
Willetts has led the search for an intellectual revival of conservatism (1997; 1998a; 1998b; 
1999). Contributions by Ancram (2007), Letwin (2003), and Streeter (2002) have also 
sought to address the question of what twenty-fist century conservatism should look like. 
Ashcroft (2005), Philp (2006), and Tyrie (2001), have looked in detail at election defeats. 
8 Competing Conservative interpretations of the context faced in 1997 are explore in Chapter 3. 
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These, and numerous politicians' speeches, provide a valuable source of information about 
how Conservatives understood, and sought to address, the challenge they faced. 
This research concentrates on the 1997-2005 period for several reasons. Firstly, this period 
has received relatively little academic attention. Secondly, bookended and bisected by 
election defeats, it provides an excellent opportunity to explore the strategies that were 
deployed over an extended time in opposition, how these were developed, and where and 
how they failed. Thirdly, through analysis of key sites of ideological dispute, it allows us 
to consider the resonance of Thatcherism in the contemporary Conservative Party, and 
assess the ideological evolution and position of the party today. Finally, a comprehension 
of Conservative politics since 1997 is essential for understanding the emergence of David 
Cameron and his agenda for modernisation. What this period may tell us about Cameron's 
Conservative Party is considered in the conclusion to the research (Chapter 8). 
1.5 Conclusion 
The fundamental purpose of political parties IS to WIn elections and implement their 
agenda in office. Historically, no party appeared to validate this more strikingly than the 
Conservatives, and students of the party dedicated themselves to explaining this success. 
However, this overview of the literature, whilst highlighting its breadth and value, has also 
demonstrated that it has difficulty accounting satisfactorily for contemporary Conservative 
Party failure. In particular, the agency-centred historical tradition leads to explanations 
based on the shortcomings of individual leaders, lacking sufficient appreciation of vital 
contextual factors. Conversely, whilst the political analytical tradition has many strengths, 
its spotlight on explaining Conservative hegemony risks limiting its effectiveness in 
accounting for its subsequent collapse. 
In short, this review suggests the need for a more nuanced theoretical approach, drawing 
on the strengths of both the historical and political science literature. Statecraft has much to 
commend it in this regard. Leadership is at the core of what any political party does. how it 
communicates with the electorate, how it interprets reality and how it defines its strategy. 
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As the agency-focused nature of its historiography shows, this is particularly so in the case 
of the Conservative Party. As Taylor has noted, 'the importance of the leader and the style 
of leadership for the Conservative Party cannot, therefore, be underestimated' (2008: xiii). 
Statecraft is limited, however, by its focus on governing and the Thatcher era. 
Since Bulpitt's (1986) article was published, a wider debate in political science over the 
nature and relationship of structure and agency has gathered apace. 9 This has been an 
important element of the movement towards more theoretically informed political analysis, 
and the preference for explicit consideration of methodological questions. lO One more-
generalised theoretical approach which seeks to overcome the dualism of structure and 
agency is the strategic-relational approach (SRA). This is not an approach that has been 
explicitly applied to party politics. However, by directing the focus of analytical attention 
to strategic action it offers a potentially fruitful new avenue for studies in this field, and 
appears particularly apt in the case of the Conservative Party, where elite leadership has 
played a central role throughout the party's history. Applied with the notion of the 
strategically selective context, the SRA provides the framework for a mode of analysis 
which highlights the interplay between strategic action and the environment in which it 
takes place, and the importance of how that environment is interpreted and understood by 
political actors. The strategic-relational approach utilised in this thesis is outlined in the 
next chapter. 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2: The strategic-relational approach 
Through a discussion of structure and agency in social and political analysis, this chapter 
introduces the analytical framework used in this thesis: the strategic-relational approach 
(SRA). The utility and relevance of the SRA for this research is then explored. The SRA is 
preferred as it leads us to focus on a number of key arenas, namely leadership. party, 
9 For example, Hay (1995), McAnulla (2002). 
10 See Marsh and Stoker (1995; 2002); Hay (2002). 
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electorate and ideology. In other words, it directs us towards an appreciation of the 
Conservative Party both as a strategic actor and as an institution. After a discussion of how 
the SRA will be operationalised to analyse the Conservatives in opposition, the chapter 
outlines the research methods used in this thesis. 
Chapter 3: The Electoral and Ideational Problem 
The strategic-relational approach leads us to note the importance of the context in which 
actors operate. Chapter 3 considers the context faced by the Conservative Party at the 
beginning of the case-study period, in 1997. This is explored through the problems faced 
by the Conservatives on both the electoral and ideational dimensions. The electoral context 
is considered in terms of the party's opinion poll rating and public image, particularly with 
regard to the key issue of management of the economy. The works of three Conservative 
thinkers (John Gray, Ian Gilmour, and David Willetts) are used to consider the intellectual 
response of conservatism to the Thatcherite legacy. This ideological uncertainty over the 
direction of Conservative politics after Thatcher is an important frame of the debates in the 
party post-l 997. 
Chapter 4: Leadership Strategy in Opposition, 1997-2005 
The pivotal contribution of the SRA is to orientate our analysis towards strategy. Within 
the context established by Chapter 3, Chapter 4 provides an overview of the leadership 
strategy pursued by the Conservatives across the 1997-2005 case-study period. It contends 
that these have been sub-optimal in electoral terms, characterised by uncertainty and 
inconsistency. The chapter concludes that the strategies pursued by Hague, Duncan Smith 
and Howard were sub-optimal: they underachieved even within the inauspicious context 
that they faced. The three case-study chapters that follow explore in detail how the party 
leadership sought to manage the challenges posed by the key issues of European 
integration; national identity and the 'English question'; and social, sexual and moral 
policy. These three cases were selected for several reasons. Most importantly, they each 
represent a significant ideological challenge for Conservatives. European integration 
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caused the deepest divisions in the party since the Corn Laws, contributing to Thatcher's 
downfall and undermining the government of her successor. Since 1997, the ongoing 
debate over British membership of the European single currency, the Treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice, and the proposed European Constitution. all ensured that 
Conservative leaders were unable to ignore the European question. Devolution and 
immigration present difficult questions for the Conservatives in the politics of nationhood, 
testing the viability of Thatcherite conceptions of national identity. The Conservatives' 
stance on social, sexual and moral subjects has also been the site of noteworthy intra-party 
disagreements. Forced to confront these issues by Labour's policies on the family and 
sexual equality, the party has again faced the question of whether Thatcherite positioning 
in this area can be translated into a viable electoral strategy. In short, all three cases offer 
the opportunity to explore significant issues in contemporary conservatism left unresolved 
by eighteen years of Conservative government, and to examine how the leadership sought 
to manage these. 
Chapter 5: The European Question 
European integration has long been one of the most controversial and divisive issues in 
British conservative politics. This chapter traces how this issue has been handled since 
1997. Whilst most academic attention has focused on the intense divisions Europe caused 
in the Conservative Party during the Thatcher and Major governments, this chapter 
suggests that since 1997 this issue has largely been neutralised within the party. The 
Conservatives, it is argued, have settled on a broadly Thatcherite Eurosceptic position. In 
this respect, the 1997-2005 period is of great importance, as it was the actions of key actors 
during this time that shaped how this came about. 
Chapter 6: National Identity and the English Question 
Chapter 6 further explores the Conservative Party's conception of national identity in the 
contemporary context of the emergence of a stronger and more visible sense of 
Englishness. Intimately related to this are the key policy issues of immigration and 
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devolution, and the party's approach to these since 1997 is mapped out. In the light of 
these two areas, the chapter considers the Conservatives' reluctant drift towards becoming 
an English party. It concludes that the Conservatives currently betray a lack of confidence 
in their conception of nationhood, which is significant as traditionally it forms a central 
aspect of both their identity and their electoral appeal. 
Chapter 7: A New Moral Agenda? 
This chapter examines party policy and rhetoric on social, sexual and moral issues since 
1997. It focuses on the Conservative approach to gay rights (notably the disputes over 
Section 28 and adoption rights for gay couples), and family policy (particularly with regard 
to attitudes towards marriage). The Conservatives were forced to consider there positions 
on these issues in response to the government's moves to equalise the age of consent, 
abolish Section 28, introduce civil partnerships, scrap the married couples tax allowance 
and introduce a system of tax credits not dependent on marriage. These debates are linked 
to the wider question of party modernisation, and the division between modernisers and 
traditionalists. It concludes that the most significant division in the Conservative Party is 
now along the social, sexual, and moral policy divide, and that this poses a significant 
challenge to David Cameron. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
The concluding chapter brings together the findings of the research, and considers the 
implications of the 1997-2005 period for the future of Conservative politics. It also reflects 
on the use of the strategic-relational approach to political analysis. 
Chapter 2 
The Strategic-Relational Approach 
I was less aware of the Prime Minister's power than the constraints upon his power. 
When you are in there, you don 'f feel you can do anything. 
Bernard Donoughue, Head of the Downing Street Policy Unit under Harold 
Wilson and James Callaghan, 1974-9. Quoted in Hennessy (1996: 169). 
2.1 Introduction 
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The focus of this research is on the elite leadership of the British Conservative Party 
since 1997, the way in which it has interpreted, debated, and sought to respond the 
context they faced. As such, the research methods debate in political science is not the 
primary concern of this thesis. However, the epistemology an author adopts is 
inevitably reflected in the research that eventuates, so the trend in recent years in favour 
of rendering one's position explicit from the outset is welcome, not least because it 
saves readers from attempting to guess it. This also helps to promotes a healthy 
pluralism amongst political researchers. The nature of social and political life means 
that no theory will ever offer us a complete explanation of the social or the political 
world, rather theories exist as a lens through which we can view the world to help us 
gain a better understanding of it. Consequently in political science 'diversity should be 
combined with dialogue' to the mutual benefit of all aspects of the discipline (Marsh 
and Stoker, 2002: 4). 
This chapter outlines the epistemology that guides this research, and develops the 
variant of the strategic-relational approach (SRA) that will be utilised as its 
methodology. This method is particularly suited to the analysis of the contemporary 
Conservative Party, as it recognises the crucial role played by key political actors at the 
leadership level and the importance of their interpretations of their situation, as well as 
demonstrating how the 'contoured terrain' of the context actors face influences both the 
paths they choose and their success or failure (Hay, 2002: 129). The chapter's first 
section introduces the issue of structure and agency in social and political research, and 
briefly considers the pitfalls of fatalism. The major agential approaches in political 
studies - behaviouralism and rational choice - are introduced, before the strategic-
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relational approach as developed by Bob Jessop (1990 and 1996). and expanded by 
Colin Hay (1995 and 2002), is summarised. Hay's seminal Political Analysis (2002) is 
the clearest exposition of this approach and it is this work which forms the baseline for 
this discussion. 
The chapter then considers the nature of social structures, which are characterised as 
transforming institutions that are both derived from, and crucial in shaping, human 
interaction. The interpretive caveat notes that the version of the strategic-relational 
approach utilised here is classified as an interpretive rather than as a critical realist 
epistemology. I then briefly comment on the important place of ideology in this 
analysis. The relevance and utility of this approach to the research topic is considered 
in greater detail, and its application to the case study of the Conservative Party in 
opposition since 1997 is discussed. Finally, the advantages and limitations of research 
methods employed (primarily interviews and document analysis) are considered. 
2.2 Structure and agency: overcoming the dualism 
Whenever we consider a political or social issue we are faced with the question of the 
extent to which change (or indeed, continuity) resulted from the actions of people 
(agency), or factors seemingly beyond human control (commonly labelled as 
structures). As Gamble notes: 'if social thought becomes 'fatalistic' ... it succumbs to 
the belief that there is very little scope for human agency to change the world' (2000: 
17). On the other hand it seems self-evident that a world without fate: 
... would mean a world in which there were no constraints, everything could be 
imagined, and everything willed. Such a voluntarist view that human beings can 
achieve whatever they desire suggests they have no fate other than the one they 
individually choose. But a more sober appreciation of the human condition recognises 
the inescapable tension between agency and constraint and therefore between politics 
and fate. (Gamble, 2000: 17). 
Although it is not always explicitly recognised, this inescapable tension is at the heart 
of all attempts at political explanation. I In examining x, to what extent did political 
actors bring about change (perhaps with results very different to those that they 
originally envisaged), and to what extent was it the result of 'fate' or 'structures'? 
I Smith (1999) effectively utilises the prism of structure and agency to examine the UK core executive. 
Unfortunately for social and political theorists, 'the agent structure-problem is not 
solved by deciding what proportions [of each] to put in the blender' (Hollis & Smith, 
1991: 393). Whilst 'structuralism' has become something of a term of abuse amongst 
political scientists (Hay, 2002: 102-3, 107), the discipline collectively retains a wealth 
of euphemisms that are employed to try and capture the apparent helplessness of 
political actors that we often observe in the face of a 'sea-change', the 'tide of history', 
'institutional pressures' or 'political forces'. This chapter will demonstrate how these 
forces (which from an individual perspective can seem to push us inexorably towards a 
certain fate), are in fact the direct result not of some invisible causal structures but , 
from the cumulative effect of human actions over time. 
This approach entails the rejection of the idea of a distinct structural realm with causal 
effects at the ontological level, in contrast to the views of critical realist theorists such 
as Archer (1995) and McAnulla (2005). This also distinguishes it from Jessop, for 
whom 'the SRA insists on the ontological distinctiveness of structure and agency' 
(Jessop, 2005: 52)? It should be made clear from the outset that this is not to advocate a 
form of voluntarism. The fact that the constraints on our individual action are the result 
of the aggregated actions of many other members of our society - both past and present 
- does not make them any less serious to us, or indeed potentially any less powerful. 
Moreover, it does not mean that concepts of structure and agency (or, as will be 
developed below, strategic actors and strategically selective contexts) cannot be 
usefully employed at the analytical level. On the contrary, this chapter will show how 
such concepts can be used to help us make sense of the complex political world. 
without hardening this distinction into an ontological dualism with all the philosophical 
problems which that entails. 
The mode of political analysis adopted in this thesis therefore emphasises the vital role 
of individual agents in the formation of political outcomes. Perhaps the key 
contribution of the SRA, certainly for this research, is to alert us to the behaviour of 
strategic actors. As Hay notes, it is the presence of 'conscious and reflective subjects, 
capable of acting differently under the same stimuli,' which 'renders the social sciences 
2 It miaht therefore be argued that the position advanced here is too far removed from that of the SRA's 
origin;) exponent for it to be regarded as 'strategic-relational". However. whilst the philosophical basis 
differs, the analytical mode is, I suggest, sufficiently similar to justify the use of the language of the 
SRA. 
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qualitatively different from the physical sciences' (2002: 50). This is the key difficulty 
that has thwarted the attempts to construct a 'science of the political' which can 
accurately predict social and political conduct or even add significantly to our 
understanding of such behaviour. Similarly, it is the inherently unpredictable nature of 
the agents that are central to processes of political change that has led most political 
scientists to regard purely structuralist explanations of politics that ignore this role as 
inadequate. 
2.3 Agency, rational choice and behaviouralism 
Agency-based approaches have been preponderant in both British and American 
political science since the 1960s, when the behaviouralist movement rose to 
prominence in the United States. Behaviouralism applied the empiricist ideas of logical 
positivism to the study of politics, in probably the most successful attempt to create a 
'science' of politics.3 Studies such as the seminal Who Governs? by Robert Dahl 
(1961) attempted to find general principles of human behaviour through the 
aggregation of statistical data gathered by systematic observation. The intuitive appeal 
of the behaviouralist approach lies in this reliance on directly observable, 'factual' data. 
Behaviouralism has been particularly influential in the field of electoral studies, where 
its proponents have considered the relationship between how people vote and an almost 
infinite number of variables. They have successfully identified many correlations 
between different factors and voting patterns. However, as Hollis notes. 'it is far from 
plain that prediction and explanation are two sides of the only coin' (1994: 65). 
Correlation does not equate to causation, and can at best offer us a partial explanation. 
As Hay notes, 'pure empiricism can establish no basis for adjudicating between 
relations of cause and effect on the one hand and mere coincidence on the other, save 
except for. .. a probabilistic approach, and ... an appeal to arguments about the specific 
temporality of that sequence' (2002: 79). In short, behaviouralism has been incredibly 
helpful in highlighting what it is that political actors are doing, but has had much 
greater difficulty in explaining why they are doing it. 
3 For a discussion of logical positivism see Hollis (1994: 40-65); see also Sanders (2002) for a brief 
overview of the development of behavioural ism. 
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Rational choice theory has suffered from a similar affliction. Its theorists also take the 
individual as their primary unit of analysis, although their approach differs from that of 
the behaviouralists in that it is deductive rather than inductive. Abstract, parsimonious, 
behaviour-predicting models are constructed upon two key assumptions derived from 
neo-classical economics. These are firstly, that people are rational, self-interested utility 
maximisers; and secondly, that they have a clear, hierarchical set of preferences such 
that in any given context there is only one optimal (,rational') course of action open to 
them (Hay, 2002: 8-9). As one proponent of rational choice theory argues. 'it is 
inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that 
political actors are not' (McLean, 1991: 496). 
Anthony Downs (1957) applied these basic assumptions about human nature to voters 
and political parties in one of the most influential works of modem political science. An 
Economic Theory of Democracy. In this text, Downs acknowledges that the rational 
choice model he utilises has only a narrow conception of rationality and human 
behaviour: 
Thus we do not take into consideration the whole personality of each individual when 
we discuss what behaviour is rational for him. We do not allow for the rich diversity of 
ends served by each of his acts, the complexity of his motives, the way in which every 
part of his life is intimately related to his emotional needs. Rather we borrow from 
traditional economic theory the idea of the rational consumer. Corresponding to the 
infamous homo economicus ... our homo politicus is the 'average man' in the electorate, 
the 'rational citizen' of our model of democracy. (Downs, 1957: 7). 
Downs candidly admits that this simplification limits the 'comparability of behaviour in 
it [the model] to behaviour in the real world,' but regards this approach as being 
necessary as without it: 'all analysis of either economics or politics turns into a mere 
adjunct of primary-group sociology' (1957: 8). However. it is upon this a priori 
assumption that people are both rational and self-interested that his theory rests. This 
aspect of Downs's work came under attack soon after its publication. In a critique of 
Downs's work, W. Hayward Rogers (a behaviouralist) claimed that theorems that 
purport to explain political action in the real world must be derived from empirical 
study of political behaviour in that world, and that 'use of the deductive method,' must 
come after such investigation, not before (1959: 485). 
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Replying to this criticism Downs claimed that his model 'is precisely a device for the 
creation of conclusions that can be tested in the real world' (1959: 1096), defending his 
position that: 'theoretical models should be tested primarily for the accuracy of their 
predictions rather than for the reality of their assumptions' (1957: 21). Downs clearly 
recognises that for his model to have predictive power, a high degree of simplification 
and abstraction from reality is necessary. As Hay notes, although this is a refreshingly 
sanguine attitude to take, 'what confidence can we have in a theory based on premises 
whose implausibility is freely acknowledged by its most prominent exponents?' (2002: 
34). It would appear that like behaviouralism, rational choice theory falls foul of the 
danger highlighted by Hollis of confusing prediction (however accurate) with 
explanation. 
2.4 The structure-agency interplay: the strategic-relational approach 
Experience tells us that no individual agent is ever totally free of all constraints, and 
our actions, although not determined by structural factors, are often influenced by the 
'structures' of the context in which we find ourselves. Sometimes this context will 
enable us to take a certain course of action, whilst on other occasions it will inhibit, or 
even totally prevent, a course of action. This is hardly a novel observation. In one of his 
most oft-quoted passages, Marx noted that: 'Men make their own history, but not of 
their own free will; not under circumstances that they themselves have chosen' (Marx, 
1852; quoted in Hay, 2002: 117). The strategic-relational approach outlined here aims 
to develop this truism into a more sophisticated analysis. 
For this analysis to be effective, it is important to clarify what we mean by 'structure'. 
The sense of powerlessness in the face of invisible constraints that Donoughue 
describes in the opening quotation will have been felt by all political actors at some 
time. The classic example of this is the perception that voting fails to make a 
difference. This is the justification many non-voters give when asked why they do not 
take part in elections. In a sense, they are correct: as a collective endeavour. politics is 
not (usually) susceptible to the preference expressed by a single voter. However. this 
feeling of powerlessness, whilst real for the individual, is a consequence of the vantage-
point of the individual rather than a result of the existence of autonomous forces 
restraining (or, conversely enabling) them. As such, 'the problem is a perspectival one' 
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(Hay, 2002: 125). Unlike in the physical world, where we are ultimately constrained by 
the laws of gravity and the vagaries of nature (which again may on occasion assist us in 
our ambitions rather than work to thwart them), there are no pre-existent, autonomous 
or causal structures in the social world. As will be discussed in greater detail below. 
social 'structures' exist only as a result of the action of a multitude of individual agents 
both past and present: as such they only exist in relation to (rather than independently 
from) human agency. The distinction between structure and agency is analytical not 
ontological, so 'the two must be present simultaneously in any given situation' (Hay, 
2002: 127). 
The strategic-relational approach attempts to highlight the dialectical nature of the 
interplay between structure and agency by concentrating on the interaction between the 
two in the 'real world' rather than in the realm of abstract theory that the two terms 
imply. To assist in this objective Jessop introduces the concepts of strategic action, 
which is that taken by conscious, reflective strategic actors, and the strategically 
selective context in which it is formulated and takes place (Jessop, 1996: 119-28; Hay, 
2002: 126-134). Jessop reaches this pairing by first taking the dualism of structure and 
agency and, in a two-stage process, bringing each into the other. As Hay illustrates, this 
is best demonstrated diagrammatically (Figure 2.1). The first move brings agency into 
structure (producing a structured context), and structure into agency (producing a 
contextualised actor), thus moving closer towards a pairing more grounded in actual 
political contexts, rather than the realm of abstract theorising. The second move then 
brings the contextualised actor into the structured context (producing a strategically 
selective context) and the structured context into the strategic actor (producing the 
strategic actor). In this new conceptual pairing 'the dualism of structure and agency has 
been dissolved' (Hay, 2002: 128). 
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Figure 2.1: From dualism to duality: the strategic-relational approach 
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This conceptual duality of the strategic actor and the strategically selective context has 
several advantages. Most obviously, it provides a terminology that more clearly 
describes the intertwined nature of structure and agency. Although these concepts can 
be separated for analytical purposes, the new terms remove the temptation to harden 
this distinction into an ontological one, and to attribute an independent causal role to 
abstract, apparently hidden structures that do not, in fact, have any existence 
independent from human agency. Even if such invisible structures did exist, it would be 
most presumptuous of us to claim that we had discovered the vantage point necessary 
to view them that had eluded political practitioners and observers for centuries. Indeed, 
if we were able to make such a discovery it would collapse in on itself, as politicians 
would be able to internalise this new structural information and nullify its causal effects 
by building it into their strategic calculations. The only way such an ontological 
distinction can be coherently maintained is if it retains a residual structuralism - to the 
effect that such structures can never be observed or (fully) understood by people; are 
ever present; and retain an independent causal role throughout the whole of human 
history. Unfortunately, such a position logically implies that independent social 
structures could both pre-exist society and exist without human society itself, which is 
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philosophically untenable if one accepts that society is a purely human, not an abstract, 
construct. As King rather more eloquently states: 
[In] contemporary social theory ... human social relations have been effaced by a 
dualistic picture in which structure confronts the individual. The infinite richnes; of 
shared human life is reduced to a mechanical model; structure imposes upon the agent, 
the agent reproduces the structure. Yet society is nothing but human social relations. 
Society consists precisely of the complex web of social relations between people. These 
social relations are the social reality. (King, 2004: 13). 
The concept of the strategic actor also more closely depicts the conscious and reflective 
nature of human agents that was our starting point in differentiating the human, social 
world from the natural world. Unlike the narrow conception of human agency 
employed by more 'scientific' approaches to political studies such as rational choice. it 
deliberately denies that in any given situation the actions of a particular actor can be 
predicted according to a set of rules or principles that supposedly govern human 
behaviour, for example the self-interest maxim. As such. actors have the power to make 
choices, and their choices do shape political outcomes. Of course, in certain situations a 
particular actor may have very few options open to them, or feasibly only one 
apparently plausible course of action before them. Such constraints are not the result of 
some external meta-structural 'forces' somehow acting upon society from outside, 
rather they are the direct consequence of the actions, beliefs and interpretations of 
others members of that society both past and present. 
This is not a particularly bold or radical claim, but it is certainly one that needs 
reasserting. Although political studies have seen a welcome revival of interpretive 
approaches in recent years, much of the discipline has been dominated by a residual 
structuralism.4 Sociology has also come to be dominated by a dualistic ontology: 'the 
dynamic power of social intercourse has been reduced to a deadening dualism' (King, 
2004: 5). This has been most prominent in the field of critical theory, which currently 
dominates social theory and is showing signs of crossing over into political analysis. 5 
McAnulla summarises the ontology of critical theory as being constituted of three 
overlapping 'realms': 
.l Recent 'interpretive' works include: Bevir (1999; 2005); Bevir and Rhodes (1998, 2003); Rhodes 
(1997). ., . 
'i Greener (2005) is just one example of recent attempts to import Archer's 'morphogenetic SOCial theory 
(Archer, 1995) into political studies. 
• 
• 
• 
The empirical realm, which consists of experienced events; 
The actual realm, consisting of events and experiences (not all events are 
experienced); 
The real, which consists of mechanisms which may be unobservable. 
(McAnulla, 2005: 31). 
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McAnulla correctly identifies that it is the realm of the 'real' which distinguishes 
critical realism from other philosophies of social science, including both positivist 
empiricism and what he labels 'interpretivist/post-modernist perspectives' (2005: 32). 
Empiricism restricts itself to that which can be directly observed via our senses, so does 
not allow room for a realm of unobservable 'real' structures. Interpretive approaches 
focus 'on the meanings that shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they 
do so' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002: 131). Contrary to McAnulla's (2005) reading, some 
versions of interpretive theory do acknowledge that 'there is a real world out there' but 
deny that we have 'unmediated access to it' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002: 149). However, 
interpretive theory does deny that there is a structural realm somewhere beyond human 
society. It is curious that McAnulla chooses to label this the realm of 'the real', when in 
his conception it is ontologically distinct from real society itself. As the next subsection 
will attempt to demonstrate, it is the institutions of human society that structure our 
lives, not the structures of a 'realm of the real' somewhere beyond this. 
2.4.1 Institutions as structures: the strategically selective context 
Institutions include any form of constraint that people devise to shape their interaction 
with each other. They can be either formal, such as written laws and constitutions; or 
informal, such as social norms and conventions. They can be either created anew, or 
simply evolve over time. As North states: 'Institutional constraints include both what 
individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some 
individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. As defined here they therefore 
are the framework within which human interaction takes place' (1990: 4). 
In short, institutions playa crucial role in shaping the context in which all individuals. 
groups, and organisations operate. They can constrain or prevent action. provide 
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opportunities, or favour certain courses of action over others. The British electoral 
system, for example, tends to enhance the chances of election of prospective MPs 
standing for one of the two largest parties. Neither the formal institutions (such as the 
first-past-the-post electoral system), nor the informal institutions (such as the tendency 
amongst voters to back one of the two potential governing parties), prevent individuals 
from being elected MPs either as independent candidates or for one of the smaller 
parties; but they do reduce their chances. Consequently we can say that the context 
facing individuals wishing to enter parliament is strategically selective in favour of 
those choosing to stand for either the Conservative or Labour parties. Similarly this 
context will inform the strategic calculation that such individuals make when 
considering whether to stand for election at all, and if so, for which party. 
North differentiates between institutions and organisations. Organisations are groups of 
individuals 'bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives', and include political 
parties, firms, trade unions, and political bodies such as the House of Commons (North, 
1990: 5). The Conservative Party is an organisation: the people that comprise it share 
the common aim of gaining political office in order to implement conservative policies 
(whatever they may be at the time), but it also acts as an institution for those within it. 
The formal rules of the party govern, for example, how the leader is selected; and its 
many informal rules, norms and traditions can both enable and constrain actors within 
the party. The most vivid illustration of this in recent times has been the difficulty faced 
by successive Conservative Party leaders in balancing the competing ideological 
demands of MPs and the wider party membership with electoral considerations, 
particularly over the issue of Europe. 
The SRA characterises the way in which our situation at a certain point in time can 
appear to favour (or enable) a particular course of action with the concept of the 
strategically selective context. This states relatively simply that our environment will 
facilitate certain strategies over others. 'The context itself presents an unevenly 
contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for 
certain outcomes while militating against others' (Hay, 2002: 129). Yet it also captures 
the dialectical nature of the relationship with agency: the context is never fixed, but is 
constantly being transformed through the actions, interpretations and beliefs of the 
actors from which it is forged. Over time however. the strategic selectivity of the 
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contoured context will 'throw up a series of systematically structured outcomes' (Hay. 
2002: 130). The result of this will be that whilst any single strategic intervention is 
unpredictable, over a longer period regularities may be detectable: that is the context 
could be said to have certain regular characteristics. These are the institutions that 
emerge from human social and political interaction, and that come to structure our 
environment. For analytical purposes then at least we are able to refer to 'structures', 
by which we mean institutions, that have emerged from and influence human 
interaction, quite different from the abstract unobservable structures in McAnulla's 
realm of the real. 
2.4.2 Strategic action: making rational choices? 
What exactly do we mean when we refer to strategic action? The concept is based upon 
the notion of reflective individuals capable of some form of interpretation of the world 
around them and the identification of their own goals (which they will devise a strategy 
to pursue). Hay states that the notion of strategic action (and indeed the whole strategic-
relational approach) is premised on the assumption that 'all action contains at least a 
residual strategic moment' (2002: 132). He suggests that two strands of strategic action 
can be identified: the intuitive and the explicit, which in practice are combined in most 
actions (2002: 131-4). 
Intuitive actions are those which are not generally rendered explicit, but which can still 
be regarded as strategic 'insofar as such practices are orientated towards the context in 
which they occur' (Hay, 2002: 132). Explicit strategic action occurs when actors 
consciously analyse and interrogate their strategy for achieving their objective in 
relation to the context they face, for example a politician attempting to gain office. This 
is similar to the concept employed by rational choice theory in the sense that actors 
have a preference set - they know what they would like to achieve - although it differs 
in that it does not assume that this preference is necessarily informed by pure self-
interest: it could, for example, be ideologically motivated. Hay is thus arguing that' all 
actions contain at least a residual strategic moment though this need not be rendered 
conscious' (2002: 132). 
This is problemati . th t 'f h' . . . c In a 1 t e strategIc element of the decIsIOn makmg process 
Occurs subcon' I" d'ffi '. . SCIOUS Y It IS 1 ICUlt for us to know about It, analyse It. or mterpret it _ 
indeed the subject themselves may not be aware of it, or may have a completely 
different interpretation of it. Therefore: 
[T]o make sense, beliefs, desires, and actions must in general be rationally connected. 
~n other. words, with?ut presupposition that agents are rational the enterprise of 
mterp~etmg t.he m~anmg ~f. their activity - and thus the point of describing their 
behaVIour as mtentlOnal actIVIty - would be undermined. (Fay, 1996: 110). 
Hollis agrees that for the most part people act rationally and that the social sciences 
depend on this belief. However, people's reasons for action are so various that Hollis 
doubts 'whether there can be any single account of practical reason for all species of 
rational action or single definition of rationality for all purposes of social science' 
(1996: 1). To avoid the difficulty associated with attempting to make sense of irrational 
acts this research assumes that all political action is rationally informed in the broadest 
sense of the term. In short, I assume that actors are strategic. 
However, this research rejects the overly simplistic notion that actors are motivated 
purely by narrow self-interest, and instead consider them to have a range of complex, 
competing, and often contradictory beliefs and desires which they try to reconcile in 
each 'strategic moment'. Their self-interest, therefore, can be interpreted as the pursuit 
of all the things that they regard as important, so may include a multitude of ideological 
preferences, as well as the desire to have a ministerial car or not to go out in the rain to 
vote. Political ideas will be analysed empirically in subsequent chapters by reference to 
the writings and public statements of the actors under analysis, and through semi-
structured elite interviews. Of course this inherently complex picture means that actors 
may be unsure of which strategies they should pursue, or indeed which of their 
competing objectives to accord priority. Our lack of unmediated access to the world 
around us exacerbates this problem, as beliefs, prejudices and ideologies inevitably 
colour our interpretation of the context and influence the strategic choices actors make. 
This complex picture is in contrast to the parsimonious models of rational choice, but 
more accurately reflects social and political reality. Rather than build abstract 
predictive models this research will attempt illuminate more clearly part of the political 
world in which we live. 
2.5 An interpretive caveat 
The strategic-relational approach uses the language of strategic action, as performed by 
strategic actors within a strategically selective context. These concepts are much more 
useful than those of structure and agency as the term 'structure' implies something that 
is pre-existent, independent and causal; whilst' agency' risks being misinterpreted in an 
overly intentionalist manner which fails to take account sufficiently of the contoured 
context faced by actors in the real world. As such, the duality of structure and agency 
has been dissolved, 'from our vantage point they do not exist as themselves but through 
their relational interaction' (Hay, 2002: 127, emphasis added). In other words, as Hay 
has reiterated elsewhere, our attention is focused on this interactional process, not on 
either 'structures or agents as real (and as potentially generative of specific outcomes),. 
Therefore, whilst denying 'the existence of underlying [social] structures which may be 
unobservable' Hay does not deny 'the existence of underlying mechanisms (structure-
agency complexes) which may be unobservable yet causally effective' (Hay, 2005: 43. 
original emphasis). Furthermore, he does 'not deny the analytical utility of appealing to 
such structures as if they were real' (2005: 44, original emphasis). The justification for 
using the strategic-relational approach in this thesis is, therefore, primarily analytical. It 
is not an attempt to assert the superiority of a particular set of ontological assumptions. 
Where the terms 'structure' and 'agency' are used, they are an analytical device only. 
The SRA offers the prospect of an analytical mode sensitive to the complexities of the 
social world and to the contingent nature of individual human action, hence its great 
value for the research undertaken in this thesis. 
However, perhaps the foremost lesson to be drawn from the (often vigorous) debate 
about these issues is that in matters ontological, clarity is everything.6 It is worth 
therefore making my own ontological position clear. and by way of doing so make a 
brief comment on that of Hay (2002). As already intimated, by denying the existence of 
autonomous social structures (a 'realm of the real' as McAnulla would have it) my 0\\\1 
epistemology is interpretivist. This is the logical position that Hay does not quite seem 
to arrive at, perhaps because of the critical realist heritage from which the SRA 
6 See for example the debate between Bates and Jenkins (2007a; 2007b). Furlong and Marsh (2007), and 
Hay (2007b). 
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emerged. Hay criticises Archer's morphogenetic theory on the grounds that its 
insistence that t t t t 11 . . s ruc ure mus empora y pre-exIst actIOn leads to an ontoloaical c 
dualism that' l' , 'd 1 . Imp Ies a resl ua structuralIsm punctuated only periodically yet 
infrequently by a largely unexplicated conception of agency' (Hay, 2002: 126). As 
King argues in his eloquent critique of Archer, the 'structures' that appear to surround 
us all are formed by other individuals, collectively. Indeed Hay quotes King on 
precisely this point: 
The key error which Archer makes in her derivation of social structure is to draw the 
s?ciol~gic.al. conclu~ion of the existence of social structure from the perspective of a 
smgle mdividual ... If she had decentred her perspective to see that the constraint which 
I face is other individuals - and no less serious for that - just as I form some of the 
social conditions which mutually constrain others, she would not have fallen into 
ontological dualism. (King, 1999: 217, quoted in Hay, 2002: 125). 
However, Hay then departs from King's stance. It is worth quoting Hay's position at 
length: 
While the structured nature of social and political reality is indeed the product of human 
agency, it is not simply reducible to it (as King here seems to imply). The relationship 
between actors and their environment is an organic one. As such the product of human 
action is, in key respects, greater than the sum of its component parts. It is this that 
gives structures what Archer terms 'emergent properties'. 
(Hay, 2002: 125). 
However, as King demonstrates, if one accepts that the 'structured nature' of the social 
and political world is the result of human agency, it is not possible to give those 
structures 'emergent properties' that are not ultimately derived from human agency. To 
attribute them with any properties beyond this risks going beyond the solely analytical 
distinction that Hay wishes to utilise, and back towards the ontological duality that he 
wishes to avoid. By appealing to structural emergent properties' greater than the sum of 
their component parts' Hay is shying away from the interpretive ontology that follows 
logically from his position, perhaps as a result of a desire to avoid an anti-
foundationalist standpoint. 
In practical terms however, this does not have a profound effect on the use of the 
strategic-relational methodology for political research. For as King notes. the 
interpretive position is not incompatible (as Hay perhaps fears) with the use of the 
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analytical concept of structure, nor does it necessarily lead to a purely intentionalist 
account. 
This re?uction of society to individuals - to other people - in no way gi\es individuals f~ee ~e~gn to do what they will. It does not in any way imply an individualistic 
hbertIlllsm. The interpretive tradition fully recognises the constraint which society 
places .up~n the in?ividual but the interpretive tradition does not hypostatise thi's 
constramt mto certam structural properties but insists that social constraint stems from 
the. relatio~shi.p~ between individuals which necessarily limits the kinds of practices 
WhICh any mdIvldual can perform. '" practically, a heuristic concept of structure can be 
usefully maintained. (King, 1999: 223). 
This conception of 'structures' as a result of relational interaction by people over time 
would seem to be entirely compatible with Hay's claim that structure and agency 'are 
in practice completely interwoven' and that beyond a purely analytical distinction we 
cannot effectively separate one from the other (1995: 200). Perhaps a final clarification 
is needed here. This interpretive conception of structure is categorically not saying that 
any social constraint is purely the result of other members of society currently living in 
that society. Rather it acknowledges that all individuals are born into a society with pre-
existing norms and traditions, and that as such many constraints or social structures are 
inherited, and so from the perspective of one individual could be regarded as pre-
existent. However, the interpretive conception of structure is arguing that these social 
constraints are the result of 'meaningfully produced social relations between (now 
dead) individuals which have an impact on the present through the actions and 
interpretations of living individuals' (King, 1999: 204). So contrary to Hay, society is 
reducible to human agency, in the sense that society was formed (and is sustained) by 
human beings interacting with each other and their natural environment, but is not 
reducible simply to the human agency present at anyone particular moment. To argue 
otherwise is to risk contradicting the self-evident truth that without people there would 
be no society, by attributing to it some properties that are somehow separate or 
'emergent' from the people that constitute it (and constituted in the past).7 As social 
relations have been built-up over a great length of time and many generations, \\e can 
now effectively identify (for analytical purposes) 'emergent properties' such as the 
institutions discussed above, without ascribing them an ontologically separate 'realm'. 
7 This debate comes down to what can and cannot be labelled critical realism, and McAnulla's definition 
utilised here is contestable. As Hay has more recently commented, it is no longer a moniker he aspires to 
(2005: 42). 
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2.6 The ideational dimension 
In his review of th' . . . e vanous positlons III the structure-agency debate McAnulla argues 
that 'the role of the ideational in social and political life remains under examined' 
(2002: 291). Ideas can both inform strategic action and form part of the strategically 
selective context in which it takes place. However, how such "ideological factors' 
should be analysed is a contentious subject: the relative importance or otherwise of 
ideas in politics has been the subject of perennial debate. and remains highly contested 
(Hay, 2002: 205, McAnulla, 2002: 285). Ideologies and their effects are difficult to 
measure, which has made some political analysts reluctant to accord them any causal 
role in the formation of political outcomes. The Downsian modeL for example, explains 
the presence of ideologies as the result of their development by political parties as 
'weapons in the struggle for office' (Downs, 1957: 96). This view of ideologies simply 
as tools used by politicians in their efforts to gain more votes does not allow for the 
possibility of them influencing the actions of the politicians themselves. Traditional 
Marxist political analysis has often been characterised by a similar inflexibility. For 
Marxists, it is materialism - or our economic condition - that defines our social and 
political existence. They accordingly tend to have a pejorative understanding of 
ideology as a product of material conditions and the class system, opposed to true 
consciousness (Freeden, 1996: 14-5).8 
Hay and Jessop have attempted to resolve the position of ideas in political analysis by 
deploying the notion of discursive selectivity, alongside the concept of strategic 
selectivity (Hay, 2002: 209-215). Actors fashion their strategy in a "contoured' or 
strategically selective context, which favours some strategies over others: that is, some 
strategies will be easier to pursue in that context than others. Unfortunately actors never 
have unmediated access to the 'real world', but view it through the fog of their own 
interpretation and understanding of it. Such 'world views' are inevitably heavily 
influenced by our personal prejudices, experiences and ideologies. It is thus between 
the strategically selective context and our cognition of it that discursive selectivity 
comes into play. This is not a one-way relationship. The context imposes a discursive 
8 It is worth noting that more contemporary Marxist political analysis is much more varied in its view of 
ideology; for example Gramscians have stressed the concept of hegemony, and tend to have a more 
positive view of ideology (see Vincent, 2004: 65-1'2; Gamble, 1994a: 174-206). 
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selectivity that favours some ideas and narratives over others, which in-turn affects the 
strategic calculation and action of actors, and consequently impacts upon the "real' 
context (Hay, 2002: 212-4). 
The role of the ideational dimension in politics remains under-theorised. McAnulla 
(2002: 284) has criticised the work of Hay and Jessop for not making explicitly clear 
the relative status of structure, agency and discourse in their analysis, but this criticism 
may rather miss the point. Precisely because these are purely analytical distinctions 
these concepts do not need to be ranked in order of precedence: rather they should be 
identified and considered in specific contextualised situations. As such, this research 
will consider ideology as a mechanism that both influences the context and how it is 
understood by actors, and is influenced by the context and strategic actors. 
2.7 Operationalising the strategic-relational approach 
Academic study of the British Conservative Party has traditionally been dominated by 
an agency-centred historical approach, emphasising pragmatic elite leadership. The task 
of explaining Thatcherism brought about a phase of more theoretically-aware critical 
analysis, which has waned somewhat with the party's electoral fortunes. As Chapter 1 
discussed, together this literature is a rich and indispensible resource. Bulpitt's 
statecraft thesis in particular pointed the way forward to an analytical mode which 
recognises the centrality of leaders to an understanding of Conservative Party politics, 
whilst also being sensitive to the structured context within which they must operate. 
However, statecraft is limited by its treatment of ideology and its focus on governing in 
the Thatcher era. This section outlines how the SRA may help us understand 
Conservative politics since 1997. 
As explored above, the key contribution of the strategic-relational approach is to do 
away with the structure-agency dichotomy, and to shift our analysis instead into the 
field of strategy - that is, behaviour orientated towards context. It directs us to see the 
Conservative Party both as a strategic actor, and as institution, constraining and 
enabling actors within it. For example the party provides the leader with 
institutionalised resources, such as a public platform. supporters and a campaigning 
organisation, but also acts as a constraint, as a leader must retain the confidence of their 
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parliamentary colleagues and (to a lesser extent) party members. The SRA is, in a 
sense, a heuristic device for exploring how the Conservative Party uses strategy in 
pursuit of its goals, and how that strategy affects, and is effected by, the strategic 
context. By placing strategic leadership at the centre of our analysis, the SRA is well 
suited to this research, which focuses on the strategy of the Conservative Party as an 
organisation with the objective of gaining and holding political office, and on the role 
of leaders within it in directing party strategy. 
The SRA thus directs the focus of our analysis into a number of different arenas, 
towards which leadership strategy is orientated. Most notably these are the 
parliamentary party, the wider party (membership), the electorate, and ideology. An 
appreciation of this multi-layered context is needed to understand Conservative Party 
strategy in the 1997-2005 period. Strategic decisions which may appear 'irrational' if 
measured against only a restricted contextual variable, for example the pursuit of the 
median voter position, can be better understood when placed in this wider framework. 
Rather than trying to ascribe particular causal weighting to various factors, however, 
the SRA concentrates on the process of formulating, implementing and understanding 
strategy. Thus, later in the thesis the focus is on noteworthy dilemmas for the 
leadership, and traces strategy regarding these over time. In short, we should not see 
'strategic success' as agential victory over structure, or strategic failure as agents being 
'defeated' by structures. Apparent failure in one area might indicate the higher priority 
ascribed to other dimensions: for example at certain times, party unity may take 
precedence over developing an inclusive electoral appeal. 
This is not to claim that previous work on the Conservative Party has ignored either the 
role of strategic actors or of the strategically selective context. As previously discussed, 
much of the literature closely examines the actions of leading figures in the party, and 
by doing so provides a detailed history. The research presented here is not drastically 
removed from this elite-historian tradition, but by being theoretically reflective aims to 
build upon it. For example where agency-focused accounts do consider 'structure', it 
tends to be when it restricts what actors can do or inhibits their strategic objectives. 
What the SRA aims to do, however, by focusing on the structure-agency relationship, is 
to highlight how structure not only curtails action, but enables, shapes, and is 
transformed by it. By considering this over a significant length of time, we also reveal 
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the importance of path-dependency as the context is altered over time. Thus, we can see 
how the handling of an issue by one party leader shapes how it is dealt with by their 
successors. The SRA thus helps us to anticipate how strategy might be shaped by 
context, assisting our effort to explain why something happened as it did, as well as 
how it happened. 
The analytical work on Thatcherism, much of it derived from a Marxist tradition, 
highlighted the structured nature of Conservative hegemony. However, by stressing the 
institutionalised sources of electoral dominance, it risked presenting a somewhat static 
view of history insufficiently sensitive to historical contingency. For example, Gamble 
very usefully identifies the pillars of Conservative hegemony as 'state, union, property, 
and empire' (1995: 8), and the decline of each of these played a part in the 
Conservative Party's fall in the mid-1990s. However, explaining events since 1997 
needs to go beyond this: whilst further electoral failure in 2001 and 2005 might be 
accounted for by the continuing absence of these pillars, apparent revival under David 
Cameron cannot.9 The context is changing and responsive, so even where it might 
appear inauspicious it is not fixed but is susceptible to strategic action. Outcomes are 
not predetermined, so even in difficult circumstances a range of strategic options 
present themselves. Again, this highlights the benefit of considering a lengthy spell of 
opposition. Faced with an unfavourable context in 1997, should the Conservatives have 
acted differently, for example by pursuing a more consistent effort to change party 
image over a two-term strategy, even if this risked (further) short-term unpopularity? 
As the previous section explored, the SRA also turns our attention to ideology. That 
ideology has performed an important role in Conservative Party politics over the past 
thirty years is a widely recognised fact, most clearly illustrated by divisions over 
European integration. Ideology has played a significant part in determining the 
outcome of leadership elections (Heppell, 2008), but also in shaping party strategy 
beyond this. Disagreement over strategy not only betrays ideological disparities in 
terms of the direction in which different actors would like to see the party move, but 
also ideologically-informed variation in terms of how the context (and competing 
strategic choices) are understood. This is illustrated by the surprisingly widespread 
9 See Hay and Wincott (1998) for an analysis of the 'latent structuralism' (p. 952) of historical 
institutionalism. 
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VIew amongst Conservative politicians that a huge swathe of the electorate (often 
referred to as the 'forgotten' or 'silent' majority) would flock back to the party if only it 
were more vigorously right-wing. lO 
Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning what Hay has recently referred to as 'the 
significant, and often neglected, performative/spectacular dimension of political action, 
especially in public settings (Hay, 2008: 6). Here, the terminology of the SRA is 
particularly apt, as politicians are indeed actors on a public stage, even if their view of 
the audience (the electorate) is somewhat blurred or even erroneous. Politicians assume 
a variety of positions on the stage in an effort to address different parts of the audience, 
although they can never be absolutely sure that there messages will be transmitted in 
the way they would like. The performative dimension is a vital part of politics, a fact 
better appreciated by politicians than academic analysts. The period under examination 
here is case in point: William Hague used his superlative performances at Prime 
Minister's Questions to rally his backbenchers and secure his position as leader at a 
time when they had little else to cheer about. lain Duncan Smith, by contrast, was 
armed with arguably a much better strategy for Conservative electoral revival, but as a 
relatively weak Commons and media performer was unable to convince his own 
colleagues, let alone the public, of the merit of his approach. In short, a good strategy, 
well-suited for the strategically selective context is not enough: it needs to be executed 
effecti vel y. 
2.8 Methodology 
The final section of this chapter discusses the research methods used in this thesis, 
considers their advantages and limitations, and briefly outlines how these relate to the 
SRA. 
This research utilises two major qualitative methods: document analysis and interviews. 
In places, it also uses descriptive statistics (such as opinion poll data) to corroborate the 
research and illustrate key points, primarily relating to voting and party support. 
Qualitative methods form the bulk of the research, as they are highly appropriate for 
10 Just such a view was expressed by Lord Tebbit (Tebbit Interview). 
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both the pnmary concern of this thesis - namely how strategic actors in the 
Conservative Party elite leadership perceived and sought to respond to the party's 
electoral failure - and for the theoretical approach utilised. Document analysis and 
interviews also complement each other well - each can be used to support the other and 
to seek confirmation of findings. In other words, the research can be triangulated. 
A wide range of documentary sources are available for analysis. These can be classified 
into three main groups: primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. In this categorisation, 
primary sources are 'evidence that was actually part of or produced by the event in 
question'; secondary sources are made up of 'other evidence relating to and produced 
soon after the event'; and tertiary sources consist of 'material written afterwards to 
reconstruct the event' (Burnham et aI., 2004: 165). In this research, primary sources 
include the transcripts of politicians' speeches, and party documents such as manifestos 
and other campaign literature. Secondary sources include newspaper articles and 
reports (and those from other media outlets such as BBC News online), and 
commentary and reports in other journalistic periodicals. Tertiary sources encompass a 
wealth of scholarly work, namely academic books, academic journal articles and 
unpublished PhD theses. Tertiary sources also include books such as diaries, memoirs, 
biographies and autobiographies by key political actors or other commentators (often 
journalists). As such, we can distinguish between academic and non-academic tertiary 
sources. I I 
Speeches and party literature are used throughout this thesis. They are particularly 
useful as they are the public, authoritative statements that politicians have chosen to 
make. Although politicians cannot control the reaction they receive or the media 
attention they are given, they alone have the ultimate say over the content of their 
speeches. Speeches thus remain a vital means by which politicians attempt to 
communicate with the public, and can be analysed to discover what messages and 
images they wish to project. Election manifestos and other publicly available party 
documents, and speeches by the party leader and other sanctioned spokespeople (for 
example members of the shadow cabinet), also represent the official party position at 
II Although, reflecting the nature of Conservative historiography discussed in Chapter 1, this distinction 
is sometimes blurred .. For example Alan C1a~k combined his role as a politician with that of ~istori~, 
producing a notable history of the Conservative Party (Clark, 1998). As a general rule, I classify ~~ 
produced by politicians as non-academic (for example Willetts, 1994; 1998a; 2002). ~ 0'1/~ 
19~ ~~ 01.t).. ~..s>}?() 
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the time they are given. Consequently they can be used to track how policies evol\'e 
over time. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, compared side-by-side the 1997 and 
2001 general election manifestos illustrate how far the Conservative position on 
devolution had shifted. Sometimes speeches also reveal internal party debates, 
disagreements, and changes of direction and strategy. In this research a key example of 
this was the R. A. Butler memorial lecture given in 1999 by the then deputy leader. 
Peter Lilley. As Chapter 4 notes, this speech was initially approved by William Hague. 
but the reaction to it contributed to a change in party strategy. A final advantage of 
primary sources such as speeches is that they are accessible, with transcripts available 
on the web sites of newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, as well 
as on the Conservative Party's own site. 
Secondary sources such as newspaper articles were also beneficial for this research. 
Most obviously, they can be used to trace the way in which particular events unfolded. 
For example, where interviewees were unable to accurately recall the chronology of 
events, these were crosschecked against newspaper reports. This is one advantage of a 
research topic which receives a lot of media coverage. Secondary sources also provide 
a record of how political strategies were interpreted and presented at the time. and 
whether they were viewed as effective. This is important as most voters do not meet 
politicians, listen to their speeches or read manifestos, but form their impression of 
politicians and political parties via media sources. 
As noted above, this research draws extensively on tertiary sources. The academic 
literature provides a valuable range of materials to draw upon. The theoretical 
perspective taken in this research recognises that we do not have unmediated access to 
'the facts', but that the real world is observed and understood through numerous 
competing interpretations. The academic literature (including this thesis) can be viewed 
in this way. It is not possible to generate a perfect explanation of any social 
phenomenon, all interpretations are necessarily partial and value-laden to some degree. 
However, this recognition does not mean they are worthless (far from it), and would 
only be a fundamental problem were we to assert the absolute truth of one claim or 
interpretative view over all others. Instead, we can attempt to build a convincing 
interpretation by using a variety of sources to crosscheck and triangulate data, by being 
aware that no interpretation is entirely objective (and that some are heavily value-
-B 
laden)~ and by avoiding over-generalisations from the data we have. It is not possible. 
for example, to make generalisations about Conservative parties across the world from 
the research conducted here. 
Semi-structured elite interviews with Conservative politicians were also conducted as 
part of this research. A list of interviewees can be found at the start of this dissertation 
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and short interviewee biographies can be found in the appendix. Elite interviewing is a 
key research technique for political researchers interested in decision-making 
processes, and can be one of the most effective means of garnering information about 
such processes (Burnham et al., 2004: 205). Elite interviewing involves questioning 
people who may offer a unique perspective on the research subject. In contrast to 
survey interviewing, it is not standardised across the interviewees: rather, a semi-
structured format is used to ensure that key issues are covered, whilst also allowing the 
'world view~ of the interviewee to emerge. Accordingly, this technique is particularly 
suited to this research, which is concerned with how key actors understood their 
political environment~ and sought to formulate strategies in response to it. Elite 
interviews provide the researcher with a unique opportunity to understand 'the 
theoretical position of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and ideologies' 
(Richards, 1996: 199). 
Another advantage of interviews, especially for a researcher concerned with relatively 
recent events, is that they can provide up-to-date information where documentary 
evidence may be lacking (Seldon, 1996: 358). For example~ most of the interviewees in 
this project are still active politicians, so have not yet laid down their 'version of 
events ~ in a memoir or published diaries. Also, whilst the typical political memoir 
might cover events going back several decades, the interviews in this project took place 
within a relatively recent time-span relative to the events under investigation, reducing 
(although by no means eliminating) the risk of interviewees colouring their accounts in 
the light of history. 
The value-laded nature of the data generated by elite interviews is one of their 
limitations. Two accounts of the same event may differ substantially. We cannot be 
certain that the line of causality implied by a particular interview is an accurate 
representation of what actually occurred, even if the interviewee sincerely believes it to 
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be the case. For this reason it is important that interviews are not the only source of 
data, but are used to support and develop findings from other techniques such as 
document analysis. However, the fact that each interviewee has their unique version of 
events is of value to this research, as it aims to explore these different perspectives, and 
how they came to influence party strategy. By exploring these different narratives \ve 
can gain a better understanding of the mindset of key actors than through document 
analysis alone. 
Other key issues involved in elite interviewing are access and selection. During this 
research, nineteen interviews were conducted, all with leading Conservative politicians. 
A further seventeen potential interviewees were approached, but declined to be 
interviewed. 12 As this research is concerned with leadership strategy, the most 
significant interview targets were the three Conservative leaders themselves: William 
Hague, lain Duncan Smith, and Michael Howard. Interviews were secured with 
Duncan Smith and Howard. However, despite several approaches, Hague declined to 
be interviewed. This demonstrates one of the difficulties of research into leading 
national figures, who undoubtedly receive many requests for their time. It also 
illustrates the importance of not relying solely on interviews for research data. 
The lack of an interview with Hague was compensated for in several ways. Firstly, as 
the Hague leadership covers the earlier half of this case-study (1997-2001), more 
secondary and tertiary documentary sources are available than for the latter half (2001-
5). In short, analysts have had longer to study this period, providing more material for 
this thesis to draw upon. Notably a biography of Hague covering most of his period as 
leader had been published (Nadler, 2000), and Walters' (2001) study of the 
Conservative Party during the 1997 parliament drew on extensive insider access. 
Further to this, in early 2008 BBC4 screened a documentary by Michael Portillo on the 
state of the Conservative Party between 1979 and 2007. This included interviews with a 
number of leading figures who had declined to be interviewed for this project, 
12 Most interview targets responded relatively promptly to an initial approach by letter. Where no 
response was received within two weeks, a follow-up letter or e-mail was sent. This generated a respo~se 
(either accepting or declining) in most cases. Where it did not a third and final letter was sent, but WIth 
little effect. 
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including William Hague, Kenneth Clarke, and David Cameron. 13 Where appropriate. 
quotes from these interviews have been used. Further to this, a number of interyie\Ys 
(including one with Hague) were carried-out by Harris (2005) in her study of the 
Conservatives and nationhood between 1997 and 2001, providing another valuable 
source of data. 
Selection of interviewees is also important. Elite interviewing involves targeting 
interviewees with privileged access or a potentially unique perspective on the events 
being investigated. In this case, this meant central leadership figures, and other figures 
who had been involved in, or had a distinctive standpoint in relation to, key issues of 
interest to the research. For example, Peter Lilley was interviewed as he had not only 
been deputy leader of the party under William Hague, but because the document 
analysis had identified his R. A. Butler memorial lecture as an important turning point 
in the direction of party strategy. Lord Parkinson was interviewed as he played a central 
role in reforming the party organisation as Hague's first Party Chairman. Kenneth 
Clarke was targeted as although he had declined to serve in the shadow cabinet, he was 
the leading alternative candidate in the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections. John 
Bercow was interviewed as he resigned from the shadow cabinet over the issue of 
adoption rights for gay couples (explored in Chapter 7). Gary Streeter was interviewed 
not only as he served in the shadow cabinet, but because of his leading role in 
developing Conservative perspectives on social and moral issues through 'Renewing 
One Nation' policy group. Theresa May was similarly interviewed not merely as she 
served in the shadow cabinet, but as she had publicly identified the need to tackle the 
Conservatives' image problem, famously telling the 2002 party conference that the 
Conservatives were viewed as the 'nasty party'. Michael Portillo was interviewed as 
the leading advocate of 'modernisation' in the party for most of this period. In short, 
interviews were specifically targeted in the light of findings from the document 
analysis. As such they were designed to support, rather than replace the documentary 
research. 
The final part of this methodology considers how we can evaluate the status of the data 
generated during the research. Bryman suggests that qualitative data should be assessed 
D Revealingly, Portillo noted during this programme that this interview was the first time he had spoken 
to William Hague since the 2001 election. 
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against four 'trustworthiness' criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability (Bryman, 2004: 272-276). Credibility is concerned with the accuracy of 
data generated, for example documentary findings or the claims of an interviewee. As 
discussed above we cannot trust any single source, hence the importance of 
crosschecking and triangulation. For example, multiple documentary sources can be 
used, and compared to statements made by interviewees. Transferability refers to 
whether or not findings can be applied to other settings. To return to an earlier point. 
this research is a single case-study so the empirical arguments and conclusions cannot 
be applied elsewhere. However, this does not make them invalid, nor does it preclude 
the possibility of 'analytic generalisation' (Yin, 1994: 10). So whilst the empirical 
focus is particular, the theoretical utility of the research, namely the use of the SRA, is 
generalisable to other cases. 
Dependability asks whether the findings are reliable: could another researcher repeat 
the research to find similar conclusions? In this case, the documents used in this 
research are virtually all publicly available, so could be easily checked by others. The 
interview data would be harder to reproduce, and in keeping with the wishes of the 
interviewees, the transcripts are not publicly available. However, most interviewees 
were happy for their participation to be acknowledged, so this could be confirmed by 
other researchers. Finally, confirmability is concerned with whether subjective personal 
values have intruded excessively on the research process. The above discussion noted 
the value-laden nature of interview data, and cautioned that no document or piece of 
academic research can be regarded as absolutely impartial. The SRA acknowledges that 
different, competing interpretations exist. However, by offering an explicit theoretical 
framework, triangulating both documentary and interview evidence, and clearly 
referencing all sources, we can control for the subjectivity of the research and provide 
readers with the opportunity to assess its trustworthiness for themselves. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how political actors make strategic choices based on 
their interpretation of the context that they face. It has shown that context is 
strategically selective - it favours some strategies over others - as a result of the 
structuring effect of institutions that have emerged from human interaction overtime. 
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As such~ it has sought to transform the abstract dualism of structure and agency into a 
method of political analysis grounded in social reality, which accounts for the role of 
ideological interpretations in shaping political outcomes. It has also considered how the 
SRA can be applied to this particular case-study, and discussed the techniques 
employed during the research. The following chapters apply this method to the 
contemporary Conservative Party, with particular reference to its electoral and 
leadership strategies, and to its interpretation of the role of conservatism in the twenty-
first century. 
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Chapter 3 
Context: The Electoral and Ideational Problem 
It was a totally no win situation. 
Lord Parkinson (Interview). 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the context faced by the Conservative Party upon entering 
opposition in 1997. This is important, as the strategic-relational approach (SRA) 
emphasises the contextualised nature of all strategic political action. The strategically 
selective context encompasses the ideational as well as the material dimension. 
Consequently, putting this research into context involves both locating the Conservative 
Party in relation to the intellectual debate over its future and purpose after Thatcher, as 
well as in relation to the economic and political circumstances that affected the party's 
popularity and electoral performance in this period. Dual crises can therefore be identified: 
an internal ideational crisis, over the purpose of conservatism and what the Conservative 
Party stands for; and an external, electoral crisis, of the politics of support. Whilst these 
can be distinguished for analytical purposes, the two are inextricably linked. They are two 
sides of the same coin. 
This chapter thus has two distinct but interrelated parts. Firstly, it considers the nature of 
the electoral problem that the party has faced since 1992. This incorporates an analysis of 
how the Conservatives' electoral base has been challenged by the rise of New Labour. It 
also includes an overview of the poor opinion poll ratings, public image, and election 
results that the party has suffered since shortly after the 1992 election, and which 
culminated in the landslide defeat of 1997. In other words, the electoral situation faced by 
the party at the beginning of the case-study period is laid out, providing important 
background for the remainder of the thesis. 
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Secondly, the chapter considers the ideational problem faced by contemporary 
conservatism. This forms the other key component of the context in which the analysis of 
the Conservative Party in opposition is situated. The ideational dimension is assessed 
through a consideration of the place and purpose of conservatism post-Thatcher, by 
reference to three key conservative intellectuals: John Gray, David Willetts and lain 
Gilmour. All three present both a normative dimension (of what conservatism should be) 
and a pragmatic dimension, in terms of how it should be articulated. Gray has argued that 
conservatism has been 'undone' by Thatcherism; Gilmour regards Thatcherism as an 
anathema to conservatism, a variant of doctrinal neo-liberalism alien to the British 
Conservative way; and Willetts, by contrast, sees Thatcherism as merely another chapter in 
a consistent and developing conservative tradition. Gray (2004: 47-8) has recently 
acknowledged that the party survives (and may again prosper), but maintains that 
conservatism is dead, whereas Gilmour (1992; 2001; and 2005) has argued that to be 
electorally successful the party needs to return to the 'One Nation' tradition. Since the 
early 1990s Willetts (1992; 1994) has consistently argued for a Conservative vision for 
communities, which he regards as compatible with a free market position. These differing 
perspectives provide a backdrop to the debate amongst Conservative politicians over the 
party's recent intellectual and strategic direction, which has not been fully resolved since 
1997. For example, the contributions of prominent Conservatives such as Peter Lilley and 
Michael Portillo to this debate (and the responses to them), have been a key part of the 
party's attempt to interpret and respond to the strategic context of opposition. 
3.2 The Electoral Problem 
This section outlines the electoral problem the Conservative Party has faced since shortly 
after re-election in 1992. The increasingly difficult electoral context for the Conservatives 
in this period can be illustrated through an analysis of a number of key events, most 
notably the ERM debacle of September 1992. Underlying this it is argued that a more 
fundamental reshaping of the strategic terrain occurred, as the shape of the political 
landscape post-Thatcher was revealed. The Thatcherite project was successful in forging a 
new economic consensus: the Labour Party was forced to accept the end of Keynesian 
demand management, and the doctrine of free markets gained intellectual ascendancy over 
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that of the mixed economy. However, as Marquand notes, whilst by the end of the 
Thatcher era the British people were no longer for Keynes, they were still for Beveridge. 
'They want a welfare state, but they also want a market economy' (Marquand. 1991: 16; 
see also Crewe, 1993: 18-25). The consequence of this for Marquand is that the political 
competition between the major parties begins to turn into 'a struggle over management 
rather than over purpose and direction' (1991: 16-17). Writing in 1991, Marquand 
correctly foresaw that this was a battle that the Conservatives were best place to win at the 
next general election. As will be seen, however, the odds in this battle over competence 
would change dramatically after Black Wednesday. The continued public demand for 
welfare - despite (or perhaps because of) a decade of Thatcherism - is a key factor in the 
strategic context that the Conservatives would struggle to respond to over the next decade 
and a half. Whilst the Labour Party successfully forged a narrative of the 'Third Way' to 
balance free market economics with this demand, the Conservatives have struggled to 
reconcile the logic of Thatcherism with the fundamentally incompatible ideas of 
Beveridge. Failure to respond to this dilemma in a convincing way has exacerbated the 
electoral problems faced by the party since its reputation for economic competence was 
shattered in 1992. 
Notwithstanding the accurate predictions of a number of political scientists (notably 
Sanders, 1991), the result of the 1992 general was regarded as something of a surprise, as it 
contradicted the prevailing trend of the opinion polls (King, 1993: 244). The Conservatives 
won a fourth successive victory in spite of the ongoing economic recession - the second in 
thirteen years of Conservative rule - and so defied the predictions of the opinion pollsters, 
and the expectations of much of the media and political classes. Garrett (1994) attributes 
this success to the electoral legacy of Thatcherism, namely 'popular capitalism'. His 
quantitative analysis revealed 'discemable popular capitalism effects in the 1992 election', 
which 'were large enough on their own to have allowed the government to retain its 
majority'. These effects included council house sales, privatisation and de-unionisation, 
and enabled the 1979-1992 government to . denude the Labour electorate and to attract 
some of the dislocated voters to the Conservative Party' (1994: 121). 
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Leadership effects were also important at the 1992 election. John Major's greatest asset 
was perhaps the fact that he was neither Margaret Thatcher nor Neil Kinnock. As Crewe 
and King (1994: 125-147) highlight, Major's public rating was significantly better than 
Kinnock's, and had a positive effect on the Conservatives' standing compared to that under 
Thatcher. Major had effectively diffused public anger over the poll tax by appointing 
Michael Heseltine to devise a replacement, and divisions over Europe had apparently been 
healed by Major's deft handling of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, successfully 
completed in December 1991. Indeed, Europe scarcely featured in the 1992 election as 
both parties accepted the broad framework negotiated by Major, with the minor exception 
of the opt-out from the social chapter that Labour wished to sign (King, 1993: 230). 
Conservative unity over Europe proved ephemeral however, and divisions concealed 
before the election soon re-emerged over the incorporation of the Treaty into law. Major's 
'triumph' at Maastricht was soon forgotten in the Conservative Party when it became 
apparent that the treaty would restrict further the government's ability to stimulate an 
economic recovery within the constraints of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
(Thompson, 1996: 188-9). By enshrining in law a commitment to European Monetary 
Union (albeit with an opt-out from the final stage), the possibility of fiscal-loosening to 
offset the effects of the high interest-rates required to maintain sterling's position within 
the ERM was effectively closed-off. 
Major was thus partly responsible for setting the trap which sprung on 'Black Wednesday', 
16 September 1992. The farcical series of events that day have been well documented (see 
Thompson, 1996: 189-214; Lamont, 1999) and need not detain us here. Needless to say 
that the government's inability to defend sterling's value within the bounds it itself had set 
less than two years previously (despite spending £11 billion in the attempt), constituted a 
political crisis of gargantuan proportions. Three major consequences can be discerned in 
relation to the Conservative Party, each of which affected its popularity. Firstly the 
Conservatives' reputation for competent economic management was lost, the corollary of 
which was a decline in their opinion-poll standing. Secondly, divisions in the party over 
the issue of Europe were vividly reopened. Thirdly, the crisis helped create the political 
space that would come to be occupied by New Labour. 
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The 1992 election, Morgan argues, took place 'in a mood of public doubt, against a 
background of uncertainty about both the economy and policy towards Europe' (Morgan, 
2001: 513). In April 1992 the electorate decisively backed the Conservatives as the party 
best able to handle this uncertainty: within six months the prevailing opinion had been 
comprehensively reversed. The point of this reversal - when these issues reached crisis 
point - can Morgan, suggests, be pinpointed with remarkable precision, to 16 September 
1992, when they 'exploded' (2001: 513). Evans similarly traces the 'roots of the disaster' 
in 1997 directly to this date, 'the blackest day in the history of post-war conservatism' 
(1999: 163). The Eurosceptic John Redwood similarly blames the failure of the 
government firmly on its policy toward the ERM, which was an 'unmitigated disaster' 
(2004: 121). He suggests that, 'the fateful decision to enter the ERM began the long period 
of troubles and the turmoil within the party' (2004: 109). 
The crisis certainly did hit the Conservatives in the polls. Between April and September 
1992, the Conservatives' poll rating fluctuated around 42 percent, the level achieved in the 
general election. At their lowest they were placed at 38 percent, and at their highest 46 
percent (MORI, 2006a). This period did see a change in Labour's position however, which 
improved from the 34 percent received in the general election to approximate parity with 
the Conservatives (MORl, 2006a). Following Black Wednesday, the Conservatives' poll 
rating began to slide, whilst Labour's strengthened further. By November, the 
Conservatives had sunk to the low-thirties in all polls, Gallup placing them on 29 percent 
to Labour's 52 (MORI, 2006a). This position deteriorated further throughout 1993 and 
1994. In 1994, forty-four national opinion polls were conducted, only once did the 
Conservatives scrape to 30 percent support. A Gallup opinion poll conducted for the Daily 
Telegraph in January 1995 gave Labour an astonishing 43.5-point lead: 62 percent to the 
Conservatives' 18.5 (MORI, 2006a). Whilst the slide in Conservative support can therefore 
be dated to September 1992, other factors were clearly at work which worsened the 
position over the following few years. The opinion poll slump precipitated by Black 
Wednesday was intensified by the by-election and local election humiliations of 1993. and 
by the election of Tony Blair as leader of the Labour Party in 1994 (Crewe, 1996: 419). 
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This slump in Conservative support persisted up to and beyond the 1997 general election, 
and is most clearly illustrated graphically (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat Support, 1992-2001 
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Source: Data from MORl (2006d). 
The ERM debacle also damaged the Conservatives' reputation as the party best able to 
manage the economy (Table 3.1). At the time of the 1992 election, 36 percent of those 
polled regarded the Conservatives as the most effective economic managers, compared to 
31 percent who thought that Labour would do a better job. By 1993, Labour had 
established a 2-point lead on this issue, a lead which they maintained and increased until 
July 1996. Interestingly, this lead actually disappeared in early 1997: polls in February and 
April gave the Conservatives a 4-point and a 7-point lead respectively on the management 
of the economy. These figures vindicate John Major's decision to delay the 1997 election 
for as long as possible, and reflect the improving state of the economy at that time. When 
placed alongside the 1997 election result, they also indicate that the public's perception of 
the parties ' respective abilities to manage the economy is only one variable informing 
voter choice. 
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Table 3.1: Best Party at Managing the Economy 
Date(s) of Poll Conservative Labour Liberal None/ 
Democrat Don't know 
30 March 1992 36 31 1 1 21 
15-20 Sept 1993 23 25 13 38 
19-23 May 1994 25 33 12 29 
21-24 July 1995 22 33 4 40 
22-25 March 1996 24 33 6 35 
21-24 February 1997 34 30 5 30 
8 April 1997 33 26 5 34 
Source. Data from MORl (2006b). 
The Conservatives' problems were not merely related to the economy, but reflected their 
more generalised loss of an image of governing competence, for which, as Taylor notes, 
'there is no substitute' (2002: 96). The loss of this image began with the ERM crisis, but 
was by no means restricted to it. A series of further problems, notably the difficulties in 
ratifying Maastricht, the botched privatisation of the railways and the mining industry, 
allegations of sleaze, and a challenge to Major's leadership of the party, all furthered the 
impression that the government was 'in office but not in power' (Lamont, quoted in 
Morgan, 2001: 513). The general decline in the public image of the Conservative Party is 
illustrated by Table 3.2. On virtually all measures, the public's view of the party worsens 
significantly in the first year after the party's re-election in 1992. The percentage of 
respondents agreeing that the Conservative Party keeps its promises, understands the 
problems facing Britain, represents all classes, has a good team of leaders~ sensible 
policies, and a professional approach all drop sharply in this period, and similar views 
persist until the following general election in 1997. 
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Table 3.2: Conservative Party Image 
Percentages of respondents agreeing that 1992 
the Conservative Party ... General April '93 April 1997 Election 
Keeps its promises 20 5 5 
Understands the problems facing Britain 38 18 20 
Represents all classes 20 9 10 
Looks after the interests of people like us 21 8 9 
Is moderate 19 12 11 
Is extreme 16 10 10 
Is concerned about the people in real need 18 10 8 
Has a good team of leaders 35 13 10 
Will promise anything to win votes 41 47 40 
Is out of touch with ordinary people 51 57 50 
Has sensible policies 31 12 14 
Is professional in its approach 42 16 10 
Is divided 14 30 13 
No Opinion 2 10 44 
Source. Data from MORI (2006c). 
The Conservative government had been re-elected on probation in 1992, and rapidly lost 
any semblance of a positive public image and its reputation for governing competence. The 
ERM debacle contributed to this loss, but was by no means the only contributing factor. It 
was this general loss, combined with the emergence of a viable alternative government in 
the form of New Labour, which led to the Conservatives' crushing defeat in 1997. As 
Sanders et al. (2001: 789) note: 
New Labour's political triumph after 1994 under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown was to 
convince voters that Labour was now the party of fiscal responsibility and competent 
macroeconomic management. Their success in this regard severely impaired the 
Conservatives' ability to benefit electorally from the rising sense of economic optimism 
among voters that the Chancellor delivered in the 18 months or so prior to the 1997 election. 
As Sanders notes elsewhere, the ERM crisis 'crystallised a number of important doubts 
that voters already entertained about the Conservatives as competent economic managers' 
(1999: 251). As such, it was important in creating the political space that came to be 
occupied by New Labour. Sanders interprets this in terms of the economic voting model: 
the crisis, he suggests, 'opened up an electoral space that allowed politics to affect voters' 
electoral preferences on a scale not encountered since 1979' (1999: 251, original 
emphasis). More subtly, the crisis facilitated the discourse of globalisation that came to 
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characterise New Labour's economIC policy. It exposed quite brutally the apparent 
powerlessness of governments to control the economy in the face of global economic 
forces, and highlighted the need for the economy to be competitive in the global market. 
New Labour, some critics have argued, has invoked this discourse of globalisation to 
justify its embrace of neo-liberalism. Hay (2002b) draws a parallel between this discourse 
and the' overload' thesis propounded by Thatcherite Conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Both, he suggests, leave room for only one 'sensible' course of action, which in both cases 
is making control of inflation the central tenet of economic policy. The difference between 
the two discourses lies in their location of the constraints that necessitate such action: for 
the globalisers it is the externally imposed imperative of the world economy, whereas for 
the Thatcherites it was the domestic failure of successive governments. This acceptance, 
Hay argues, means that Britain is now a 'one-vision polity' (1997: 372). Stuart Hall makes 
a similarly withering attack on Labour's accommodation of Thatcherite economics. In 
contrast to the rightward shift of the political centre-of-gravity he identified in 1983, he 
characterised New Labour as 'the great moving nowhere show', failing to embrace radical 
reform, largely for reasons of electoral expediency (1998: 9-14; see also 1983). 
The globalisation discourse invoked by New Labour implies that there is no policy space 
realistically available for a more radical economic strategy of the left. They cite as 
evidence for this the disastrous failure of Mitterrand's attempted 'alternative economic 
strategy', which rapidly became unsustainable and abandoned for the plan de rigueur. 1 Yet 
the work of Giddens himself implies that a range of alternative strategies exist that can be 
broadly classified under the third way umbrella. Referring to recent or current social 
democratic governments in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and France, as 
well as to the 'New Democrats' and New Labour, Giddens notes that they are all part of 'a 
single broad stream of third way thinking' (2001: 31). Such governments have pursued a 
variety of policies with varying degrees of deference to the neo-liberal demands of the 
market. For example as Clift notes, the French PS reject 'the assumption that "there is no 
alternative" to neo-liberal orthodoxy ... a significant degree of voluntarism [they argue], 
1 For discussion of this u-turn, see Ludlam (2001: 28): Callinicos (2001: 27-8); Callaghan (2000: 4-9,102-8). 
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remains possible, despite constraining global forces' (2001: 63). Wickham-lones (2000, 
2002) also suggests that it may be possible for social democrats in Britain to develop a 
more ambitious reformist programme, however, he tempers this possibility with a crucial 
caveat. It would only be possible if such a reformist party (presumably Labour) enjoyed 
'sufficient electoral strength and political power' (2000: 22, also 2002: 475). 
The international economic situation of the 1990s was radically different from that of the 
1960s and 1970s. The transformation of the context in which policy is formed explains in 
part the different policy positions taken in the different periods - as Gamble and Kelly 
highlight, national economic protectionism is simply 'no longer politically or economically 
viable' (2000: 182). However, political considerations seem to have taken primacy in New 
Labour's repositioning. The discourse of globalisation invoking the dangers of attempting 
to counter the market (with the ERM crisis as a prime example of the dangers) has been 
most useful to the party as a justification and explanation for this shift. This shift was also 
largely accepted by the electorate in 1997, and has, its proponents would argue, been 
justified by the subsequent strong economic performance under Labour. The repositioning 
of the Labour Party in the changing global economic context hit the Conservatives in the 
1997 election, as did the ongoing social transformation wrought by popular capitalism. 
Nevertheless, as Cowley (1997: 48) argues, more banal political factors were also at work: 
The transformation of the Conservative Party from dominant party to English-based rump 
has its roots in three perceptions of the Party: that it was incompetent; that it was disunited; 
and that it was sleazy. All three perceptions had some validity, but all were exaggerations ... 
However, perception is more important than reality and as a result by May 1997 the British 
public had decided that it was time for a change. 
Regardless of whether or not it was an exaggeration, the sleazy, incompetent, disunited 
image of the Conservative Party in the mid-1990s was hugely damaging for the party at the 
1997 election. Responding to the changing social and economic context, the challenge of 
New Labour and recasting the image of the party formed a formidable task for the party 
leadership upon entering opposition in 1997. 
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3.3 The Ideational Dimension 
The difficulties faced by British conservatism in the 1990s, whilst characterised by the 
malaise in John Major's government, were not solely caused by it. Rather as Willetts notes, 
'the problem is much deeper and it is ultimately an intellectual one. It is a dangerous 
uncertainty about the nature of modem conservatism' (1994: 7). This uncertainty was one 
of the unintended consequences of Thatcherism and has continued into the twenty-first 
century. The New Right provided conservatism with a clear purpose and direction in 
response to the crisis of the 1970s. Since then, it has undermined the efforts of some 
Conservatives to reinvigorate conservatism over the past two decades, and struggled to 
adapt to the new strategic terrain that it helped to create. 
The ideational dimension of the strategically selective context for both conservatism and 
the Conservative Party since 1990 has therefore been defined by Thatcherism. The 
Thatcherite legacy has shaped and constrained Conservative political thinking, 
communication, policy-making and statecraft. The party has struggled to reconcile itself 
with the Thatcher's regicide, which overshadowed her successor's tenure even after he had 
won his own mandate at a general election. It has also impaired attempts to modernise the 
party in opposition, inhibiting the Conservatives' famed ability to adapt in order to prosper 
electorally, the 'statecraft' of which Bulpitt regarded Thatcherism as the latest instalment. 
The 'art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing 
competence' (Bulpitt, 1986: 21) has, Michael Portillo suggests, been undermined by the 
party's fixation with Thatcherism: 
During the period of tremendous success for the Conservatives, during the early-1980s 
particularly, very large numbers of people came into parliament for the first time, they were 
typically then young, white, middle-class men from the southeast of England (by the way I 
was one of them); and many of them are still in Parliament today. And they are Thatcherites, 
but in this very limited and perverse sense, that they have frozen Thatcherism in time, 
forgetting that one of the key ingredients ofThatcherism was that it was revolutionary, it was 
cutting-edge, it was new. Thatcherism now of course is retro, it is twenty years past its sell-
by date. A new Thatcherism today wouldn't be an old Thatcherism. because it would have to 
be new and cutting-edge. So these rather boneheaded old Thatcherites occupy a lot of the 
positions in the party, and that's another reason that has stopped the party changing. 
(Portillo Interview). 
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Yet the effect of Thatcherism on the configuration of the political context runs much 
deeper than the politics of personality within the Conservative Party. If the Conservative 
Party has been paralysed by Thatcherism, the Labour Party was - eventually - galvanised 
by it. The creation of New Labour can, it is suggested, be traced directly to Thatcherism 
(Heffernan, 2000). Hay suggests that the end of the Conservative Party's electoral 
hegemony 'may be seen as a direct consequence of New Labour's acceptance of the neo-
liberal political and economic paradigm that is the sole vision animating contemporary 
British politics' (1997: 372). On this reading, Britain has become a 'one-vision polity' 
based on a 'neo-liberal post-Thatcher settlement' (Hay, 1997: 373), which has swept away 
the post-war consensus and the last vestiges of social democracy with it. The Conservative 
Party, therefore, has been a victim of its own success - in helping to forge this consensus it 
has robbed itself of its primary purpose and electoral appeal: its opposition to socialism. 
How conservatism reacted to this post-Thatcher settlement is considered here through the 
work of John Gray, Ian Gilmour, and David Willetts; who represent three important 
intellectual trends in recent Conservative thought. Willetts represents a neo-Thatcherite 
position. He justifies Thatcherism in the context of the 1980s, but argues that it forms just 
one instalment in a consistent Conservative tradition, which, whilst not repudiating or 
rejecting Thatcherism, needs to adapt itself again for current times. Gilmour represents an 
anti-Thatcherite position. A leading Conservative critic of the Thatcher governments, he 
has consistently maintained that Thatcherite neo-liberalism is fundamentally at odds with 
what he regards as true British conservatism. Of the three, Gray has shifted his position 
most significantly. He rose to prominence in the 1980s as a political thinker in the 
Hayekian mould, but his more recent work has been heavily critical of the flawed 
rationalism of the New Right (Gamble, 1999: 117). Gray represents a post-Thatcherite 
position. Whilst his stance is far from that of most contemporary Conservative politicians 
and intellectuals (arguably it has much more in common with New Labour), it is derived 
from a right-of-centre rather than a left-of-centre perspective, and is inherently 
conservative in its anti-rationalism. 
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3.3.1 Anti-Thatcherites: The One Nation 'wets' 
Gilmour's account has the advantage of consistency. It regards Thatcherism as inherently 
un-conservative, as it involved the application of alien New Right monetarist 'dogma' 
which took precedence over the pragmatic statecraft traditionally associated with 
Conservative governments. The dogmatic nature of Thatcher and her followers caused 
them to stick to their ideological guns even when the results became disastrously apparent. 
By the time of the 1981 budget, he claims, 'evidence had by now accumulated to prove 
that the monetarist slaughter had been performed in the name of a false god,' but the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Geoffrey Howe) 'only moved faster in the wrong direction' 
(Gilmour & Garnett, 1997: 312-3). As Gamble notes, Gilmour explains the seemingly 
bizarre attachment to monetarism as the result of the government being 'in the grip of an 
ideology which blinded it to the practical realities of managing the economy' (1993: 121). 
Gilmour's conservatism is part of the 'One Nation' strand of Conservative thought that 
fears social conflict, and prioritises the preservation of order and social harmony. He 
echoes Burke in his anti-rationalism and reveals a traditional Conservative suspicion of 
intellectual reasoning. 'Harmony' he states, can only be attained 'by policies which are 
based on practical wisdom and judicious generosity, not on the cold abstractions of the 
dogma of discord' (Gilmour, 1992: 279). He seems bemused as to how the Conservative 
Party fell prey to what to him is such patently absurd, doctrinal thinking, and his 
explanation as to 'why the moderates lost' (1992: 30-44) is rather unsatisfactory. He 
dismisses the explanation that the crises of the 1970s left the moderates bereft of 
alternative ideas, preferring instead the answer that the power of Thatcher's personality 
rode roughshod over the opposition. The moderates (including himself) were therefore 
'guilty of a grave dereliction of duty' in their failure to force the Prime Minister to back 
down (1992: 32). 
Yet the idea that the Conservative Party would so easily fall victim to such a 'foreign' 
doctrine, even one conveyed through a character as powerful as Mrs Thatcher, is ultimately 
inadequate. Whilst Thatcher and her style of leadership were vital for Thatcherism, they 
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did not constitute it in its entirety. Context was crucial, and was strategically selective in 
the New Right's favour. The u-turns and failure of the Heath government provided the 
political space within the Conservative Party for a different approach to economic policy to 
gain the ascendancy. An alternative had for some time been enunciated within the party by 
Enoch Powell, who Thatcher later praised as 'absolutely right about the economy" (quoted 
in Heffer, 1998: 928); an alternative that would later be vigorously expounded by Keith 
Joseph (1976; 1979). Thatcherism also drew strength from the traditional Conservative 
attachment to the nation, and the patriotic concern to reverse the long-run relative decline 
of the British economy. The context of economic decline, or at least the perception of 
decline, has been widely cited as a crucial factor in the emergence and formation of 
Thatcherism by many writers. Amongst others, Krieger (1986), Marsh (1995), Gamble 
(1994a) and Jenkins (1989) have highlighted the centrality of British decline to 
Thatcherism. Thatcherism is best understood as an attempt to reverse this decline, and in 
certain respects was 'as radical an attempt as any that has been made this century' 
(Gamble, 1993: 127). As Kavanagh (1997: 50) notes, the politics of consensus came to be 
seen as the politics of decline, and consequently became the subject of Thatcherite vitriol. 
Un-conservative measures would be required in the pursuit of the higher Conservative 
objective of national recovery - not only of the economy, but of the nation's social and 
moral virtues. 
The Winter of Discontent played a vital role in persuading voters of the accuracy of the 
diagnosis by the Right, rather than that of the Left, of the cause of British decline. The neo-
liberal explanation of Britain's economic difficulties (particularly 'stagflation'), 'was 
elegant in its simplicity and in its simplicity lay its persuasive capacity' (Hay, 2002b: 199). 
The New Right argued that the problem was one of political overload, as irresponsible 
politicians attempting to 'buy' their re-election precipitated fiscal crises (Hay, 2002b: 198-
202: see also King, 1975). The solution, therefore, was to reassert the primacy of economic 
imperatives over political ones. Monetarism was seen as the best way to impose the 
necessary discipline on both the government and the economy. This discourse has been 
compared by Hay to the (in his eyes, equally spurious) discourse of hyper-globalisation 
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that has been used by New Labour to justify the prioritising of the interests of capital 
(2002b: 202-3). 
Gilmour's critique of Thatcherism lacks sufficient awareness of the political and economic 
context to provide a powerful explanatory framework. As Gamble comments, the 
weakness in Gilmour's account is his inability to explain 'why Thatcherism was so 
successful for so long if it was so flawed from the outset ... Why should such a malign 
ideological bacillus have inexplicably seized on the party and been so hard to expel?' 
(1993: 121-2). Mark Garnett (the co-author with Gilmour of Whatever Happened to the 
Tories?) provides a more sophisticated explanation of this apparent hijack of the party in 
his own later work. Garnett identifies in the twentieth century Conservative Party two 
competing ideological strands - free market liberalism and One Nation conservatism. 
According to this account, the free market tradition, whilst always present, was for most of 
the twentieth century the junior partner to the One Nation Conservatives. This position was 
reversed in the years following Thatcher's election as leader in 1975, as she and her 
ideological bedfellows exploited the panic about decline to mount a takeover of the 
Conservative Party. This victory has been so complete that 'today's Conservative Party is a 
liberal organisation, with a nationalistic twist' (Garnett, 2003: 112). This forms a coherent 
post-hoc explanation of the Thatcher effect and of the party's electoral difficulties since 
1992. If conservatism equals adaptability and electoral success, and if the Conservative 
Party has abandoned conservatism, it will, by Gilmour and Garnett's logic, be bound to 
suffer electorally. However, this approach fails to track the changing strategic location of 
conservatism, or offer a satisfactory explanation as to why it was apparently abandoned by 
the party. 
For Gilmour then, Thatcherism was damaging not only for the country but for 
conservatism and the Conservative Party. But for all his lamenting at the disastrous 
consequences of Thatcherism, his is also a positive message. Whereas for Gray, the 
possibility of a return to traditional form of conservatism has been closed-off by the 
unintended consequences of Thatcherism, for Gilmour the path back to One Nation 
conservatism remains open. The damage done to conservatism can be undone. Indeed if 
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the Conservative Party is once again to become an election-winning party, it must be 
undone, through a return to One Nation conservatism. However, he is sceptical about the 
likelihood of the Conservative Party regaining the electoral dominance it enjoyed for much 
of the twentieth century, as he sees it as unlikely to choose to readopt his favoured 
conception of conservatism (1997: 382-5). Such is the power of the 'dogma' that has 
captured the party. 
The continued adherence to ideological dogma has caused the Conservative Party in 
opposition to reinforce the mistakes made in government. The party has failed to take the 
pragmatic and politically sensible course. This trend is contrasted by Gilmour to the rapid 
recovery that the party made after landslide defeats in 1906 and 1945. 'On both occasions 
the party soon made a dramatic recovery. After the similar defeat in 1997 no such recovery 
has happened. Instead the party has made almost every conceivable mistake, and now 
looks likely to continue that record' (2005). The decision not to elect Kenneth Clarke as 
leader in 1997, when he was 'unquestionably the best of the candidates and indeed the only 
one who was unquestionably qualified for the job', was 'suicidal' (2001). The same 
mistake was made in 2001, and Gilmour urged readers of the London Review of Books to 
vote for Clarke again in 2005, thereby redeeming the last eight years and once again 
becoming' a serious party' (2005). 
Clarke was, as Gilmour suggests, by far the best qualified of all the available candidates in 
the last three contests for the leadership of the Conservative Party. He also had the 
advantage of being the most popular with the general public, although an alternative with 
at least the potential for wide public appeal emerged in the form of David Cameron in 
2005. The decision not to elect Clarke - the responsibility of Conservative MPs in 1997 
and 2005, and party members in 2001 - can only be explained by his views on Europe, 
which clashed with the prevailing ideology in the party. As Gilmour (2001) vividly puts it: 
The trouble is that, not merely in the Parliamentary Party but in the Party in the country as 
welL there are many Far-Right Little Englanders who, as the old American saying goes, 
'would rather be right than President', which is the political equivalent of a death wish. 
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The 'little-Englander' mentality derives from the Thatcherite conception of national 
identity. Whereas Gilmour associates himself with the inherently British One Nation 
tradition (in which the stability of the British state and the maintenance of the Union are 
paramount), for Thatcherites such as Shirley Letwin, politics begins with the people. As 
Gamble (1993: 125) states: 
She [Letwin] does not identify the nation with the historic Conservative state as Gilmour 
does, because that would mean accepting and approving of the way in which the state has 
developed. There is much in the way that this state has developed in the twentieth century 
that Thatcherism repudiates. Preserving the Union and ensuring social peace through 
policies that make citizens dependent, and suppress the vigorous virtues, ends by 
threatening the special national character of England. 
Gilmour mocks the 'Conservative Europhobes' who seem to 'regard England (not even the 
United Kingdom) as a latter-day Kingdom of Mercia ... cowering behind an Offa's Dyke, 
in the form of the English Channel, that will keep the Europeans at bay and enable it to 
remain a satellite of the United States', and 'bleat in Mercian style about national 
sovereignty and national independence' (Gilmour, 2001). The Mercian tendency that he 
identifies is an integral part of the Thatcherite ideology to which many Conservatives 
subscribe, although most baulk at the logical conclusion of English independence to which 
it leads (Chapter 6). Conservative scepticism towards Europe and the single currency has, 
ironically, been one of the party's most popular policies since 1997, which also helps 
explain the unwillingness to follow Gilmour's advice and pursue a more centrist line. 
Thatcherism, he suggests, has never been popular with the general public: Thatcher's three 
general election wins can be explained by the 'divided opposition, her own qualities, and 
the failure of Old Labour to appear a credible alternative' (Gilmour, 2001; see also 1992: 
271-4). After the 1997 general election, as it became clear that 'New Labour was but old 
Thatcherism writ large', even a 'modestly competent opposition could have made itself 
popular by adopting centrist policies' (2001). This apparently obvious and pragmatic 
course for the Conservative Party upon entering opposition in 1997 was not followed. To 
explain this, a more sophisticated understanding of the party's struggle to adapt to the post-
Thatcherite context than that provided by Gilmour is required. Gilmour is right to 
acknowledge the importance of the Conservative Party as a strategic actor, but his account 
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is not sufficiently contextualised. He implies that the party's position and electoral fortunes 
could be relatively easily transformed by the actions of the leadership, irrespective of the 
strategically selective context, leading to bewilderment about why they have not. 
For a time, the One Nation approach that Gilmour advocates was a great electoral success. 
as it meshed neatly with social reality and public opinion. Thatcherism achieved a similar 
concordance in the 1980s, as did New Labour in the late-l 990s. The Conservatives' efforts 
in opposition can only be understood in an adequately contextualised analysis, not simply 
as an autonomous agent as Gilmour implies. 
3.3.2 Neo-Thatcherism: Markets and communities? 
Like Gilmour, Willetts maintains the consistency of his position. However, whereas 
Gilmour finds constancy in his opposition to Thatcherism, Willetts attempts to place 
Thatcherism within a harmonious Conservative tradition, dating from Burke and Adam 
Smith in the eighteenth century, via Salisbury and Spencer in the nineteenth and Oakeshott 
in the twentieth (Willetts, 1992: 3-17). The use of the term 'Thatcherism' suggests a 
coherence or strategic direction not typically associated with Conservative governments. 
Willetts acknowledges that it 'implies that a clique of free market ideologues managed in 
the mid-1970s to launch a coup and capture control of the Conservative Party' (essentially 
Gilmour's position) but denies that this was actually the case (1992: 47). Whereas for 
Gilmour free market 'dogma' was anathema to conservatism, for Willetts 'the principles of 
free markets aligned with a strong sense of community are fundamental conservative 
principles ... very little of what she [Mrs Thatcher] said could not have been found in a 
typical One Nation Group pamphlet of the 1950s' (1992: 51-2). Free markets have been at 
the centre of conservatism 'since Edmund Burke went into politics as a follower of Adam 
Smith', and the tendency of 'some Conservatives' (presumably the likes of Gilmour) to 
downplay their role in Conservative thought is 'bad history' (Willetts, 1994: 9). The 
distinctive features of Thatcherism then can be found not in the content of its political 
programme but in the personal qualities of Mrs Thatcher herself, and the style and tone 
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that she brought to politics (1992: 51-4). Crucially for Willetts, 'it was still conservatism 
that she was expounding' (1992: 47). 
Nonetheless, Willetts concedes that 'there is more to conservatism than the free market' 
(1994: 9). For him, the aim of modern conservatism is to 'reconcile free markets (which 
deliver freedom and prosperity) with a recognition of the importance of community (which 
sustains our values)' (1992: 92). Further, 'conservatism is at its finest and its most 
distinctive precisely when it integrates a commitment to the free market into the core 
values and institutions which hold our country together' (1994: 9). This is a call not just for 
Conservatives to seek to neutralise the worst effects of the market, but to use market 
mechanisms to strengthen communities and social institutions. The Thatcherite reforms are 
therefore welcomed not only as necessary for economic reasons - to 'sort' the trade 
unions, curb inflation and reverse decline - but by reasserting the value of the market they 
also offer the chance of social and political enrichment. The problem for Conservatives in 
recent years is that they 'have become wary of relying as heavily on the free market as we 
appeared to do in the 1980s' (1994: 7). Willetts believes that Conservatives should not be 
afraid to make the case for free markets, which he sees as integral to the British tradition 
and way of life. 'The tension between markets and communities is resolved because they 
help to sustain each other' (1992: 186). However, Conservatives also need to be at pains to 
highlight how markets and communities help to sustain each other, as much of the 
language of Thatcherism implied that the party was only interested in free markets and 
economIcs. 
This neo-Thatcherite position is distinct from the moderate One Nation position articulated 
most clearly and effectively by the Conservative MP (and shadow minister) Damian 
Green, which, whilst accepting the need for Thatcher's medicine to treat the sickness in the 
economy left by the 1970s, would now like to advocate less distasteful remedies for 
current problems such as inadequate public services. Nevertheless, it leads to similar 
recommendations as to how the contemporary Conservative Party should proceed. As 
Willetts (2005a) told the Social Market Foundation: 
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It would be a failure of imagination for a political party to say to the British people that they 
c?uld only have half. of what they want - either personal freedom or a strong society. O~r 
aIm must. be to not Ju.st to make the British economy stronger but British society 'better. 
Surely thIS long promIsed debate about the future of Conservatism should be about how 
these two great principles of a dynamic economy and social cohesion come together. 
Green similarly emphasised social cohesion and communities in his Tory Reform Group 
Macmillan lecture in March 2000. A One Nation Conservative government would, he 
suggests, 'seek to use the tools at its disposal to encourage individual responsibility and the 
building of communities. It would take a pragmatic attitude to public services, asking how 
they can be improved before it asks who should be providing them' (Green, 2000). 
However, Green offers a different conception of conservatism. Both Green and Willetts 
like to advocate the pragmatic rather than the ideological nature of their respective 
conservatisms - Willetts claims that to label Thatcherism as 'ideological' is simply a term 
of abuse - but the free market does not play such a central role in Green's One Nation 
conception: 
We can happily proclaim victory on the economic argument and move on. A successful 
modern conservatism will need not just a new style, but will also need to recognise which of 
its traditional purposes is most important. The main purpose of a One Nation Conservative is 
to create a good society for all. In the 1970s this was correctly identified as making the main 
priority the reduction of the size of the state ... Where in the 1970s the state was largely seen 
as the enemy, now life is more subtle ... our absolute core purpose must be to deliver 
practical improvements. Any hint that we have a different agenda will make it impossible for 
us to deploy new policy ideas effectively. (Green, 2000, emphasis added). 
Green's position is derived from the same intellectual tradition as Gilmour's, and 
consequently shares the overriding desire for social harmony. However, Green has 
incorporated the Thatcher governments into his narrative of conservatism: they are part of 
the Conservative desire to 'create a good society' by responding to the challenges of the 
time. As such, monetarism was not dangerous alien 'dogma' as Gilmour suggests, but a 
tool utilised by pragmatic Conservatives to tackle the particular problems of inflation and 
an overly burdensome state sector. Different tools are required to respond to the problems 
the country now faces, particularly in terms of improving the public services. As Green 
explains: 
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The id~a that making the state smaller,. having individualism as the main spoke of 
everythm~, was clearly a necessary correctIve to where Britain had got to in the mid-1970s. 
But, . precIsely because the product was relatively successful, both intellectually and 
pra~tIcally, meant that you don't, in my view, need to continue in that direction as the main 
sprmg o~ Conservative polic~. That is what I mean when I say that its time has gone - it is 
not that It ~as. false, but I thmk that the true Tory belief is that any Tory government will 
seek to mamtam a proper balance between the interests of the individual the interests of the 
wider community and the interests of the state. (Green Interview). ' 
This accommodation of Thatcherism represents a convergence of the One Nation and neo-
Thatcherite perspectives, as both (illustrated by Green and Willetts), justify Thatcherism as 
a response to the crisis of the 1970s and argue that conservatism now has to move beyond 
Thatcherism to respond to current electoral and social challenges. 
This convergence may enable the Conservatives to develop effective responses to the 
salient issues at the next general election. However, a tension between the neo-
Thatcherite/David Willetts position and the Damian Green/One Nation position still exists. 
This revolves around the role of the state, and the capacity of the state for nurturing and 
protecting communities. For unswerving neo-Thatcherites, it is the state, not markets, that 
represents the biggest threat to communities, and as far as they acknowledge social 
breakdown, it is generally blamed on state-led progressive politics. This view is derived 
from their general abhorrence of socialism, which they equate with statism, and which was 
blamed for everything from accelerating economic decline to social rot (Thatcher, 1993: 6-
12; see also Letwin, 1992). In simplistic neo-Thatcherite conceptions, the British left (in its 
desire for equality) remains wedded to statism, as the state is 'the representative of all' 
(Kruger, 2006: 32, original emphasis). Whilst congratulating themselves on defeating 
socialism, the neo-Thatcherite suspicion of the state therefore remains deeply ingrained. 
The One Nation position propounded by Green, however, subordinates its view of the state 
to 'values' - so it is possible to regard centralised state planning as appropriate for the 
Conservative governments of the 1950s, and at the same time argue that policies to 'roll 
back' the state were appropriate for the 1980s (Green, 2000). A more proactive view of the 
role of the state in the twenty-first century can therefore be countenanced. 
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In his 2005 speech to the Social Market Foundation Willetts has acknowledge this 
potential difficulty, and has been at pains to acknowledge that the state may be able to play 
a role in strengthening communities. This represents a compromise in his position, from 
that of 1997 when he wrote that 'the real threat to civil society comes not from the market 
but from the state' (1997: 3). Better government, rather than less government, is the ne\\ 
mantra: 
[1]t is not just a matter of rolling back the state. Of course government can't do everything. 
but that doesn't mean it must do nothing. We Conservatives recognise that often the state 
fails but we shouldn't react with glee when it does. Instead we should believe in effective 
government. Too often government seems to be in the way when you don't need it but not 
there when you do. So yes, the state needs to be reformed and indeed rolled back but not 
because we hate it like some libertarians who have taken to the hills of Montana. 
(Willetts, 2005a). 
A potential escape from the Conservative markets-communities dilemma can also be found 
in institutions that are neither market nor state-based, for example charities, voluntary 
bodies and 'not for profit' organisations. Willetts hopes that these will be the basis for the 
'new idea of community' that conservatism needs (2005b: 73). The key institution for 
Conservatives in this regard was formerly the established church, with that symbol of the 
nation - the monarch - at its head. Religion has continued to be at the heart of 
conservatism in America. George W. Bush's 'compassionate conservatism' attempts to use 
the glue of religious morality to bind together a society dominated by the free market. 
Obligation to others is placed on the shoulders of individuals, families and communities, 
not onto the state. Willetts (2005a) quotes President Bush in support of this point: 
I leave you with this challenge: serve a neighbour in need, because a life of service is a life 
of significance. Because materialism ultimately is boring, and consumerism can build a 
prison of wants. Because a person who is not responsible for others is a person who is truly 
alone. Because there are few better ways to express our love for America and to care for 
other Americans. And because the same God who endows us with individual rights also calls 
us to social obligations. 
But Willetts recognises that if it ever existed, such a strong Christian morality no longer 
exists in Britain's increasingly secular society, and cannot therefore form the basis of 
contemporary conservatism on this side of the Atlantic (2005b: 74). Other institutions 
between the state and the market need to be found and nurtured. The recent Conservative 
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interest in localism is one attempt to do this, which has attracted the interest of David 
Cameron (Kruger, 2006: 36; see also Direct Democracy, 2005). Oliver Letwin's (2003) 
vision of a 'Neighbourly Society' is another, as was lain Duncan Smith's reassertion of the 
importance of social justice (Duncan Smith, 2002b; 2002d; see also Streeter. 2002). This 
intellectual activity has not, however, been translated into electoral success, as later 
chapters of this thesis will consider in greater detail. 
Willetts makes an eloquent case for the centrality of both free markets and communities to 
the British conservative tradition. However, as he occasionally acknowledges, and despite 
his efforts to dispel it, a tension between the two still remains. The resolution of the tension 
that he suggests is firmly on Thatcherite ground. He claims that the wets, who enjoyed 
periods of dominance between 1958 and 1965, and between 1971 and 1975, have finally 
been defeated by Thatcherism. Whereas previous Conservative governments succumbed, 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major both held firm to their pledges to 'hold inflation down 
and intervene less ... The party's dangerous flirtation with corporatism and loose money is 
now finally over' (1992: 49). Willetts is right of course to note the 'intellectual victory' 
(1992: 49) of neo-liberal economic theory in the Conservative Party - this consensus now 
extends across the political spectrum. However whilst New Labour (at least in its early 
years) successfully appealed to the electorate on the basis of accepting the neo-liberal 
economic settlement and developing a better society, the Conservatives have failed to do 
the same. Regardless of whether or not the perception is correct, the Conservatives have 
become associated in the public mind with free market economics and little else. a 
perception that became particularly damaging after the ERM debacle destroyed their 
reputation for economic competence in 1992. Contra Willetts, the problem was perhaps the 
Conservatives over-willingness to rely on the free market, certainly in their public 
pronouncements. 
3.3.3 Post-Thatcherism: Conservatism undone 
Gray delights in irony. He revels in the 'unintended consequences' of neo-liberalism. 
rather ironically in a manner not dissimilar to the Gramscian left. As CoIls comments, 
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Gray's paradoxes come in all sizes, but 'as a general rule, the bigger the better' (ColIs, 
1998: 67). One of the biggest is that neo-liberalism, which in the 1970s and 1980s was 'a 
compelling response to otherwise intractable dilemmas' has turned out to be 'a self-
undermining political project' (Gray, 1994: 7). Neo-liberalism's success was, Gray 
contends, dependent on the cultural and social fabric that it inevitably undermined. 'In an 
irony that will delight historians in years to come, the political effect of the ephemeral 
intellectual hegemony of the New Right in Britain, and similar countries, has probably 
been to accomplish the political destruction of conservatism: it may have rendered 
conservative parties unelectable, perhaps for a generation' (1994: 8). 
This pessimism about both neo-liberalism and the electoral prospects of the Conservative 
Party marks a significant shift for Gray, who in the early 1980s was one of the foremost 
intellectual advocates of the New Right and a supporter of Thatcher's Conservative 
government. He IS now better known for his critique of neo-liberalism, his 
environmentalism, and, perhaps, his fatalism. He is disillusioned with modernity, but 
sceptical about humanity's ability to transform things for the better: indeed, any rationally 
inspired attempt to do so will almost certainly make things worse (one of his many 
paradoxes). Nonetheless, consistent reasoning underpins Gray's intellectual journey - his 
position has not shifted 'qualitatively' (Gamble, 1999: 118). Unusually for a critic of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism, he is an Oakeshottian pessimist, inspired in his approach 
and method by Hayek. As Kenny notes, 'Gray remains an intellectual standard bearer for 
selected aspects of the conservative philosophical tradition, which he combines with a deep 
commitment to the value-pluralist aspect of liberalism' (1998: 84). 
Gray's early position shares some similarities with that maintained by Willetts. In his essay 
'A Conservative disposition' (in Beyond the New Right) Gray defended the policies of the 
Thatcher government in extending the market, and called for this agenda to be carried 
further forward: 
There is much farther to go in extending market institutions into hitherto sacrosanct areas, in 
reducing taxation, inflation and government expenditure, and in privatising industries ~nd 
services. There is a strong case for introducing market choice in many social and weltare 
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services. In all of these areas, the achievements of the past decade will provide a sound base. (Gray, 1993: 62). 
However, he saw the potential danger in this programme. If Conservative policy became 
solely associated with marketisation, it risked provoking public 'revulsion', the result of 
which would be the loss of the 'traditional Tory concerns for the health of the community' 
to 'egalitarians and collectivists' (1993: 63). Consequently he advocated a reassertion of 
traditional conservatism of the One Nation ilk. The free market, whilst vital for individual 
freedom, 'is only one dimension of society'. Furthermore, free markets can only operate 
successfully and be preserved within a strong social framework. As such, 'only a 
reassertion of the traditional Tory concern for compassion and community' could 
safeguard the achievements of the Thatcher era (1993: 63). 
Soon after the publication of Beyond the New Right (1993) Gray became a vocal critic of 
the marketisation agenda that he had previously advocated (see Gray, 1994, 1997 and 
1998). This moved him closer to Gilmour's position, but was not a complete volte-face on 
his part. Gray continued to maintain that free markets could only operate successfully 
within a strong social framework. However, he had come to the conclusion that the effect 
of neo-liberal economic policies was to weaken communities and social bonds - neo-
liberalism was therefore a self-undermining and self-limiting political project (1997: 1-10). 
This process had been carried so far that a reassertion of the paternalist and communitarian 
Tory tradition (of the kind he had previously espoused) was no longer a possibility. 
Conservatism had been undone. The resultant political consequences are (of course) ironic. 
The agent of the modernisation of Britain in the 1980s, the Conservative Party~ forced the 
modernisation of the Labour Party but struggled to modernise itself. The 'capture' of the 
Conservative Party by neo-liberal ideas has 'all but destroyed the social base of 
conservatism' (1994: 47) by 'hollowing-out' Tory England, whilst the 'economic 
constituency that gained most from early Thatcherism has been most savaged by its longer-
term effects' (1997: 3). Thatcherism encouraged voters to 'question their loyalties' through 
rapid economic and social change. This process initially worked in the Conservatives' 
favour as socially mobile former Labour voters (the fabled C2s) switched their support. 
However, over time it 'corroded Tory support in the middle classes' and made 
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Conservative rule 'impossible to sustain' (1998: 32). The processes of class and party 
dealignment identified by psephologists can be seen as part as part of this broader trend. 
This forms part of a wider anti-rationalist critique by Gray of the Enlightenment and all the 
major ideologies that are associated with it. None can offer satisfactory solutions to 
dilemmas posed by the death throes of modernity. The single global market is the 
'Enlightenment's project of a universal civilization in what is likely to be its final form'. a 
self-undermining rival to democracy, the 'natural counterpart' to which is 'the politics of 
insecurity' (1998: 3, 17). Radical policies are therefore required to meet the human need 
for security, community and personal fulfilment that used to be addressed by conservatism. 
Market processes, 'which neo-liberalism has emancipated' must now be re-embedded in 
communities (1997: 10). Such a project would be 'little short of revolutionary in its 
implications', and is of a magnitude that 'no form of conservative thought today is willing 
to contemplate' (1997: 10). 
Upon entering opposition In 1997, the strategic terrain for the Conservative Party as 
defined by Gray was most unpropitious. Armed only with a redundant ideology, it could 
offer no solution to the economic and social problems that their New Right policies had 
helped to create. New Labour under Tony Blair initially filled this void, by offering the 
electorate a palliative promise of measures to promote social cohesion and reduce the 
worst effects of neo-liberalism, such as pensioner poverty, higher crime and anti-social 
behaviour. Alas New Labour's attachment to a 'neo-liberal model of modem is at ion' means 
that the effect has been to give 'Thatcherism a new lease of life' (2004: 39-40), and after 
some initial enthusiasm for the Blair government, Gray quickly became disillusioned. If 
the Conservative Party was able to renew itself electorally (as he acknowledged that in 
time it probably would), lacking a relevant intellectual tradition it would struggle as 
Labour has to respond to these challenges. 'Tory England, which it existed to conserve. is 
already no more than a historical memory', which leaves the party without a purpose 
beyond technocratic management (1997: 10). 
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Robert Eccleshall counters Gray's pessimistic outlook for both conservatism and the 
Conservative Party, suggesting that Gray 'underestimates the capacity of conservatives for 
self-renewal' (2000: 275). He also contends that the fortunes of the party are not 
necessarily linked to the intellectual conservative tradition. 'There is little correlation 
between intellectual purity and electoral success because conservatism in its various forms 
has always been something of a patchwork' (2000: 277). This patchwork, Eccleshall 
suggests, has always contained competing and often contradictory strands. 'whose 
consistency, either internally or in relation to one another, does not necessarily match 
standards of intellectual rigour' (2000: 276). The current 'crisis' in conservatism is perhaps 
then not quite as new or as apocalyptic as Gray (and others) suggest. Rather, the 
dominance of Thatcherite ideas in the contemporary Conservative Party is somewhat more 
banal. It is simply the latest chapter in a long-running debate within the party over the 
extent to which free market policies should be pursued - a debate that has swung for a time 
in the neo-liberal direction. It does not therefore represent a major break with 
conservatism, which Gray wrongly presents as a cogent One Nation tradition which was 
rather suddenly contaminated by an alien doctrine. As such, Gray's position is 'weak on 
historical perspective' (2000: 277). 
Denham and Garnett consider Gray and Eccleshall' s rival theses through a case study of 
the politics of Sir Keith Joseph. They argue that Joseph's career 'provides persuasive 
evidence in support of Gray's view that contemporary British conservatism is hollowed-
out' (Denham and Garnett, 2002: 57). Eccleshall's primary criticism of Gray's position is, 
they suggest, that he is wrong to claim that New Right ideology is incompatible with 
conservatism, 'saying, in effect, that British conservatism can survive in contemporary 
conditions provided that we can accept that it is now synonymous with nineteenth century 
liberalism' (2002: 60). For Denham and Garnett, the neo-liberalism of the New Right runs 
so contrary to their understanding of conservatism that it cannot be regarded as a 
competing strand within that tradition. Whilst ideologies require the capacity to change in 
order to renew themselves and survive, 'there must be limits' to the extent of that change 
(2002: 60). Yet whilst claiming that neo-liberalism is alien to conservatism, they 
acknowledge that it has been an important position within the Conservative Party for over 
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a century: 'Since Peel, the party has been split between devotees of two different - indeed 
deeply antagonistic - ideologies'. This division has now - finally - been all but resolved as 
'one of these has left the stage of practical politics' (2002: 73). As Garnett has argued 
elsewhere, this means that the contemporary Conservative Party is not conservative at alL 
rather it is a liberal nationalist party (Garnett, 2003: 112). The essence of their analysis -
that neo-liberalism is, as Gray suggests, alien to conservatism - does not form a 
devastating critique of Eccleshall's position. In the end they come to a similar conclusion-
that neo-liberalism is in the ascendancy in the British Conservative Party. Whether this is 
part of conservatism or is a rival ideology is of limited practical concern. Their primary 
difference seems to be over the definition of conservatism. 
Denham and Garnett, Eccleshall, and Gray agree that the Conservative Party may (indeed 
probably will) revive its electoral fortunes, whatever the status of 'true' conservatism. 
However, whether or not the party can ever re-establish Conservative hegemony in Britain 
is perhaps dependent on whose interpretation of the ideational dimension is most accurate. 
If Gray is right in his assessment that the intellectual basis of conservatism is now 
obsolete, it is difficult to conceive of a sustained Conservative revival. If Gilmour is 
correct a return to electability is possible on a One Nation platform, but the prognosis for a 
party so wedded to Thatcherism is not good. The party's best hope lies in the Willetts 
interpretation. If the Thatcher legacy can be reconciled with a new Conservative narrative 
that responds to the challenges posed by the neo-liberalism of the past three decades, a new 
Conservative hegemony may be possible. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Lord Parkinson commented that when William Hague became leader of the Conservative 
Party, he faced 'a totally no win situation' (Parkinson Interview). The strategically 
selective context faced by the Conservatives upon entering opposition was certainly 
inauspicious. This chapter has located the problem faced by Hague along two fronts. On 
the electoral dimension, Hague inherited a party that had lost its reputation for governing 
competence. had a poor public image. and had suffered its worst election defeat in o\er a 
76 
century. As Chapter 4 explores, Hague needed to somehow devise a strategy that would 
both unite the party and begin the long process of recovering its image and repositioning in 
a position to once again challenge for power. 
However, perhaps the most fundamental problem facing the Conservative Party at this time 
is illustrated by the analysis of the ideational dimension. What was the Conservative Party 
actually for? The future purpose and direction of conservatism was far from clear, whether 
considered from a neo-Thatcherite, post-Thatcherite or anti-Thatcherite perspective. 
Differences of opinion over the causes of defeat led to confusion and disagreement over 
strategy in opposition, as explored in later chapters. The party lacked a vibrant intellectual 
tradition upon which it could draw in its efforts to develop a new narrative of conservatism 
to appeal to a twenty-first century electorate. Ideological differences within the party over 
issues such as Europe (Chapter 5), national identity (Chapter 6) and moral issues (Chapter 
7) would shape the debate about how the party should move forward, and impact upon 
efforts to modernise party image and strategy. 
Chapter 4 
Leadership Strategy in Opposition, 1997-2005 
Leadership is hugely important. If the leader is giving you momentum there's a 
clear sense of direction and you tend to be following, you are moving. It is when 
you are static that people are standing around looking at each other and 
thinking "where the hell are we going?" 
Gary Streeter MP (Interview). 
4.1 Introduction 
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Chapter 3 contextualised the period of Conservative opposition between 1997 and 2005 
through an analysis of differing interpretations of the party's strategic terrain post-
Thatcher. Three different positions were characterised: anti-Thatcherite, neo-
Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite. This analysis of the ideational dimension 
demonstrated the difficulty proponents of conservatism have had in formulating an 
electorally appealing ideology since 1992, not least because of their disagreements over 
the direction of conservatism post-Thatcher. Related to this ideational problem was an 
unfavourable material context, which was explored through the electoral difficulties 
faced by the Conservative Party since Black Wednesday. The party's poor public 
image, loss of reputation for economic competence, and the rise of New Labour's 
'Third Way' narrative and electoral strategy combined to create a serious electoral 
problem for the Conservatives, which was spectacularly verified at the 1997 election. It 
is in this context that the case-study of this thesis - the Conservative Party leadership 
strategy between 1997 and 2005 - is based. 
In contrast to the contextual chapter 3, this chapter is explicitly agency focused. It 
provides an overview of the strategies of the Conservative Party leadership between 
1997 and 2005, and contends that these have been sub-optimal in electoral terms. 
characterised by uncertainty and inconsistency. In part this is a reflection of the 
unfavourable context, both electoral and ideational, that the party faced. The chapter 
will analyse the Conservative reaction to landslide defeat in 1997, and consider how the 
competing interpretations of defeat influenced the strategies pursued by the party 
leadership. The SRA has particular utility in this regard, as it places the focus of 
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analysis on the key strategic actors and their interpretation of, and interaction with, the 
strategically selective context. The strategies of William Hague, lain Duncan Smith, 
and Michael Howard are examined through key speeches, such as keynote conference 
addresses. Speeches are considered in this way because they provide authoritative 
statements of the position that politicians would like to project, even if they attract 
limited public interest. The chapter concludes that the strategies pursued by each were 
sUb-optimal: they underachieved even within the inauspicious context that they faced. 
4.2 Strategic confusion, 1997-2001 
The context faced by William Hague upon his election as leader of the Conservative 
Party could not be described as favourable. Tony Blair's New Labour government 
enjoyed an extended political honeymoon, and the Conservatives faced an 
unsympathetic media and public. They parliamentary party also remained divided on 
the issue of Europe. In spite of this Hague was enthusiastic about his task: he 
maintained that the Conservatives could win the 2001 election and never articulated a 
two-term strategy (Nadler, 2000: 289-292; Parkinson, 2003: 217-220). Ashbee suggests 
that in the aftermath of the 1997 defeat, 'the need for a policy rethink was widely 
accepted' (Ashbee, 2003: 43). Whilst this need may have been apparent to most outside 
observers, no such consensus existed amongst Conservatives themselves. Disagreement 
over the reasons for defeat led to muddled and ineffective attempts to tackle its causes. 
Seldon and Snowdon suggest that in opposition, the Conservative Party 'has 
traditionally avoided recrimination, has changed the leader, rejuvenated the party 
organisation to reconnect with its supporters, and adapted its policies to appeal again to 
the middle ground' (2005a: 244). Between 1997 and 2005, the Conservative Party 
changed its leader on four occasions, and frequently attempted to reinvigorate its 
organisation and refresh its policies, but largely failed to renew its appeal to voters. 
Seldon and Snowdon explain this failure as the result of the loss to Labour by the 
Conservative Party of its 'two secret weapons', its hunger for office and adaptability 
(2005a: 244). This transition, they argue, occurred during the Thatcher and Major 
governments. when the Conservatives metamorphosed into an . ideological and 
sectional' party, the role previously occupied by Labour. The transformation of the then 
opposition into the 'non-ideological party' in the shape of New Labour sealed the 
Conservatives' fate (Seldon and Snowdon. 2005: 245). 
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However, this analysis is problematic. Firstly, it implies an overly simplistic inverse 
relationship between success at British general elections and the vigour of a party's 
ideology, despite the obvious counter examples such as Labour's landslide victory in 
1945, or indeed, the Conservatives under Thatcher. Secondly, it subscribes to the 
'puzzlingly long-lived notion' that the Conservative Party before Thatcher was non-
ideological (Green, 2002: 2). Whilst the party was arguably more successful at 
portraying itself as non-ideological (perhaps as a result of the tradition of pragmatism 
and suspicion of abstract theorising in Conservative thought), this does not mean that 
Conservatives lacked an ideologically informed view of the world. Moreover, the more 
avowedly ideological rhetoric under Thatcher did not lead to electoral disaster for the 
Conservatives. However, the task facing the new Conservative leader in 1997 was not 
to purge the party of ideology, but to reconnect the party's ideological outlook and 
policies with a greater mass of public opinion, a challenge that remained unmet by May 
2005. 
4.2.1 A fresh start? The Hague leadership 
William Hague's success in the 1997 leadership election was due in no small part to the 
fact that he was 'the candidate with the least number of enemies' in the party (Lansley, 
2003: 221). It is telling that this was a key factor in his election, against a candidate 
whom the polls suggested was much more likely to appeal to the floating-voters who 
had deserted the Conservatives in 1997. He also benefitted greatly from the failure of 
the right-wing of the parliamentary party to unite behind one individual, support being 
split between Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and John Redwood. Hague's campaign 
sought to present him as the candidate best able to both unify and revitalise the party, 
and made much of his popularity amongst the new intake of Conservative MPs 
(Alderman, 1997: 9). Despite his unholy alliance with right-winger John Redwood, 
Ken Clarke was defeated in the final run-off with Hague because of his pro-European 
views (Walters, 2001: 13; Nadler, 2000: 37-40). The Clarke-Redwood pact was part of 
an effort by Clarke to seize the unity mantle from Hague, who hardened his stance on 
the single currency in an effort to shore-up his support on the right (Alderman. 1997: 
11). Redwood, however, could only deliver a small proportion of his supporters to 
Clarke, who lost some of his own, disapproving, original backers (ibid: 13). Lord 
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Parkinson recalled how when he telephoned Margaret Thatcher to inform her of this 
link-up she was initially disbelieving, telling him' John Redwood would never do that , 
he was a member of my political office'. Once confirmed, however, it was instrumental 
in her decision to appear with Hague and urge MPs to support him (Parkinson 
Interview). 
In his history of the Conservative Party Alan Clark claimed that the preoccupation of 
Conservative MPs with 'the balance of probability in their retaining their seats', 
combined with the ruthless treatment of their leaders, accounts for the party's ability to 
'sleepwalk the path to whichever tactical decision will keep it in power' (Clark, 1998: 
491). The vote for Hague over Clarke can be interpreted either as the victory of 
ideological dogmatism over traditional Tory pragmatism or, more charitably to 
Conservative MPs, as another example of Conservative Party statecraft, with Clarke 
rejected as a divisive figure unable to provide a convincing narrative of what 
conservatism is for. 1 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Clarke's leadership bids 
(in 1997, 2001 and 2005) were the late casualties of the bitter ideological wrangling 
over Europe that consumed the party in the early-1990s (see Gamble, 1996; and Buller, 
2000). However, as Heppell and Hill convincingly demonstrate, Hague's ideological 
acceptability over Clarke extended beyond the issue of Europe to Hague's 'drier' 
economic stance and more socially conservative disposition. The end result was that 
'the necessary processes of adaptation, and the reconfiguring of the Conservative 
narrative, would be delayed by a decade' (Heppell and Hill, 2008: 64). 
As a youthful, fresh figure, Hague had the opportunity to present a different tone of 
conservatism. As Theresa May commented, 'what William was able to do, by being a 
younger person, a fresh face, with new thinking, was to start a process of thinking 
about change in the party' (May Interview). He was as well placed as anyone to unite 
the party, being regarded as a 'non-ideological figure' who had avoided the factional 
infighting of the 1990s (Taylor. 2003: 230; Nadler, 2000: 243-6). The change of 
leadership thus offered some hope of 'A Fresh Start' (Hague's campaign slogan) to 
Conservatives. Hague scored an early success with his clarification of the party's policy 
I On Conservative statecraft see Bulpitt (1986); and on the need for narrative. see Bevir and Rhodes 
( 1999). 
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towards Europe in general and the single currency in particular. His decision to rule out 
British membership of the Euro in the event of a Conservative general election victory 
for at least one parliament provoked disquiet amongst the few remaining pro-Europeans 
on the Conservative benches, but was overwhelmingly endorsed in a ballot of party 
members (Garnett, 2003: 56). This tactical success, whilst not resolving the European 
question for the Conservatives, despatched it into the long grass for the remainder of 
his term of office and beyond. 
Hague's early speeches demonstrate his desire to develop a more inclusive brand of 
conservatism. In his first speech to the party conference as leader, he declared his wish 
to 'tell you about an open Conservatism, that is tolerant, that believes in freedom, is 
about much more than economics, that believes freedom doesn't stop at the shop 
counter' (Hague 1997: 3). He went on: 'I'd like to tell you about a democratic, popular 
Conservatism that listens ... that has compassion at its core ... which is rooted in its 
traditions, but embraces the future' (1997: 3). However, when he attempted to describe 
in greater depth this new kind of conservatism, Hague returned to more traditional 
Conservative themes. He highlighted freedom, enterprise, education, self-reliance, 
obligation to others, and the nation as his core beliefs and as the core values of this 
variety of conservatism (1997: 7-15). Of these, the inclusion of education and 
'obligation to others' represents an attempt to counter the claim that the Conservatives 
were interested in little more than tax-cuts and economics, and to prove that the party 
had a 'compassionate' edge (Chapter 7). Compassion, Hague claimed, 'is not a bolt-on 
extra to conservatism. It is at its very core' (1997: 12). However, even these two 
themes were discussed in terms familiar to Hague's Conservative audience. Choice, he 
suggested, 'lies at the heart of a good education' (1997: 9), before condemning the new 
government's decisions to scrap grant-maintained schools and the Assisted Places 
Scheme, which subsidised the cost of private school fees. 
By stressing the importance of 'obligation to others', Hague aimed to refute those who 
'labelled conservatism as being just about individualism. or even selfishness' (1997: 
12). However, he discussed social obligation in terms of local groups, charities, and 
voluntary organisations; using similar language to Willetts (see Chapter 3), and was 
keen to emphasise the limited role for the state in facilitating obligation towards others. 
Contrasting his Conservative approach to Labour"s, he argued that a compassionate 
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society 'is one where more and more over the years people and communities take on 
more responsibility ... Making moral choices, not just assuming that the authorities \yill 
do it all for them' (1997: 12). The purpose of the speech was therefore much more 
about changing the language, tone and emphasis of the Conservative Party's message 
than about any radical reassessment of policy or content. It therefore effectively 
demonstrated the duality of Hague's message, which was directed at both the party and 
the electorate. 
Hague hoped that changes of tone and language would improve the party's image, and 
help to distance himself from the Thatcher-Major era. As Nadler noted, 'throughout his 
leadership campaign and first years as leader, Hague's reforming rhetoric was bold and 
extravagant' (2000: 206). Much of this boldness was directed towards the internal 
organisation of the Conservative Party, which Hague attempted to rejuvenate, 
promising a 'democratic revolution' in his first speech as leader (Seldon and Snowdon, 
2005: 250). Hague hoped that by reforming the party organisation he could demonstrate 
to the public that the Conservatives were renewing themselves for government once 
again. He enlisted Lord Parkinson as his first Party Chairman and gave him a brief to 
pilot the reform process. As Parkinson explains: 
That was how William was going to demonstrate to the country that the party had 
changed. We were going to become a one-member one-vote party, we were going to 
have a governing board in which all strands of the party were represented. He was 
going to make the Conservatives a democratic party. He thought that was a change that 
would bring home to people that we weren't just satisfied with the past, but that we 
were planning to be a different party in the future. (Parkinson Interview). 
For May, these internal reforms were Hague's most significant achievement, as they 
began the process of change in the party, however incrementally. She regretfully 
acknowledged, however, that they were not accompanied by 'much policy change in 
terms of the issues that we campaigned on' (May Interview). 
As well as the policy on the Euro, Hague put his own leadership, and his package of 
party reforms (labelled The Fresh Future) to votes by party members. 2 These ballots, 
and the new electoral system for subsequent party leaders contained in The Fresh 
~ An all-party ballot was also held by Hague on his draft manifesto in October 2000. For a breakdown of 
the results from all of these ballots see Kelly (1003: 88). 
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Future, represented an unprecedented extension of democracy for the ConservatiYes, 
which would resist attempts to unpick them by the outgoing Michael Howard in 2005.3 
However, this extension of 'one member, one vote' (OMOV) has been criticised as 
coming from a more centralised, less democratic party management. On this reading. 
Hague used the facade of democracy to strengthen his own position and his control 
over the party (Kelly, 2003: 82-106). This was an astute strategy on Hague's part. 
clearly inspired by the success of the New Labour project. Faced with a party out of 
touch with mainstream public opinion, it offered the opportunity for Hague. with the 
endorsement of party members, to stamp his own message on the Conservative Party 
and offer a genuine 'fresh start'. 
Kelly argues however, that far from revitalising Conservative Party organisation, 
Hague's reforms actually weakened it. Whilst the new structures cannot be held 
responsible for the 2001 election defeat, they 'clearly failed to mitigate if (2002: 38). 
He goes as far to suggest that in electoral terms they arguably made things worse. 'by 
demoralising, and thus diminishing, the party's constituency membership' (2002: 38). 
This is a damning critique: Hague had sold the reforms to party members as a package 
aimed at enhancing intraparty democracy, and with it the membership organisation. For 
Lees-Marshment and Quayle however, the rationale driving the organisational changes 
was not primarily democratisation, but one of political marketing. They claim that the 
reforms were 'part of an overall strategy to make the Conservatives more market-
orientated and put them in a stronger electoral position' (2001: 206). Their analysis 
leads to a more positive appraisal of Hague's efforts. Whilst these failed to yield results 
in the opinion polls or the 2001 general election, Hague did make 'significant headway 
in undertaking subtle but significant changes that have the long-term potential to 
heighten the Tories' market orientation and electoral prospects' (2001: 206). 
The key issue here (as Lees-Marshment and Quayle acknowledge) is whether any 
extension of internal party democracy is compatible with the deYelopment of a more 
effective marketing strategy and organisation. For example, if such reforms had the 
effect of making the party leadership more responsiyc in policy terms to the wider 
3 After the 2005 election defeat, Howard immediately announced his attention to resign the par1y 
leadership, but not until a review had been conducted. into the rules for selecting the next ~eader. ~arty 
activists rejected the eventuating plan to return the chOIce of leader back to ~ IPs (The Guardwn, 200=,a). 
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membership, would this leave them less able to orientate themselves to their primary 
'market', namely the electorate at large? Lees-Marshment and Quayle suggest a way 
out of this difficulty: 'the introduction of reforms that increase individual membership 
power may in practice serve to strengthen the leadership' (2001: 208). This line of 
reasoning suggests that by devolving power to all party members (who are more likely 
to support the leadership) leaders can sideline radical and/or dissenting party activists. 
This supports Kelly's (2003) accusation, noted above, that Hague centralised power. 
From a political marketing perspective, however, this was a prerequisite for electoral 
recovery: Hague's failure was not his changes to party structure, but his inability to 
utilise these to market the Conservative brand effectively. 
Hague's deputy, Peter Lilley, understood party strategy at the time to be about 
decontaminating the Conservatives' tarnished image, and engaging with the current 
concerns of the electorate. As he explains: 
Instead of being seen as the party which dealt with the problems of the 1980s, we had to 
identify ourselves with the problems of the next decade. Hence our 'Listening to 
Britain' effort to identify new challenges - not going to listen to people to ask them 
what the solutions were, so much as to ask them what the challenges were. Once we 
knew that we could identify ourselves with solving those problems. So that was the first 
part of our strategy. The second part of our strategy was recognising that we were seen 
as being nasty and looking at how to change that aspect of the image, which has taken 
until Cameron to really set about doing in a thorough and comprehensive way. 
(Lilley Interview). 
Such change was certainly required if the Conservatives were to make a substantial 
electoral recovery. In April 1997, MaRl found that 50 percent of the British public felt 
that the party was 'out of touch with ordinary people', and 40 percent believed that it 
would 'promise anything to win votes'. Only 11 percent regarded it as 'moderate' and a 
mere 8 percent believed that it was 'concerned about the people in real need- (MaRl, 
2006). In the early days of his leadership, Hague and his team appeared to grasp the 
need for an image as well as a policy makeover for the party. However, attempts to 
portray Hague as a man of the twenty-first century people were the subject of 
embarrassment and ridicule, and looked unprofessional alongside those of the new 
Prime Minister (Nadler, 2000: 211-214). 
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Hague completely failed to rebrand the ConservatiYe Party (Table 4.1). By May 200 I, 
the public's perception of the ConservatiYe Party \yas largely unchanged from that of 
four years previously. The party was now regarded as 'out of touch' by 36 percent, and 
opportunistic by 46 percent. Less than 1 in 5 respondents agreed that the party 
'understand the problems facing Britain', and only 11 percent thought that a future 
ConservatiYe government would look after their interests. Over the four-year period, 
little tangible advancement can be discerned. Most of the indicators have shifted only 
within the standard margin of error of plus or minus 3 percent, whilst those which have 
shifted by more than this indicate either a greater degree of public cynicism, or perhaps 
more seriously, public indifference. 
Table -1.1: Conservative Party Image, April 1997 - May 2001 
Percentages of respondents agreeing that April 1997 May 2001 Change the Conservative Party ... 
+/- % 
Keeps its promises 5 5 -
Understands the problems facing Britain 20 18 -2 
Represents al/ classes 10 8 -2 
Looks after the interests of people like us 9 11 +2 
Is moderate 11 12 + 1 
Is extreme 10 12 +2 
Is concerned about the people in real need 8 9 + 1 
Has a good team of leaders 10 7 - 3 
Will promise anything to win votes 40 46 +6 
Is out of touch with ordinary people 50 36 - 14 
Has sensible policies 14 15 + 1 
Is too dominated by its leader 10 13 +3 
Is professional in its approach 13 13 -
Is divided 44 30 - 14 
No Opinion 9 10 + 1 
Source: data on Conservative Party image from MORI (2006b). 
In a revealing statement after his resignation Hague acknowledged the strategic errors 
that he had made: 'I got this Parliament the wrong way round. I should haye spent the 
first year or so shoring up the base ConservatiYe vote and then reached out later on' 
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(quoted in Walters, 2001: 111). The context of a party shaken by defeat, with a new 
leader at the helm, gave Hague the opportunity to style a new more inclusive (or 
'compassionate') form of conservatism with wider appeal, and use the authority gained 
by his election and endorsement by party members to impress this on his party. The 
implication of the above quotation is that there was a successful 'core vote' strategy 
that could have then been built upon. However, the second half of his period as leader 
did not shore up the core vote. At the 2001 election, the Conservatives received 8.35 
million votes, over 1.25 million fewer than in 1997. On a substantially reduced turnout, 
the party's share of the vote advanced by one percent, but the polls suggested that a 
higher turnout would have worked against the Conservatives (Butler and Kavanagh, 
2002: 251-264; Tyrie, 2001: 5). 
4.2.2 The fresh future curtailed 
Two key events marked the shift in strategy away from 'reaching out' to 'shoring-up' 
the base Conservative vote. The first was the 1999 R. A. Butler Memorial lecture given 
by the then deputy leader Peter Lilley; the second was the Conservative victory in the 
elections for the European Parliament later the same year. The events surrounding 
Lilley's speech and how it was handled by Hague are a potent illustration of the 
confusion amongst the party's high command about the strategy they were attempting 
to pursue. The speech was cleared by Hague, and was meant to elucidate the 
philosophy of 'Kitchen Table Conservatism' (Walters, 2001: 116). Whilst not a 
repudiation of Thatcherism per se, it was a call for a rhetorical shift by Conservatives 
to a narrative that recognised the value of welfare as well as the value of free markets. 
Lilley recognised that being associated solely with free market doctrine was damaging 
the party, as it served to 'reinforce people's concern that we were planning to convert 
public services into profit making businesses ... that we nurse some nefarious plans to 
privatise health, education and almost everything else ... ' The free market, he argued, 
has never been the sole belief of Conservatives, rather' a sense of obligation is the most 
fundamental Tory value of all' (Lilley, 1999). 
In content, this was not a hugely radical claim. Amongst others, David Willetts had 
been arguing for years in favour of 'civic' as well as free market conservatism 
(Willetts, 1992; 1994). This places a greater emphasis on society and communities as a 
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natural extension of the free market agenda of the 1980s, which is regarded as having 
been essential for securing the prosperity of the country but not as an end in itself. It 
sees no great inconsistency between Thatcherism and traditional conservatism, and 
rejects Gray's (1994) notion that conservatism has been 'undone' by free market zeal. 
Lilley's call for a more prominent Conservative advocacy of the importance of public 
services also appeared consistent with Hague's desire to forge a new identity outlined 
in Kitchen Table Conservatism only six months earlier. This internal party document 
had called for a new Conservative narrative, 'which is about much more than 
economics', addressing issues such as the future of the public services. It called for a 
series of' 10,000 volt initiatives' that would demonstrate in a very public way that the 
party was changing, and generate media attention (Conservative Party, 1998: 4-7). 
Lilley's lecture was an attempt to meet this challenge. He saw it as taking forward the 
findings of 'Listening to Britain', although 'you didn't actually need, or shouldn't have 
needed, that exercise to realise that the focus had turned to improving public services, 
rather than the economic and industrial problems of the 1980s' (Lilley Interview). He 
also saw it as seeking to counter the 'unfair caricature' that the Conservatives had little 
interest in the public services beyond a desire to privatise them. He was warned by 
Nick Wood, Hague's press secretary, that the media would not admit they had 
previously caricatured the party inaccurately, rather 'the best you can hope for is that 
they will say you have changed, and abandoned these policies'. Lilley thought that was 
'fair enough' and telephoned Hague to see if he was happy with that: 'he said yes, as 
long as you emphasise choice'. He also cleared the speech with eleven colleagues 
(Lilley Interview). 
The reaction to the speech suggested the Conservative Party was far from ready for the 
kind of shocks Kitchen Table Conservatism had called for. The lecture was 'one of the 
most incendiary in history' (Taylor, 2005: 146). Thatcher's aides informed Hague that 
she had 'gone ballistic' over the speech, which ironically coincided with the twentieth 
anniversary celebrations of her first general election victory in 1979 (Walters, 2001: 
117). Rather than play it down, party spin doctors initially portrayed the speech as a 
radical new departure for the Conservatives, similar in scale and importance to 
Labour's abandonment of Clause 4 (Walters, 2001: 116; Taylor, 2005: 145-7). Lilley 
was surprised by the reaction, he had 'thought it would be jolly difficult to get any 
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coverage' and saw the speech more as 'an educational resource' to 'try and teach 
people in the party to talk a language that didn't lend itself to being caricatured' as the 
party had been in the past (Lilley Interview). 
At first Hague attempted to weather the storm, after all, he had cleared the speech 
before it was given. However, the outrage amongst the shadow cabinet, parliamentary 
party and local activists proved too strong, and Lilley was sacked in June (Taylor, 
2005: 146). Lilley's departure was 'more or less' a direct consequence of his lecture 
(Lilley Interview). Walters suggests that Hague was 'seared' by the experience: 
'Having tried, tentatively, to take one-step out of the towering shadow of Margaret 
Thatcher, he had been forced to go running back to mummy. He was too scared to step 
out of line again' (2001: 118). 
The furore over the Lilley's lecture weakened Hague, and made him wary of further 
attempts to forge a more 'inclusive' narrative of conservatism. If the key fault line in 
the Conservative Party was now between liberal modernisers and traditionalist 
reactionaries (or 'mods and rockers' as The Times (1998) put it), the context facing 
Hague was transformed in favour of the rockers by Lilley's speech.4 It was the key 
moment in his decision to side with the rockers, 'despite his own sympathy for a more 
"inclusive" approach' (Garnett and Lynch, 2003: 258). This shift was reinforced by the 
results of the 1999 elections to the European Parliament. 
Campaigning on a Eurosceptic manifesto entitled In Europe, not run by Europe, Hague 
led the Conservatives to a dramatic victory in the first nationwide test of the 
government's popularity since the 1997 general election. Despite the threat of the 
breakaway 'Pro-European Conservative Party' (that failed to win a single seat) and the 
resurgent United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) the Conservatives won the 
greatest number of seats (36) and the highest share of the vote: Labour saw its vote 
share slump to 28 percent. Hague hailed the victory as 'a major breakthrough' for his 
party, but more cautious voices pointed to the 23 percent turnout and Labour's 
.j The Times borrowed the 'Mods and Rockers' analogy from the conflicting 1960s youth subcultures. 
The rockers were associated with heavy drinking and 1950s rock and roll, whilst the mods experimented 
with recreational drugs, rhythm and blues, and psychedelia. In the case of the Conservative Party, The 
Times saw the mods as liberal modernisers, and the rockers as authoritarian traditionalists. This is 
discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. See also Denham & O'Hara (2007a). 
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continued lead in the opinion polls (BBC News, 1999). Nonetheless, the electoral 
success did secure Hague's position as leader, and he used the opportunity to reshuffle 
his shadow cabinet and evict his deputy Peter Lilley. It reinforced Hague's position as 
leader and consolidated the hold of the right on power (Shrimsley, 1999). 
The Conservative campaign had been fought on the core vote messages of 'save the 
pound', and 'In Europe, not run by Europe'. The manifesto claimed to be that of 'a 
proudly British party' and promised to 'oppose all new European directives on tax 
harmonisation', 'oppose any extension of qualified majority voting', to protect the 
British rebate, and 'resist any attempt to develop a common immigration policy for the 
EU' (Conservative Party, 1999: 1; 16; 27). Whilst these themes played well with 
Conservative Party members, they lacked the appeal to form the basis of a successful 
general election campaign. Theresa May saw this election as a key moment for the 
party, as 'we took the wrong lessons from them. Having done reasonably well in those 
Euro elections we decided that the way forward was to adopt a core vote strategy, and 
that was a mistake'. Ultimately, she suggests that was 'a collective decision' (May 
Interview). 
However, the twin issues of Europe (Chapter 5) and immigration (Chapter 6) came to 
characterise the public face of the Conservative Party, not least because of the amount 
of media attention that they received. Europe in particular dominated the 
Conservatives' 2001 election campaign. Gary Streeter, who was a member of the 
shadow cabinet, claimed that this change of strategy was not discussed beyond Hague's 
close circle of advisers. However, he noted that 'the election campaign that we ran took 
me slightly by surprise and wasn't quite what I thought we were preparing for. It did 
become a little bit of a core vote strategy, playing to our core support' (Streeter 
Interview). 
In Parkinson's view, Hague had little option but to pursue the core vote: reaching out 
beyond that was simply not a feasible possibility, as anti-Conservative feeling remained 
too strong: 
I'm not sure William could have broadened the party's electoral base much beyond the 
core vote, to be blunt. It was only four years after this horrendous defeat, and there was 
a real reaction against the Conservative Party. He took over a party with the smallest 
parliamentary representation in living memory, with no money, totally demoralised. 
Whatever William had done he was never going to appeal to more than the core vote. I 
couldn't see any floating voters coming back to us after just four years when we'd 
previously been in power for eighteen ... I think William just decided to go after the 
core vote because it was the only vote that was likely to come his way. 
(Parkinson Interview). 
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In one sense, it would have been perverse for the Conservatives not to campaign on 
Europe and immigration - opinion polls suggested public support for the Conservative 
positions, particularly compared to other policy areas such as the public services. 
However, the focus on these issues reinforced the negative image of the Conservative 
Party, and failed to provide a convincing narrative about the purpose of the party. As 
the pollster and political adviser Stan Greenberg commented: 'The people who raise 
these issues, and presumably agree with the Conservative position, still think that the 
Conservatives are backward looking, negative and intolerant. There is no narrative to 
link these concerns, and that is required in modern elections' (quoted in Butler and 
Kavanagh, 2002: 248). 
In her study of Conservative strategy in the 1997-2001 period, Harris commented that: 
'when he first became leader of the Conservative Party, Hague placed his emphasis on 
Britain's multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity but during his leadership this emphasis 
dissipated and he reverted to the more traditionalist rhetoric' (2005: 29). This shift can 
be clearly seen in Hague's speeches. His conference speech in October 1998 attempted 
to associate the Conservative Party with the 'character of the British people' through 
the idea of the 'British Way' (Hague, 1998: 4; 6). Through repeated references to 
Britain and the British people, Hague tried to link the Conservative Party with the idea 
of the nation, and by implication, national identity. Conservatives, Hague suggested, 
reject the 'abstract theories of purists and ideologues' and prefer instead to draw 
inspiration 'from the character of the British people' (1998: 4). He went on: 
Our character is the character of the people. Our beliefs, the beliefs of the people. Our 
purpose the defence, the advancement, the elevation of the people... It is my 
profoundest belief that if the Conservative Party is not in touch with the identity and 
values of the British people then it cannot be authentically Conservative (1998: 5-6). 
Whilst the election results suggested that the Conservatives were far from in touch with 
the identity and values of the people, the notion of a 'British Way' gave Hague some 
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scope to tap into the 'One Nation' Conservative tradition: the speech contained 
references to Pitt, Wilberforce, Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain, as well as the de 
rigueur nods to Churchill and Thatcher. But by linking the Conservatives to an 
apparently deep-rooted and enduring Britishness, it risked excluding the those who 
lacked an affinity to such an idea, in stark contrast to the big tent of New Labour's 
'New Britain'. Contrary to Hague's claim that 'the Conservative way is the British 
Way' (1998: 19), the 'British Way' appeared as a rather narrow Conservative way. 
The 'British Way' slogan did not survive for long, but its spirit was transferred to the 
'Common Sense Revolution' (CSR) which became the dominant theme of Hague's 
speeches and campaigning.5 Launched at the 1999 conference, the CSR 'was ostensibly 
based upon the public services and Europe' with inclusion as its major theme (Harris, 
2005: 273). However, as Harris noted, these themes 'were submerged by Hague's 
vociferous appeals to those who shared his common sense values, whom he believed to 
constitute the "mainstream majority" of the British people' (2005: 273). There is a clear 
parallel here with Keith Joseph's advocacy of the 'common ground' in the 1970s. 
Joseph contrasted the common ground, which he regarded as 'the common ground with 
the people and their aspirations' with the 'middle ground', which is simply an 
unprincipled compromise between the shifting positions of politicians (1976b: 19). He 
argued that attempts to stay on the middle ground, in the hope of attracting the median 
voter, had left the Conservative Party dangerously out of touch with the people, and led 
to a 'left-wing ratchet' (1976b: 19). More than twenty years later the CSR was 
premised on a similar belief - that the politically correct liberalism of the metropolitan 
elite did not represent the 'real' people, who would much prefer a dose of 'common 
sense'. However whilst Joseph's prescription for curing the British disease in the 1970s 
- primarily tackling inflation and the 'union problem' (Joseph, 1976a; 1979) - chimed 
with the electorate and hit upon salient issues, Hague's call for a Common Sense 
Revolution did not. In 1979 the Conservatives' agenda was assisted by the Winter of 
Discontent, which helped to justify Joseph's thesis and tarred the Labour government 
with responsibility for the apparent crisis of governability and economic decline. 
Twenty years later, by contrast, it was the Conservatives who were held largely 
responsible for the problems in the public services, which the CSR proposed to solve. 
5 For a systematic analysis of the CSR strategy, see Harris (2005), particularly chapters 6 & 7. 
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The Conservatives' language and campaigning grew gradually more hysterical as the 
parliament dragged on, culminating in Hague's notorious 'foreign land' speech in 
March 2001. In this speech Hague invited his audience to image the 'foreign land' that 
Britain would become if Labour were to be re-elected, and claimed that the 
Conservatives would 'give you back your country' (Hague, 2001). The forthcoming 
election was, he suggested, 'the last chance' the electorate had 'to vote for a Britain that 
still controls its own destiny' (Hague, 2001). The themes covered in the speech -
Europe, tax, health, education, and asylum - were simply a continuation of the CSR 
strategy, but the language used was a deliberate attempt to mobilise the Conservative 
core vote, and caused something of a furore as Hague was openly criticised by 'One 
Nation' Conservatives such as Michael Heseltine (Watt, 2001). 
Harris claims that the CSR 'was narrow yet inclusive: it was inclusive to all Britons as 
long as they shared traditionalist values and a traditionalist approach to, for example, 
Europe and the issue of asylum. The mainstream majority was in direct contrast to the 
liberal elite' (2005: 248). This seemingly oxymoronic conclusion sums up the failure of 
the CSR - it was narrow, as it was 'inclusive' of only a certain section of the electorate, 
and was far from ever constituting a mainstream majority. Although it was never 
presented in overtly racial language, its openness only to 'all Britons' who shared 
certain traditionalist views implicitly excluded ethnic groups such as those Hague had 
flirted with at the Notting Hill Carnival. Hague's decision to target the core vote was 
clear when he told the party conference in October 1999: 'when local councils spend 
more money looking after bogus asylum seekers than after old people in homes, Britain 
needs a Common Sense Revolution' (Hague, 1999). The narrow and sectional nature of 
this appeal left the Conservatives bereft of an over-arching narrative with any 
widespread appeal. The Conservatives lost the 2001 election as they lacked such a 
narrative, they lacked a reputation for governing competence, and because the public 
image of both the party and its leader were poor. The focus on core vote issues such as 
Europe reinforced the negative image of the party. Public enthusiasm for the Labour 
government had waned after four years in office, but the Conservatives did not benefit 
from an electoral bounce and the pendulum failed to swing. The Tories were also 
penalised by the electoral system, which worked against them as their votes were less 
efficiently distributed than Labour's. The context of Labour's commanding majority 
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and reputation for economIC management made a Conservative victory all but 
impossible; but the failure to make any headway was a serious one, and Hague duly 
resigned. 
4.3 The search for narrative, 2001-2005 
My view was that the scale of our slaughter suggested that we needed to do 
some very fundamental rethinking. 
John Bercow MP (Interview). 
The battle between mods and rockers was rejoined in the leadership election to succeed 
William Hague. The defeat of the doyen of the modernisers, Michael Portillo, initially 
appeared to be a major blow to their cause. Portillo rapidly retreated from politics, and 
the mantle instead passed to the archetypal rocker lain Duncan Smith (Chapter 7: 181-
8). The party Duncan Smith inherited was arguably in a more parlous state than at the 
time of Hague's accession. Perhaps the only major advantage Duncan Smith enjoyed 
over his predecessor was a greater realisation amongst his colleagues of the scale of the 
challenge they faced if they were ever be returned to power (see for example, Tyrie, 
2001). However, Streeter claimed that whilst the number of his colleagues on the 
Conservative benches who realised 'the extent to which we needed to change' was on 
the rise, the increase in numbers was 'a trickle, not a flood'. In his view, 'maybe twenty 
or thirty people were moving' (Streeter Interview). For Bercow, this is relatively easily 
explained: 
I think both colleagues in the parliamentary party, and party workers in the country, still 
felt that the was no need for the party to change in a fundamental way ... [They thought] 
the reason we had lost heavily for a second time in a row was simply that the economy 
was in a relatively good state, house prices were rising, people felt comfortable. And if 
they thought anything beyond that, they probably felt well, we were in office for a long 
time, the public may not be completely enamoured with the Blair Labour Party but they 
have only been in four years and they want to give them a bit longer. 
(Bercow Interview). 
The election of Duncan Smith offered no immediate prospect of a solution to the 
Conservatives' popularity problems, inspiring little public or media enthusiasm. Under 
the new rules for electing the leader, Duncan Smith received 54 votes in the second 
ballot of MPs, to Clarke's 59 and Portillo's 53: before winning 60.7 percent of the vote 
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in the final all-party run-off against Clarke. This new system was soon blamed for the 
election of Duncan Smith and the travails that followed, despite the lack of evidence to 
suggest that a different result would have been achieved under the old rules (Cowley 
and Green, 2005: 47-50).6 However, one consequence of the Hague rules was that just 
25 of the 112 MPs who had not voted for Duncan Smith could trigger a vote of no 
confidence in his leadership: as Denham and O'Hara note, 'MPs who regarded the new 
party leader as an electoral liability would not even have to nominate an alternative 
candidate' (2008: 66). Further, there was no restriction on when the required number of 
signatures could be gathered, allowing dissenters the opportunity to strike at a time of 
their own choosing (although a leader surviving such a vote cannot be subjected to 
another for at least a year). This potential problem with the 'no confidence' aspect of 
the system was discussed when the rules were devised, when there 'was patently 
considerable unease amongst MPs that unless it were carefully circumscribed the new 
procedure would unduly weaken the leader's position' (Alderman, 1999: 266). On the 
other hand, as Kelly argued, the Hague rules potentially helped to secure Duncan Smith 
by creating 'strong incentives to leave an incumbent alone' - not least the prospect of 
another long, drawn-out and acrimonious leadership election attracting further negative 
publicity to the party for several months (2003: 101). As Denham and O'Hara argue 
however, the leadership selection rules put Duncan Smith in 'an impossible position' as 
he had not received either deep or widespread support from his MPs, who held the 
procedural key to his removal (2008: 99). 
The episode illustrates the constraints of the strategic context of the time. Had either 
Clarke or Portillo emerged victorious, they would have faced the same apparent lack of 
legitimacy having secured (like Duncan Smith) barely one-third support in the 
parliamentary party. They would also have faced the same problem of how to respond 
to the Blairite Labour hegemony. The context of a public perception of economic crisis 
and national decline, which gave Thatcherite solutions their electoral appeal, no longer 
applied. The new context of greater economic prosperity had created a more pressing 
political dilemma - how to fund and deliver better public services. The Labour Party 
had successfully made this the public's key electoral concern, by accepting the free 
market in many areas but questioning the extent to which untrammelled market 
6 For example, Michael Howard and Peter Lilley are both of the view that Duncan Smith would have 
emerged victorious had the final decision remained with MPs (Denham & O'Hara, 2008: 69, note 47). 
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liberalism and privatisation could deliver public services effectively. Even as market-
based initiatives such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have been spread 
throughout the public services, Labour have successfully preserved (at least 
temporarily) the mass provision of health and education services free at the point of 
delivery. In this sense, the major accomplishment and legacy of the Blair government 
has been the fencing-off of a distinct state sector, and the apparent creation of a new 
consensus on the scope of the state in the early twenty-first century. Whilst the 
government's progress in improving the public services between 1997 and 2001 did not 
fulfil the electorate's hopes, the Conservatives had 'evolved neither a convincing 
narrative nor effective statecraft' in answer to this quandary (Taylor, 2005: 152). 
The brief tenure of Duncan Smith also demonstrates the import of agency. The vote of 
confidence in his leadership was ultimately triggered by the faintly ridiculous 
'Betsy gate' scandal, when he was accused of impropriety over the employment of his 
wife in his private office (Duncan Smith was later exonerated); but other more serious 
avoidable mistakes were made (O'Hara, 2005: 296-7). The fiasco over the Adoption 
and Children Bill exposed his tactical ineptitude as a leader, and the irony of the former 
Maastricht rebel demanding that the party 'unite or die' was not lost on many (Chapter 
7: 185-6). His weak grip on the party was apparent to the both the media and the public, 
particularly after his botched attempt to install Barry Legg as chief executive of 
Conservative Central Office (Redwood, 2004: 156). Duncan Smith lacked the 
charismatic public persona necessary for success in the media age, and the polls 
suggested that he was an electoral liability (Garnett and Lynch, 2003b: 8). Nonetheless, 
an embryonic Conservative narrative emerged during his leadership, and a substantive 
policy renewal process began. 
4.3.1 On the quiet: progress under Duncan Smith 
Despite his reputation as a traditionalist hardliner, Duncan Smith showed signs of 
having heeded some of the lessons of defeat. Within weeks of being elected leader, he 
expressed his desire to re-establish the Conservative Party as 'the party of ideas' by 
launching a policy review (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005a: 259). The early days of his 
leadership were overshadowed by the events of 9111, but he used his first keynote 
conference address as leader to proclaim that' Public services are our greatest mission.' 
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He pledged to 'bring an open mind to the task of reforming public services', declaring: 
'not for us the ideological baggage, the special favours for those who pay the political 
bills. For the Conservatives it is just the determination to succeed' (Duncan Smith, 
2001). 
This speech marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the Conservatives to 
reposition themselves as a party of the public services, an agenda that would outlive 
Duncan Smith's leadership and be taken into the 2005 general election and beyond. It 
also marked a shift in rhetoric towards pragmatic politics, and a search for attractive 
policies. Members of the shadow cabinet made speeches and wrote articles on the 
subject of schools, hospitals and crime consistently over the following four years. 
Oliver Letwin made a series of speeches on the 'Neighbourly Society', a thoughtful 
form of conservatism that sought to go beyond free markets (Letwin, 2003a). The issue 
of Europe received a much lower profile, although opposition to the proposed European 
Constitution was quickly established. However, a commitment to the public services 
presented a strategic dilemma to the Conservatives. How could they balance their 
desire for lower taxes with the new dedication to public services? (Taylor, 2005: 144-
153). 
The process of policy renewal made progress under Duncan Smith, and his record in 
this regard compares favourably to that of his predecessor (Seldon and Snowdon, 
2005a: 259-62). However, there 'was no obvious sign of a coherent general "narrative", 
underpinning the various policies' (Garnett and Lynch, 2003b: 11). Duncan Smith and 
his team did attempt to weave such a narrative around the theme of 'Compassionate 
Conservatism', a term borrowed from George W. Bush. The revival of local 
government through 'community government' based on 'trusting the people' was 
suggested, in language not dissimilar to that of the Direct Democracy campaign that 
came three years later (Duncan Smith, 2002a; Direct Democracy, 2005). Duncan Smith 
pledged to 'champion the vulnerable', with a revival of public services 'as community 
institutions, not branch offices of government' (Duncan Smith, 2002b). He used his 
first anniversary as party leader to declare publicly his desire to defeat 'the five giants' 
that blight Britain's poorest communities. The targets he selected - 'failing schools. 
crime, substandard healthcare, child poverty, and insecurity in old age' - were less 
instructive than the language he chose to employ, which deliberately echoed that of the 
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Beveridge Report (Duncan Smith, 2002d; Seldon and Snowdon, 2005a: 260-1). 
Similarly, his speech to the 'Compassionate Conservatism Conference' a year later 
declared that Labour should not be allowed a monopoly on compassion, as poverty 'is 
too important [an issue] to leave to anyone political party' (Duncan Smith, 2003). 
Duncan Smith saw this as a two-stage strategy. The first stage was 'to move away from 
the subjects that we are most readily identified with... [on to] issues that are not 
normally associated as priorities of the Conservative Party' (Duncan Smith Interview). 
Hence the persistent focus on public services: 
When people are asked what are their priorities, they started with health normally, and 
then went go things like education and employment, and we needed to reflect those 
priorities as our own. I had a sense that the public needed to instinctively begin to re-
identify with the party that they felt cared about what they did, a big challenge. 
(Duncan Smith Interview). 
The second phase was then to 'refocus the party even further still, into the problems of 
the worst-off in society' (Duncan Smith Interview). The aim of this was not to win 
votes for the Conservative Party in the deprived areas of Britain, but to: 
. .. demonstrate to people, for the right reasons, that the Conservative Party back in 
government would want to govern in the best interests of Britain as a whole, not just as 
what we had become identified as (not true, but we did), as solely in favour of a 
smallish number of people who had 'made it'. That's not true of conservatism in its 
wider historical context, and it's not true of the Conservative Party I joined, but that's 
the perception that the media had imparted and that people had gleaned from the latter 
days of the Conservative government, and that needed to be rectified. We needed to 
broaden the party out, stretch the elastic out a bit. And that meant going further and 
deeper than we'd been before. (Duncan Smith Interview). 
This attitude demonstrates that Duncan Smith had appreciated one of the major 
electoral problems that the Conservative Party faced - its public image, reinforced by 
Hague's Common Sense Revolution, as a narrow, sectional party. Duncan Smith hoped 
to change this not by changing policy on Europe or immigration (these were in fact 
firmed slightly), but by focussing on other things. For Duncan Smith, 'we needed at 
least two years working away at this before we even talked about those [Europe and 
immigration] again' (Duncan Smith Interview). As such, Duncan Smith made a 
consistent attempt to recast conservatism in the language of 'Compassionate 
Conservatism', with key foci on tackling poverty and improving the public services. 
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Arguably, only a figure from the right such as Duncan Smith could pursue such a 
strategy, as it drew criticism from that wing of the party (Cowley and Green, 2005: 52). 
Like Hague's brief flirtation with compassionate conservatism it failed, despite the 
greater persistence of Duncan Smith. It failed not because it lacked intellectual 
coherence, but because of poor leadership and party image (Taylor, 2005: 153). 
Conservative Party image data remained stubbornly negative under both Duncan Smith 
and Howard, showing little deviation from the picture bequeathed by Hague (Table 
4.2). 
Table 4.2: Conservative Party Image, May 2001 - April 2005 
Percentages of respondents agreeing that May 2001 Sept April Change, the Conservative Party ... 
2003 2005 2001-5 
+/- % 
Keeps its promises 5 4 3 
-2 
Understands the problems facing Britain 18 20 22 +4 
Represents all classes 8 8 9 + 1 
Looks after the interests of people like us 11 9 11 -
Is moderate 12 14 12 -
Is extreme 12 12 14 +2 
Is concerned about the people in real need 9 11 14 +5 
Has a good team of leaders 7 8 8 +1 
Will promise anything to win votes 46 35 45 - 1 
Is out of touch with ordinary people 36 32 32 -4 
Has sensible policies 15 16 17 +2 
Is too dominated by its leader 13 5 16 +3 
Is professional in its approach 13 14 15 +2 
Is divided 30 34 23 - 7 
No Opinion 10 19 14 +4 
Source: data on Conservative Party image from MaRl (2006c). 
Duncan Smith was hampered from the beginning by a lack of support in the 
parliamentary party, and failed even to convince key members of his shadow cabinet 
members of the merits of his approach (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005a: 260). Theresa 
May noted that support for the' change' agenda amongst her shadow cabinet colleagues 
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'varied' (May Interview). One commented that: 'I didn't dislike lain personally but 
thought that his leadership was completely hopeless and there wasn't the slightest 
chance of us winning an election under his leadership' (Anonymous Interview). 
Another of Duncan Smith's frontbench colleagues echoed this sentiment: "He was a 
pleasant enough fellow but totally ill-suited to the task of leading the Conservative 
Party' (Anonymous Interview). For Streeter, 'the agenda was coming right, although 
I'm not sure that people believed it from us at that stage, and that's important'. The 
central problem was Duncan Smith's personal appeal and skills: 'lain was not electable 
as a Prime Minister. It was just about his personal leadership, he just wasn't up to if 
(Streeter Interview). 
Like Hague, Duncan Smith also showed signs of deviating from this agenda in the light 
of his failure to increase the level of Conservative Party support. John Bercow, who 
resigned from Duncan Smith's shadow cabinet (Chapter 7: 185) saw his agenda for 
change as limited and undermined by a number of problems. He accepts that Duncan 
Smith started the policy renewal process, but only on 'a pretty modest scale'. He 
explained: 
He did do that, but I think there were a couple of problems. Firstly there wasn't full 
sign-up to it in the party, there was no great enthusiasm for that message of change. No 
way had it seized and energised the party, it was very much in the mind of lain and a 
few people around him, and there were people in the shadow cabinet who didn't really 
believe in it. And secondly, once he failed to make progress in the polls he retreated 
into his shell and started to adopt the core vote approach. That was reflected in what I 
thought was an unfortunate and regrettable speech delivered weeks before his 
departure: he spoke to the party conference and delivered a very hard-line speech which 
effectively represented the return to the core base. I thought that was a great pity. 
(Bercow Interview). 
In the speech Bercow refers to, Duncan Smith (2003b) claimed that the asylum system 
was 'spiralling out of control'; made 43 references to 'tax', 'taxes' and 'taxpayers': and 
won a standing ovation for his pledge to fight the proposed European constitution. 
indicating that (even if it were signed) a future Conservative government would seek to 
withdraw from it. In the opinion of one commentator, Duncan Smith 'chose to save his 
own skin' but by doing so 'sank his own party' (Glover, 2003). 
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Duncan Smith's legacy was the policy agenda adopted by Michael Howard. In Theresa 
May's view, 'lain did a lot more to change the party and to move the change agenda 
forward than many people actually realise' (May Interview). The origins of the five 
pledges made by Howard in the 2005 election campaign can all be found in speeches 
and articles delivered in 2002 and 2003, either by Duncan Smith himself or other 
shadow ministers. For example, the promise of 'More Police' can be traced to Letwin's 
(2003b) call for 'neighbourhood policing'; and the pledge of 'School Discipline' was 
present in an earlier speech by the Shadow Education Secretary Damian Green (2001). 
The pledge that would dominate the 2005 election, that of 'Controlled Immigration' 
and the associated campaign posters proclaiming that 'It's not racist to impose limits on 
immigration', widely attributed to campaign director Lynton Crosby, differed little in 
tone or content from an article attributed to Duncan Smith (2002c) published in The 
Sun in May 2002. 
The Conservatives therefore had a more consistent policy agenda, with a greater range 
of policies on key issues such as health, education and crime. However, they had failed 
to dissipate the perception that they were 'the nasty party', and their protestations about 
tackling poverty and improving the public services therefore remained unconvincing. 
This left the Conservatives in a bind. To revert their focus to the unholy 'Tebbit trinity' 
of Europe, immigration and tax would only serve to reinforce the 'nasty party' image, 
and confirm public suspicions of their true colours.7 However, the Conservative 
message on poverty and the public services, hampered by a lack of support amongst 
some Conservatives themselves and the poor communication skills of their leader, had 
failed to convince a sceptical electorate. A change of leadership, despite fear of yet 
more bloodletting, became the most palatable option. 
4.3.2 Abandoning the search: Michael Howard and a third defeat 
The effort to meet Greenberg'S challenge - to develop a coherent narrative - was 
abandoned by Michael Howard. His emphasis was on delivery. 'It's time for action' 
was the by-line of the party's 2005 manifesto, which also laid out a timetable for action 
for the first few months of Conservative government. Howard told colleagues that: 
7 The 'Tebbit trinity' is Andrew Rawnsley's phrase, quoted in O'Hara (2005: 324). 
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"Talking about small concrete measures to improve people's lives is what I'm about, 
not having a big idea or vision'. This frustrated some, one shadow minister commented 
that: "The dye was cast then. We were not going to have a strategy' (quoted in 
Kavanagh and Butler, 2005: 38). 
This was a strategic error by Howard. His leadership brought a public unity to the 
Conservative Party, and - momentarily at least - the apparent revival of the desire for 
power traditionally regarded as the key to Conservative hegemony. The fears of further 
public bloodshed in yet another leadership contest were swept away by Howard's 
coronation. It brought a new vitality and sense of purpose to the party, and was 
welcomed as "the first sign of realism in the Conservative Party after so many years of 
disagreement and divisions' (Redwood, 2004: 159). Howard's early pronouncements as 
leader also suggested that he would take forward the reform agenda begun by Duncan 
Smith. Two months after becoming leader, he gave a major speech to the think-tank 
Policy Exchange outlining his vision of "the British Dream'. In it, Howard discussed 
proposals for improving schools and the health service, better provision of childcare, 
his support for civil partnerships, and how to "help families achieve the work-life 
balance that is best for them' (Howard, 2004: 14). There was no mention of 
immigration or asylum, and just one passing reference to the European Union. Today, 
he declared, 'we face new challenges. As the country's economy has strengthened and 
stabilised, the failings of our public services have become clear' (2004: 18). As such, 
this speech appeared to recognise, as Duncan Smith had done, the importance of the 
public services in the forthcoming election. 
Howard acknowledged that in policy terms he continued the programme begun by 
Duncan Smith: 
A lot of policy work had been carried out during lain's time as leader - with which of 
course I was intimately involved because as I was Shadow Chancellor - and I took on 
and developed a lot of the themes that he had started, but there was no radical shift, I 
don't think, in policy terms between his leadership and mine. (Howard Interview). 
However, Duncan Smith had tried to deploy a two-stage strategy: the first stage 
involving a greater focus on the public services and the development of new policies in 
this area, and a second stage aimed at changing people's image of the Conservatives 
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through a focus on issues not traditionally associated with the party. particularly the 
social justice agenda. By his own acknowledgement, Howard failed to carry this 
forward: 'Yes, I probably didn't do enough in terms of talking about championing the 
vulnerable, although I subscribe to his general approach. In terms of policies we 
developed the policies that lain had started to develop' (Howard Interview). Duncan 
Smith similarly saw his strategy as being neglected by his successor: 'It's interesting 
that David Cameron has picked up the baton, with a small blip from Michael Howard. 
For about a year we didn't follow that agenda, but we're back on the same agenda now, 
which is good' (Duncan Smith interview). Theresa May views the Howard period in a 
similar way: 
I think Michael, to a very great extent, returned us to the more traditional Conservative 
Party areas ... there were some areas where he did carry forward the change, but in 
terms of the key issues ... schools and hospitals were within the five key points that we 
campaigned on, so to that extent yes he did carry it forward. But the wider issues of 
social justice, and helping the vulnerable, those sort of things were not really carried 
forward. (May Interview). 
The failure to carry this agenda forward can be seen throughout Howard's later 
speeches, and in the Conservative campaign at the 2005 election. A typical Howard 
speech, in the run-up to the election, declared that 'it's time to take a stand on the issues 
that matter' (Howard, 2005). In this speech Howard suggested that voters 'unhappy 
about higher taxes, uncontrolled immigration, rising crime and dirty hospitals' should 
'take a stand' and 'be true to our country' by voting against the government (2005). 
Although public service issues such as health and education were mentioned, Howard's 
claims that the Conservatives would address them more successfully than Labour 
lacked credibility or a coherent critique. This failure is even more damning as 
Howard's authority - having successfully inculcated his MPs with discipline and unity 
- offered him the opportunity denied to Duncan Smith to pull the party behind the 
'Compassionate Conservatism' narrative. More sympathetically to Howard, he perhaps 
calculated that his own image as a Thatcherite right-winger (not dissimilar to that of his 
predecessor), would render such a pitch unconvincing, and he opted instead for a 
statement of 16 core beliefs. This was presented as a personal rather than an ideological 
list, but a conservative tinge was present in his stated desire to 'remove the obstacles' 
in the way of people's ambitions (see Redwood, 2004: 167-8; O'Hara, 2005: 313-328). 
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Howard's pitch to the country at the 2005 general election was an offer of incremental, 
quantifiable measures, inspired by his list of core beliefs. The personalisation of the 
Conservative campaign was completed by the addition of Howard's 'eleventh word' -
accountability - to the five key election pledges. This tied the successful delivery of the 
'Timetable for Action' to Howard personally, with the pledge that he would resign ifhe 
failed to deliver. The Conservatives lost their reputation for governing competence with 
the ERM debacle in 1992, and the accountability pledge was an attempt to restore faith 
in the party's ability to manage the country. Howard sold the 'Timetable for Action' on 
the basis of his record as Home Secretary, claiming that his success in reducing crime 
demonstrated that he 'knows how to get ajob done' (Conservative Party, 2004). 
The 2005 Conservative election campaign was criticised for the prominence given to 
immigration policy, although this can be partly explained by the increased salience of 
the issue (Chapter 6). The influence of Lynton Crosby, Howard's election strategist, 
was also important in determining the tone of the campaign. As Michael Howard noted, 
whilst Crosby did not determine the content of policies, 'in terms of the emphasis we 
gave to different policies and the way that we presented them, certainly Lynton's 
advice was very influential' (Howard Interview). Compared to the party's campaign of 
four years previously, Howard's five pledges covered a broader range of concerns. 
Duncan Smith's public service agenda was utilised, albeit in a grossly pared down 
form. The core theme of Duncan Smith's agenda - concern for the vulnerable and the 
need for social justice - no longer featured. Without this, the Conservatives lacked an 
over-arching narrative, and were left with managerialism, with Howard to be personally 
accountable, as the unifying theme. Without an economic crisis to destroy Labour's 
reputation for economic competence, it was a battle that the Conservatives could not 
hope to win. 
4.4 Conclusion: Strategic Failure 
The scale of the Conservative Party's woes since 1997 has been well documented: after 
18 years in office, the 'natural party of government' saw its share of the vote and 
representation in the House of Commons collapse, in a landslide defeat the size of 
which few had anticipated (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 120-132, 244-253). Four years 
later, 'Labour's second landslide' produced another defeat of similar statistical 
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magnitude, arguably the worst result in the Conservative Party's history (Tyrie. 2001: 
3; Geddes and Tonge, 2001; Butler and Kavanagh, 2002: 251-9). The general election 
of 2005 saw the government's majority more than halved, and the Conservative ranks 
swelled to 198, a net gain of 32 seats. This was presented in the media as something of 
a success for the party and may represent a turning point, if only in terms of preventing 
an implosion of the Conservative Party as a credible political force. On the plus side for 
the Conservatives, the party came within 3 percentage points of equalling Labour's 
share of the vote, although this was largely due to a decline in support for the governing 
party from 40.7 percent in 2001 to 35.2 percent in 2005 (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005: 
204). The Conservatives actually out-polled Labour by 57,000 votes in England, 
although they won 93 fewer seats. However, the 32.4 percent of the national vote 
received by the Conservatives represented an improvement of only 0.7 percent on 
2001, and the party's share of the vote fell in the North East; the North West; Yorkshire 
and Humberside; and perhaps most surprisingly, the East Midlands (Ashcroft, 2005: 
85; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005: 204-7). Michael Howard followed the precedent set by 
William Hague and John Major before him by resigning the day after the election. 
These three consecutive defeats represent the Conservatives' worst electoral 
performance for over a century. This failure is the result of an unfavourable political 
terrain combined with poor strategic decision-making by the party. The external factors 
of a resurgent centrist Labour Party and an electoral system biased against them made a 
Conservative return to power within four years of 1997 highly improbable, but the 
failure to make any substantive progress towards that goal represented a serious 
breakdown for a party that prides itself on being a governing party (Ball, 2005: 1). The 
Conservatives' continued travails after 2001 have led some authors to speculate that the 
party faces a long-term structural decline, caused by ideological divisions and an aging 
support-base (Garnett and Lynch, 2003b: 15-18). 
After the 1997 election Willetts and Forsdyke suggested that the Conservatives could 
either move rapidly to regain the electorate's confidence, or be forced to change more 
slowly by a series of defeats, either way change 'is inescapable' (1999: 1). The 
Conservatives, it has been argued, did not act quickly to recover after Labour's 1997 
landslide. Even after a second crushing defeat in 2001, the election of Duncan Smith as 
party leader appeared to be an illustration of the Houdini-esque abilities of the 
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Conservative Party to escape from the need for change. However, this conventional 
interpretation fails to appreciate the complexity of the actual series of events. The party 
did undertake several re-branding exercises under Hague, none of which had the 
desired effect on the party's image or opinion-poll rating. The party 'tried everything' 
(Ancram Interview), but nothing seemed to work. The narrow core vote appeal that 
Hague left with at the 2001 election only served to make the job of his successor all the 
more difficult. A more consistent narrative was pursued under Duncan Smith, but also 
with little apparent positive effect for the Conservatives. In policy terms, Duncan Smith 
did lay some important foundations, and in the development of his social justice agenda 
began the long process of re-engaging the Conservatives with issues that had received 
little attention from Thatcherism. However, his inability to manage his party or present 
it in a credible way meant that his leadership was doomed. For Seldon and Snowdon, 
Michael Howard 'had the easiest task, and his failure was thus the greatest' (2005b: 
143). The relatively fortuitous circumstances he enjoyed, of a policy agenda, rapidly 
united party and an embryonic inclusive narrative, were not transformed into a coherent 
strategy, and were ultimately reduced to a 'mean-spirited and reactionary' election 
campaign (Portillo, 2005). 
The application of the strategic-relational approach (SRA) provides a framework for 
the analysis of the party in this period, and its adaptive efforts. In addition the SRA 
encourages greater understanding of the reasons for Conservative electoral failure. A 
classic Downsian analysis would suggest that the party should have moved rapidly to 
reposition itself in the 'centre-ground' position of the median voter following defeat in 
1997. Such an explanation is clearly inadequate. The SRA allows for a more nuanced 
interpretation, which highlights the strategic calculations of key actors and how they 
were informed by their interpretation of the context at the time. In this case, the 
analytical division between 'mods and rockers' in the Conservative Party reflects a 
disagreement over electoral strategy based on differing interpretations of the political 
situation and the nature of the party's context. The presence of a threat to the party's 
'right flank' in the form of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). 
undoubtedly informed these strategic calculations, inhibiting a Downsian repositioning. 
This was partly informed by a need to retain the party's core vote, but in articulating an 
appeal designed to do this, the party reduced its attractiveness to the wider electorate. 
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This influenced the election campaigns of both 2001 and 2005, with the focus on 
immigration during the latter being a deliberate ploy to neutralise the UKIP threat. 
The strategic-relational analysis also accentuates the way in which greater economic 
prosperity in the 1990s led to the emergence of a new strategic dilemma for the 
Conservative Party. The 'reversal of national economic decline' was no longer the key 
task for the party as it had been under Thatcher, nor was it any longer an issue of major 
public concern. However, the rhetoric of Thatcherism and the known desire of 
Conservatives to 'roll back the frontiers of the state' had a lasting impact, causing 
distrust amongst an electorate increasingly concerned with the government's ability to 
enhance public service delivery in health and education. The perception that the 
Conservatives held a secret desire to privatise or abolish core public services may well 
have been misguided, but derived from Conservative discourse. Previous politicians 
had shaped the strategic terrain that Hague inherited in this manner, but he and his 
successors have struggled to recast it. 
The application of the SRA to the Conservative Party in opposition exposes the need 
for the party to devise a narrative that meets the electorate's desire for improved public 
services, without alienating the voters or disowning the Thatcherite commitment to the 
free market. This dilemma has confronted the past three Conservative leaders, and 
remains the key challenge under David Cameron. In this respect, the SRA manifests the 
medium to long-term 'waves' in the contours of the political context, which often 
extend beyond the traditional electoral cycle. Applying the SRA has also demonstrated 
the importance of this contoured context in structuring the choice of strategies by 
successive leaders. Faced with no easy solution to the public services dilemma, Hague 
succumbed to short-term tactical point scoring against the government. As his final 
conference speech demonstrated, had it lasted a full parliament the Duncan Smith 
leadership may well have yielded in the same way, particularly if the more consistent 
message he aspired to continued to bear no fruit. 
It has been suggested that the key factor underlying electoral choice is 'valence', that is 
'people's judgements of the overall competence of the rival political parties' (Clarke et 
ai., 2004: 9). The Conservatives' trump card in 1992 - the reputation for econOlnic 
competence - had been lost on Black Wednesday. Furthermore, it is argued that 
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judgements of valence are reached through two shortcuts, 'leadership evaluations and 
party identification' (Clarke et al., 2004: 9). On both counts, the Conservatives haye 
consistently fallen short of Labour. Combined with the distrust on the public services, 
the effect has been a virtual flat-lining by the Conservatives in the polls. The 
importance of leadership (and political actors generally) was also illustrated by the 
application of the SRA. Poor leadership skills and tactical errors undid Duncan Smith, 
and allowed Howard the chance to put his own stamp on the party. The strategic-
relational analysis also highlights the importance of context, and suggests that whoever 
had led the Conservatives during this period would have found leading the party to a 
general election victory a near impossible challenge. However, the strategies of Hague, 
Duncan Smith and Howard were sub-optimal, and missed the chance to develop a 
convincing narrative of the purpose of conservatism in the post-Thatcherite era. 
Between 1997 and 2005, the Conservatives were unable to fulfil the mImmum 
requirement for an opposition party: the presentation of a credible govermng 
alternative. Incapacity to appreciate the reasons for defeat in 1997 led to strategic 
confusion and a failure to develop a consistent narrative of conservatism. As Chapter 1 
discussed, having provided an overview of this period, further chapters will analyse in 
greater depth three particular dilemmas, as a way of considering how conservatism has 
reacted to the changing strategic context in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. These three each pose significant ideological challenges for the party, 
unresolved after 18 years in power. This will shed light on the ideological nature of 
conservatism, and expose how contradictions and difficulties within it have contributed 
to political problems for Conservatives over the past decade. 
The first dilemma to be explored (Chapter 5) will be the European Question. The issue 
of Britain's relationship with Europe has been a highly divisive one for many years, 
and was a crucial factor in the demise of John Major's government. This chapter will 
explore whether the relative calm in the Conservative Party on this issue in recent years 
reflects a genuine resolution of it, or is simply a function of being out of office. 
The issue of national identity within conservatism will be explored further in Chapter 6. 
As well as the issue of Europe, other challenges to a traditional ConserYatiyc 
understanding of British national identity have occurred in recent years: for example as 
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a result of devolution, and as a consequence of higher levels of immigration. The issue 
of immigration is also not a new dilemma for Conservatives, but has once again 
become an electorally very salient one. In an increasingly liberalised global market, it 
presents a dilemma to Conservatives: how can they balance their commitment to free 
markets with their desire to conserve traditional forms of national and social identity? 
Chapter 7 will consider the dilemma of social morality in politics. In a world where the 
old debate 'systems debate' no longer reigns supreme, different challenges animate 
politics. For Conservatives in particular, their old role as the defenders of capitalism is 
no longer sufficient justification for their election. One possible avenue for 
Conservatives politically is to present themselves as defenders of a traditional social 
morality - a social conservatism such as that adopted by the Republican Party in the 
USA. However, this also raises potential problems for Conservatives, such as the 
electoral viability of such a stance in the UK, and the potential conflict with the 
liberalism within modern conservatism. 
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Chapter 5 
The European Question 
5.1 Introduction 
The European Question has long been a difficult one for the Conservative Party, as it 
goes to the heart of the question of national identity. Like the issue of immigration, 
which is examined in the next chapter, it challenges, and has often been seen as 
threatening British, and particularly English, national identity. For the Conservative 
Party, which has historically identified itself with 'the nation', this has caused 
particular problems. As Britain lost its empire and had to search for a new role, so did 
the Conservative Party. Europe, as Harold Macmillan realised, potentially offered a 
new role for both (George and Sowemimo, 1996: 244). However, not least because of 
de Gaulle's vetoes, Macmillan was unable to settle the debate in the Conservative Party 
decisively in favour of Europe. Even after Edward Heath successfully negotiated 
British entry to the EEC, his own enthusiasm for the proj ect was not spread through the 
party as a whole (George and Sowemimo, 1996: 246). 
The prevlOus chapter provided an overvIew of the case-study period, through an 
analysis of the strategy of the Conservative Party leadership between 1997 and 2005. 
This analysis exposed the failure of the Conservatives to forge and pursue a consistent 
strategy in opposition, informed by confusion about how conservatism should respond 
to politics after Thatcher. This lack of clarity will be further explored through three 
particular dilemmas, of which the first is the European Question. This issue is of 
special significance in terms of understanding post-Thatcherite Conservative politics as 
in recent years it appears to have been largely neutralised within the Conservative Party. 
as the parliamentary party has united around a broadly Eurosceptic position. This 
represents a dramatic shift compared to the intense divisions Europe caused in the 
1980s and 1990s. Key to this has been contextual change in terms of the diminishing 
electoral salience of the issue over the past decade, and the ideational shift within the 
Conservative Party itself. This chapter will analyse how this once toxic issue has been 
largely resolved, and how this process relates to the wider question of the Conservatin~ 
Party's strategy and ongoing electoral problem since 1997. It will explore the 
leadership's strategic-relational approach to the issue. in terms of how the party 
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hierarchy has sought to manage it in relation to both party and public opinion. It will 
consider whether the leadership deliberately sought to neutralise the issue. or whether 
this has been an unintended consequence of, or independent from, their agency. 
5.2 The European Problem 
Since the end of the Second World War, the contours of British politics have been 
shaped by the question of the United Kingdom's place in the world, as a former 
hegemonic power adjusting to a new position of reduced global status. As Dean 
Acheson famously stated in 1962, Britain had 'lost an Empire [but] not yet found a 
role' (quoted in Sanders, 1990: 292). Europe emerged as a choice for Britain, 'although 
the choice was born from a lack of alternatives' (Geddes, 2005b: 122). This process 
had profound domestic as well as geo-political implications, drawing into question 
understandings of British identity and the future of the British state. This manifested 
itself in both a preoccupation with the politics of decline,l and in the debate about 
Britain's relationship with the American superpower and the emerging economic and 
political association in Europe. Britain's relation to Europe has increasingly been seen 
as conflicting with the 'special relationship' with the United States, and it is unclear 
whether Britain will be able to continue to view itself feasibly as a bridge between the 
two, or whether it will be forced to opt for one over the other (Gamble, 2003: 1). 
These questions are difficult ones for all political parties, and have tended to cut across 
traditional left-right ideological demarcations, within and between parties. For the 
Conservatives, Britain's relation to Europe has always been viewed and understood in 
the context of a particular view of the state and the nation. Between 1945 and 1975, the 
Conservative view of the state was dominated by the 'progressive right' (Smith, 1999: 
187; Gamble, 1974). As Smith (1999: 187) summarises: 
For the progressive right, which reached i~s apex ~nder Edward Heath, the k~y role of 
the state was to maintain order by preventmg conflIct between labour and capItal. They 
accepted that the state should provide welfare and even maintain full employment as a 
means of ensuring the unity of the nation (Gilmour, 1978). 
Ian the politics of decline and 'declinism'. ~s an i~e?logy see To~linson (2000). For an over~ie\\ of the 
. t of the debate about decline on Bntlsh polItICS, see EnglIsh and Kenny (2000), particularly the Impac ...-
chapters on theories of decline (Gamble, 2000b) and party IdeologIes and declme (Eccleshall, 2000). On 
Thatcherism and decline, see Krieger (1986) and Gamble (1994a and 199.tb). 
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On to this progressive right View can be mapped the Heathite national strategy 
identified by Lynch (1999: 28-38), of which 'EC membership was the centrepiece. 
viewed as the key to Britain's modernisation' (1999: 28). The progressive right theory 
of the state was challenged by a New Right critique, and Heath's national strategy was 
opposed by a Powellite alternative (Lynch: 38-45). Following Thatcher's election as 
party leader in 1975, a Thatcherite theory of the state began to emerge, and to dominate 
the Conservative standpoint from the late-1970s. This view 'rejected the pluralism of 
traditional Conservatism, taking from Enoch Powell the idea of the supreme 
importance of Parliament as the sovereign decision-maker, with the elected executive at 
its pinnacle' (Smith, 1999: 188). This perspective continues to underpin the 
predominant Conservative position, that European integration threatens to undermine 
national sovereignty and with it the integrity of the state and the legitimacy of its 
institutions. In this sense, the current Conservative view of the state is a traditional and 
rather inflexible variant of the Westminster Model (see Smith, 1999: 9-37). More 
conspiratorial versions of this story regard the European Union as attempting to 'break-
up' the United Kingdom so that it can be subsumed within a federal 'Europe of the 
regions' super-state (Hitchens, 1999: 364-7; Booker and North, 1997). Yet as Crowson 
(2007: 1) points out, Conservative administrations were' at the vanguard of Britain's bid 
to become a member of the European club', culminating in accession to the EEC in 
1973 under Edward Heath, and supported continued membership (whilst in opposition 
under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher) in the 1975 referendum campaign. Labour, 
by contrast, was more suspicious of attempts to join the EEC, and Wilson's decision to 
hold a referendum was prompted by party and cabinet divisions. Even this clear vote in 
favour of the 'Common Market' failed to heal Labour's internal rift, and by the early 
1980s the Conservatives could rightly claim to be the 'party of Europe' as their 
opponents advocated withdrawal from the EEC and suffered the SDP breakaway in 
large part because of the issue (Butler, 1996: 934). 
As in many other areas, it was the Thatcher governments that broke this pattern in 
British politics. Thatcherism profoundly altered the shape of the strategic context faced 
by the Conservatives, but also had an internal effect on the party and its own 
understanding of that context through a transformation of its dominant ideological 
perspective. At the heart of this ideological shift was the economic liberalism of the 
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New Right, but as Gamble (1996: 35) argued, it also included a turn towards more 
overtly (English) nationalist discourse, and, to some degree, away from the idea of 
patriotic Britishness associated with state and empire that the Conservatives had 
traditionally defended. Previously, Lynch suggests, a One Nation political strategy had 
'established the Conservatives as the party of nation, Empire and Union, the authentic 
voice of a state patriotism built around British identity and institutions'. This strategy 
had brought 'considerable political and electoral advantages', but by the late 1960s was 
undermined by decolonisation, declinism, Celtic nationalism, 'and a developing 
multiculturalism' (1999: 49). Powellism, Lynch suggests, was 'a Tory nationalist 
reaction to this ... [that] replaced imperial myths with those of national homogeneity 
and unfettered parliamentary sovereignty' (1999: 49), and in which the genesis of the 
Thatcherite politics of nationhood can be found (1999: 47). 
Powell was a radical forward-thinking Conservative to the extent that he sought to 
redefine national identity in terms suited to the end of empire. Powell's concern, Tom 
Nairn argued, was with the 'half-submerged nationalism of the English ... England's 
destiny was once an imperial one; now it had to be something else' (Nairn, 1970: 5). 
However, in his endeavours to define a post-imperial destiny, Powell promulgated a 
myth of an ancient, unchanging England that predated the imperial era. Almost 
inevitably this appeal to 'national homogeneity', as Lynch (1999: 49) delicately puts it, 
became a race-based argument. The idea of national difference is central to this story, 
and difference in particular from Europe. As Thatcher herself argued, 'Britain is 
different. That is why Britain is still repeatedly at odds with the other European 
countries' (2002: 366). Here, a clear lineage between Powellism and Thatcherism can 
be seen, as Powell's mix of 'free economy and strong state themes plus his populist 
patriotic discourse' were picked up by Thatcher in the 1980s (Lynch, 1999: 46). 
Thatcher though was mindful of political constraints, and was reluctant to translate her 
Powellite rhetoric and sympathies to policy. 
The Thatcher years were instrumental in creating the circumstances which led to 
intense Conservative disunity over Europe, notably over the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in the early-1990s. The stricter view of sovereignty promulgated by 
Powellism and Thatcherism was central to this, as a zero-sum conception that saw any 
move towards sharing or 'pooling' sovereignty as a loss, even if it could be justified on 
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'pragmatic' statecraft grounds as being in the national interest. Gamble attributes the 
rise of Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party directly to Thatcher herself. Her 
leadership, he argues, led to the denial of the possibility (maintained bv the 
Conservative Party leadership previously) that 'Britain could be both European and 
Atlanticist' (2003: 176). Further to this, 'the depth of the split that emerged in the party 
was a direct result of Thatcher's leadership of the party. She legitimated opposition to 
Europe in a way which the leadership had hitherto successfully avoided' (Gamble, 
2003: 178). Her Bruges speech was a critical turning point in this regard, as Thatcher 
laid out her vision of 'willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign 
states' (1988). Crowson (2007: 53) characterises this as a 'rejection of her 
government's previous approach to Europe' which had seen Thatcher strongly defend 
the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). More than this, by being voiced by an incumbent 
Prime Minister it signified 'that Euroscepticism was moving into the mainstream', and 
sanctioned as admissible views 'that previously had been dismissed as held by cranks 
and extremists' (Crowson, 2007: 53). Thatcher thus inaugurated the party management 
problems that her successor would face, particularly during the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
The attachment to neo-liberalism is also important for understanding Thatcherite 
attitudes towards European integration. As Thatcher noted in her Bruges speech, her 
government had not 'rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them 
re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercIsmg a new 
dominance from Brussels' (Thatcher, 1988). A party's outlook towards European 
integration can thus be understood as a function of its (domestic) political position, 
particularly its view on the appropriate role of the state in the management of the 
economy. Marks and Wilson use cleavage theory to analyse party responses to 
European integration, and conclude that the issue 'is assimilated into pre-existing 
ideologies of party leaders, activists and constituencies that reflect long-standing 
commitments on fundamental domestic issues' (2000: 433). They plot a possibility 
curve relating neo-liberalism to European integration, which shows 'single market 
regime competition' to be the 'preferred outcome' for neo-liberals (2000: 454). Neo-
liberals thus support European integration to the extent that it contributes to the 
weakening of market restraints. They oppose political integration, however, as they fear 
that it 'will create authoritative capacity for market regulation at the European level' 
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(2000: 455). Thatcher's support for the SEA was therefore consistent with a neo-liberal 
strategy, which saw a comparative advantage in a deregulated, low-tax economy within 
a single market area. Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), for example. regarded by 
some as one of the most significant erosions of British sovereignty, was supported by 
Thatcher a necessary means to this end (Gamble, 2003: 176; Marks and Wilson, 2000: 
455). 
In their survey of European conservative parties, Marks and Wilson found that most 
supported Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 'as the final step' in the creation of a 
liberalised single market. However, as they also note, neo-liberalism 'exists alongside a 
national orientation' in most conservative parties (2000: 455). For Conservatives. 
nationalism thus supplies the 'unambiguous bottom line for European integration'. 
namely that 'the national state should not share with European institutions its legitimate 
sovereign right to govern persons living in its territory' (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 455). 
In Britain, the single currency project was viewed by most Conservatives as an 
infringement of that right, and much more so than the completion of the single market. 
As Forster notes, 'the arguments of Conservative sceptics against a single currency 
were never purely economic' rather they 'were also rooted in political ideas relating to 
sovereignty and national identity' (2002: 116). Even if they had been persuaded by the 
economic case for a single currency, the political costs would have remained a problem. 
As one prominent Eurosceptic, Norman Lamont, argued: 'a single European currency 
would thus be a gigantic step towards the creation of a European government and a 
European state' (Lamont, 1996: 100, quoted in Forster, 2002: 117). 
Whilst it is a very useful stylisation of how views on European integration are informed 
by concerns at other levels of governance, Marks and Wilson's generalised model can 
only go so far in explaining the distinctive positions of different conservative parties. In 
the case of the British Conservative Party. the prevalent position on European 
integration has also been affected by a neo-liberal view of globalisation, which Baker. 
Gamble, and Seawright (2002) have characterised as 'hyperglobalism'. In this way. 
neo-liberalism has led some Conservatives to oppose membership of the European 
Union completely. Conservative MP Douglas CarswelL for example, argues that British 
participation "has been a political and economic disaster' and believes that 'if we do not 
leave sooner rather than later it will be a catastrophe' (2006: 1). For hyperglobalists, 
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'the national policy-making constraints of globalisation are welcomed because they 
rule out the kind of social democratic and socialist measures which are viewed as 
incompatible with British national identity, forcing the government to set the people 
free whatever its ideological predilections' (Baker et aI., 2002: 409). The competition 
state is therefore compelled to pursue a free market policy of minimal state intervention 
in order to maintain national economic prosperity in the globalised economy. This not 
only 'sets the people free', but entails a Hayekian form of spontaneous order. of which 
the nation is the natural product. 
The hyperglobalist and Eurosceptical strand of British conservatism that Baker et al. 
identify thus reject the rationally planned European Union as a threat to the nation, and 
as an infringement of their (limited) view of freedom that will inhibit competitiveness 
and undermine the economic gains of Thatcherism. For advocates of this position, the 
EU threatens to undermine the neo-liberal project: 
We are being led towards a Europe which displays many of the characteristics of 
Britain twenty years ago. It is populated with over-manned and protected nationalised 
industries. In many places private sector managers are in thrall to trade unions. Business 
is tied down by government bureaucracy and interventionism. Public spending is 
appallingly high. There persists the belief that Europe can go its own sweet way, 
unaffected by the assault from international competition, provided that the fortress 
walls are built high enough (Portillo, 1998: 7). 
As Geddes notes, the Thatcherite mantras of 'no alternative' and 'no turning back', 
articulated through a discourse of globalisation, had ascended 'to a global plain' (2004: 
195). Although a few prominent Europhiles in John Major's government, notably 
Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke, continued to view EMU as an essentially 
economic question, and prevented Major from hardening government policy beyond 
the position of 'wait and see', by the time of the 1997 election the Conservative Party 
was generally Eurosceptic, and Major had been 'cajoled into conceding a referendum 
on the Euro if the government recommended entry' (Forster, 2002: 126). 
A 1994 survey of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) found the majority of 
Conservative MPs to be clearly Eurosceptic: 50 percent favoured the passing of an act 
of Parliament to 'establish explicitly the ultimate supremacy of Parlianlent over EU 
legislation'; 60 percent thought that the Commission should lose the ability to initiate 
legislation; and 85 percent thought that Britain should use its \'Cto to preyent the 
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introduction of QMV for foreign and defence policy. Further, in the opinion of 79 
percent, the way to achieve greater democratic accountability over the ED is not 
through reform or democratisation of European level institutions, but by 'strengthening 
the scrutiny by national parliaments of the ED legislative process'. A repeat of the 
survey in 1998 found these figures to have increased to 69 percent; 61 percent; 90 
percent; and 84 percent respectively (Baker et aI., 2002: 417). 
This degree of Euroscepticism played a decisive role in the 1997 leadership election, as 
the seemingly better qualified, more experienced, more popular but Europhile Kenneth 
Clarke was passed over in favour William Hague, who was understood to be less pro-
European. As Gowland and Turner argue, 'this choice represented an unmistakeable 
victory for the Eurosceptic tendency and was indicative of a shift in the balance of 
power within the Conservative Party' (Gowland and Turner, 2000: 212). A mock 
advertisement for the job of Conservative leader published in The Economist in March 
1997 stated that candidates ' [m Just be of Eurosceptical disposition, but not so 
Eurosceptical as to split the party', and Hague met these criteria in a way that Clarke 
could not (The Economist, 13 March 1997, quoted in Harris, 2005: 100). Similarly in 
2001, attitudes to European integration played an important part in the election as 
leader of the former Maastricht rebel lain Duncan Smith, who won by a clear margin 
(again over Ken Clarke) in a ballot of party members (Chapter 4: 79-80; 92). The 
following sections analyse the Conservatives' position on European integration since 
1997, and consider whether an understanding of this is essential for an understanding of 
the Conservatives' travails in opposition. 
5.3 William Hague: Managing the European Question, 1997-2001 
On becoming Conservative Party leader, Europe presented William Hague with 
challenges on both the ideational and electoral dimensions. In electoral terms, the 
Conservatives had been badly affected by their image as a disunited party, and Europe 
was central to this picture. At the time of the 1997 election, MORI surveys found that 
44 percent of respondents saw the Conservatives as divided (Table 4.1). Cowley 
comments that, 'by the middle of 1996, the percentage of people who thought that the 
Conservatives were united had fallen into single figures. The public saw the 
Conservatives as riven' (Cowley, 1997: 40-1). In fact, the 1992 Parliament had not 
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been an unusually rebellious one on the Conservative benches: in relative terms the 
level of dissent was similar for other recent Parliaments (Cowley, 1997: -+ 1). As 
Cowley notes, contrary to public perception 'cohesion remained the norm, dissent the 
exception', and there was 'no collapse in Party discipline' (1997: 42). Europe, however. 
particUlarly the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, was a highly visible exception, 
over which more than 60 percent of Conservative backbench dissent activity during the 
1992 Parliament occurred (Cowley, 1997: 42). The Eurosceptics were also very vocal 
in their cause, and had continued to cause party management problems for John Major 
until he left office (Hogg & Hill, 1995: 264-283). Hague therefore needed to settle 
party policy on European integration, particularly on the most pressing and divisive 
issue of a European single currency, as a matter of urgent party management. For 
Harris, Hague's efforts to 'neutralise the issue of Europe' were part of a 'survival 
strategy' he employed for the first 18 months of his leadership (2005: 105-6). 
Europe presented a difficult challenge to the Conservatives in party management terms 
in part because of its ideational aspect: unwillingness to compromise from strongly 
held positions had served to highlight the ideological fissures in the party under Major, 
and threatened to do the same under Hague. Conservative divisions over Europe also 
reflected the malaise over the purpose and direction of conservatism discussed in 
Chapter 3. For arch-Thatcherites such as Shirley Letwin, 'Nothing in the whole project 
of creating a European State conforms to the British style of politics' (1996: 175). For 
Letwin, the central objective of the 'Thatcherite crusade ... was to make such crusades 
unnecessary' (1996: 175), by limiting the role of the state to upholding a strong 
framework (the rule of law) within which people could go about their lives without 
political interference. The missionary zeal of Thatcherism was not therefore the usual 
state of British conservatism or British politics, it was merely necessitated by the 
magnitude of the crisis the country faced in 1979. European integration, however, poses 
an even greater threat to this 'British way' of politics, and thus opposing it should be 
the primary purpose of the Conservative Party. As Letwin states: 
The unfortunate truth is that although 'we are all capitalists now', the battle fought by 
the Thatcher government has to be fought all over again, but on a new terrain, \\ith a 
new vocabulary, and new weapons. And what is at issue is even more fundamental than 
the issue in 1979 - it is the independence of Britain, it is the supremacy of British law 
and self government in Britain (1996: (76). 
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Thatcherite malice to the enemy within (the trade unions and socialism) has thus not 
dissipated with their self-proclaimed victory, but has been transferred to the even more 
threatening enemy without, the European Union. Letwin's position is not, of course. 
shared by all Conservatives, but it does illustrate the intellectual shift wrought by 
Thatcherism. 
Whereas 'One Nation' or anti-Thatcherite Conservatives such as Ian Gilmour may 
argue that 'by helping the European Union to be one of the major powers in the world, 
[Britain] could retain considerable control over her own destiny, or she could cling to 
formal sovereignty, while in reality becoming an American satellite and enjoying the 
international influence equivalent to a county council' (Gilmour and Garnett, 1997: 
378), this no longer represents anything other than a small minority view within the 
Conservative Party. David Willetts agrees with Letwin to the extent that any 
Conservative 'committed to the integrity of the United Kingdom' will recognise 'that 
ultimately the issues involved here are far more than economic'. Concerns over 
European integration, he claims, 'rest on the recognition that there is indeed more to 
Conservatism than simple economic liberalism' (Willetts, 1996: 83). Hague's former 
Party Chairman, Michael Ancram, states clearly that in his view: 'The State and 
European integration are mutually incompatible ... the only Europe compatible with the 
protection of our sovereignty and the smaller state is a European partnership of 
sovereign nations' (Ancram, 2007: 14). A similar view is held by a group of young 
Conservative candidates and self-proclaimed modernisers, who argue that 'UK 
sovereignty has been ceded to Europe without the British people being consulted'. 
Whilst not arguing for an immediate reversal of this, they suggest that a future 
Conservative government should pass a Bill so that any moves towards further 
integration can only be ratified by a public vote: 'a referendum on ceding sovereignty 
would become the expectation, rather than the exception' (Philp et aI., 2006: 158). The 
neo-Thatcherite view that Europe represents a fundamental threat to British sovereignty 
has thus established a hegemonic position within British Conservative discourse. 
For Hague and his successors, the effect of this ideological transformation of the party 
under Thatcher and Major was to restrict the scope of viable party management 
strategies for the leadership on the issue of Europe. As Hall comments, ideas can 'lend 
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representative legitimacy to some social interests more than others, delineate the 
accepted boundaries of state action, associate contemporary political developments 
with particular interpretations of national history and define the context in which many 
issues will be understood' (Hall, 1993: 289, quoted in Geddes, 2005b: 115-6). Geddes 
argues that following Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech, 'a potent Eurosceptic critique' 
arose from the view that European integration was impinging upon 'core elements of 
the Thatcherite governing project' (2005b: 129). The impact of this was not so much 
upon actual government policy, but was 'central to a realignment of Conservative 
thinking about Europe' (2005b: 129). Hague needed to devise an approach that could 
exist within this realignment, whilst not either reinforcing the public impression that the 
Conservatives were either 'extreme' or 'obsessed' with Europe, and also without 
splitting the party. 
The most urgent issue facing Hague in this regard was the party's policy on 
membership of the single currency. The formula Hague struck upon was that the 
Conservatives would oppose entry during the current Parliament or in the next. The 
party could thus campaign against membership without actually ruling it out 'on 
principle' or 'forever'. This was the basis of Hague's call to 'save the pound' during 
the 2001 election campaign, although this was effectively neutered by Labour's pledge 
to hold a referendum before British entry. Hague established this line in October 1997, 
and suffered two shadow cabinet resignations (Ian Taylor and David Curry) as a result 
(Harris, 2005: 150). In autumn 1998 Hague held a ballot of party members to seek 
approval for this policy, which was overwhelmingly endorsed, with 84 percent of 
returned papers in favour (Harris, 2005: 165; Garnett, 2003: 56). For Bale, Hague 
adopted this line as: 'he wanted, firstly, to maintain Tory distinctiveness in a manner 
which seemed to play well with public opinion and, secondly, to use the internal 
referendum on the issue to give the impression of an authority he sadly lacked' (Bale, 
2006a: 388). This is perhaps a little harsh on Hague. To have maintained the 'wait and 
see' line of his predecessor would have been nigh-on-impossible in the face of 
deepening Euroscepticism in his ranks, and the position of not joining 'for the 
foreseeable future', which he used in the first couple of months of his leadership, 
suffered from an intense vagueness to the extent of appearing almost meaningless. The 
all-party ballot was also a success in that it brought a degree of legitimacy to the policy 
(which held firm for four years) and was a tactical victory of sorts over its vocal critics 
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such as Heseltine and Clarke. For some, such as Hague's chief policy advisor Daniel 
Finkelstein and his party Chairman Michael Ancram, it 'was significant because it 
enabled the Conservative Party to finally stop talking about Europe' (Harris, 2005: 166). 
Ancram commented that Hague 'wanted to put the issue effectively to bed ... so that's 
why we had a referendum in the party on it' (Ancram, interview in Harris, 2005: 166). 
Hague's policy also had the advantage that it was generally in line with public opinion: 
polls continued to show public scepticism over joining the Euro (ICM, 2001). It did not 
succeed, however, in radically changing the image of the Conservatives as a disunited 
party. By the 2001 election 30 percent of the public still regarded the Conservatives as 
divided, down 14 points since April 1997 (Table 4.1). 
5.4 'Harder but quieter': European policy 2001-5 
Bale characterises Conservative Party positioning on Europe between 1997 and 2005 as 
becoming 'harder but quieter' (2006a: 388-391). Following Hague's clamorous calls to 
'save the pound', a much quieter line was rapidly established under his successor, lain 
Duncan Smith. One of his first moves as leader was to harden Conservative policy, to 
rule-out membership permanently. As Bale comments, this 'was intended not just to 
"close" the issue within the party but also to prevent it dominating the Tory campaign 
in the 2005 general election in the way it had done four years earlier' (2006a: 388). 
Duncan Smith succeeded in this regard: the party said very little on Europe under his 
leadership. This was a deliberate effort to move away from core vote issues, which 
may, ironically, have weakened his position as leader. Theresa May commented that 
'there were a lot of people who voted for lain because they thought he would be sound 
on Europe and would put Europe centre-stage. And he didn't: one of the first things he 
did was to park Europe as an issue' (May Interview). However, as May went on to 
acknowledge, this was only one factor in Duncan Smith losing the confidence of the 
parliamentary party: 
It was a mixture of things. I think it was partly a reaction against the way that he was 
trying to take the party. I think it was partly the feeling that he hadn't done what they 
thought he would do, i.e. return to a 'core vote', right wing, be an anti-Europe leader. 
Partly, some of the personal issues about his leadership; and partly the fact that there 
were others who had an interest in becoming leader, and were therefore agitating, or 
getting others to agitate on there behalf. (May Interview). 
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The decision by Duncan Smith to deliberately focus on issues other than Europe was a 
rational interpretation of the strategic context he faced. As Bale argues, 'the 2001 
debacle had proved beyond all reasonable doubt that Europe was incapable of winning 
the Tories an election', whilst raising its profile risked inflating the profile of UKIP 
(Bale, 2006a: 388). The issue also had a low level of electoral salience (Figure 5.1). 
According to MORl (2008a) opinion poll data, at the time of Duncan Smith's election 
as party leader in September 2001, only 9 percent of voters regarded European 
integration as an important issue. Since then, it has remained a relatively low salience 
issue, although brief spikes of public interest occurred in June 2003 (when Gordon 
Brown announced the assessment of the economic tests for joining the Euro); in May 
and June 2004 (at the time of the European elections and Labour's concession of a 
referendum on the proposed European constitution); and in June 2005 (when the debate 
about the renegotiation of Britain's rebate hit the headlines). 
Figure 5.1.' The Salience of European Integration to the British public, 1997-2007 
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Percentaoe of respondents ranking European integration amongst the most important political issues, 
based onbdata from Ipsos Mori Political Monitor: Long Term Trends. The Most Important Issues Facing 
Britain Today. Unprompted, combined answers to the questions: 'What would you say is the most 
important issue facing Britain today?' and 'What do you see as other important issues facing Britain 
today?' www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml (MORI, 2008a). 
122 
By comparison, 43 percent of those polled in September 2001 regarded health as an 
important issue, 30 percent named education, and 60 percent cited defence (an 
abnormally high figure in response to 9/11) (MORI, 2008a). Duncan Smith therefore 
saw Europe as a low salience issue on which the Conservative position was relatively 
well known, and chose instead to focus on the priorities identified by the public. As he 
commented: 
Well I didn't think there was any point in talking about it [Europe] really, because I 
didn't think there could be anyone in Britain who didn't know what our view was. 
Ironically, it [the message] had got through on that one, which is, that we didn't want 
any more integration and we thought that the level of integration that we were at now 
needed serious review. We were against the single currency, all those sorts of things 
were clear positions. I cleared-up the position over the single currency, and in actual 
fact we didn't discuss it again for the whole time I was there. The constitution came to 
the fore in the second year, but we dealt with that with our referendum policy ... So we 
stayed off Europe for a while. (Duncan Smith Interview). 
Ann Widdecombe concurred with the rationale of this policy, but attributed the failure 
of Duncan Smith's leadership to his personal qualities: 
The one big plus of having lain Duncan Smith was that it shut everybody up about 
Europe, because everybody knew where he stood on Europe, there wasn't a lot of angst 
about Europe. He very wisely decided that we weren't going to talk about Europe ... 
That much worked, and I think there was a lot of reassurance in that he did talk about 
that sort of things I've been talking about - social justice, inner city estates and all the 
rest of it, which gave some reassurance to people who regarded him simply as rather 
mindlessly right-wing and not much else. But he never had the personality. I've never 
seen a leader with less charisma. He just didn't have it. And it might not have mattered 
twenty years ago, but now, with the cameras everywhere, it matters. And he just 
couldn't hack it. It really is as simple as that, he couldn't hack it. You can theorise all 
you like, but no, he just couldn't do it. (Widdecombe Interview). 
Chapter 4 highlighted the deliberate strategy pursued by lain Duncan Smith to 
reposition the Conservatives as a party of the public services, and develop a new 
Conservative narrative based around 'championing the vulnerable' and social justice. 
As Widdecombe implies, and as Chapter 4 discussed, this failed not because it lacked 
coherence, but because of poor leadership and party image problems. The 'harder but 
quieter' European policy was integral to this strategy. Chapter 4 also noted how 
Duncan Smith's agenda was only partially carried forward by Michael Howard, who 
abandoned the search for a narrative based around the language of compassionate 
conservatism, but did retain elements of the broader policy approach. Howard 
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maintained the relative silence on Europe established by his predecessor. Although not 
a former Maastricht rebel like Duncan Smith, Howard's Euroscepticism was widely 
acknowledged. In his own words, his position is clear: 'I'm not in favour of ceding 
more powers to the European Union; on the contrary I'm in favour of bringing powers 
back from the European Union' (Howard Interview). 
However, Howard's decision not to make European integration a prominent issue was 
not informed by the same strategic logic that underpinned Duncan Smith's avoidance 
of the subject. As Cowley and Green comment, Duncan Smith's 'hardening of policy 
was not a sign that the party was even more obsessed about Europe; rather, the shift in 
policy was designed to ensure that the party did not spend any longer discussing the 
issue' (2005: 51). Reflecting how actors take lessons from their understanding of the 
context and adjust their strategies accordingly, he was 'determined to escape the 
criticism levelled at Hague in 2001 for running a single-issue campaign on Europe' 
(Cowley and Green, 2005: 51). In this sense, the position adopted by Duncan Smith on 
Europe, and his success in enforcing it, was dependent, although it had failed 
electorally, on the legacy left by Hague. The mistake of focussing on Europe in 2001 
was widely recognised, even amongst Conservative MPs, increasing willing 
compliance with Duncan Smith's tactic of minimising the issue. The Labour 
government was also happy not raising what for them was not a strong suit. When the 
proposed European constitution came on the agenda in 2002, it was dealt with in the 
Conservative Party by a promise of a referendum (as noted by Duncan Smith above). 
By taking a firm position to oppose the single currency permanently, and to oppose 
(and offer a referendum on) any future constitutional treaty, Duncan Smith also aligned 
himself with mainstream opinion with the Conservative parliamentary party, 'the 
number of pro-European Conservative MPs having diminished yet further at the 2001 
election' (Cowley & Green, 2005: 51). Armed with his own impeccable Eurosceptic 
credentials, there could be little doubt amongst Conservative MPs that Duncan Smith 
would honour these commitments. 
Howard was therefore happy to maintain Duncan Smith's 'harder but quieter' position 
on Europe, as it was a success in party management telIDS, gave the party space to 
discuss other issues, and created some distance from the discredited 2001 election 
campaign. However, retention of this element of Duncan Smith's approach should not 
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be allowed to disguise the overall shift in strategy directed by his successor. Duncan 
Smith had attempted to both change the image of the Conservative Party and forge a 
new narrative of conservatism by concentrating more attention on issues of public 
concern which were viewed as Conservative weaknesses, and focussing much less on 
traditional Conservative messages on tax, immigration and Europe. Under Howard, tax 
and immigration policies acquired renewed prominence, and immigration in particular 
came to dominate the Conservatives' 2005 election campaign. As Bale comments, 
'Duncan Smith's decision worked, at least as far as it went: under his replacement, 
Michael Howard, the Tories again made the same mistake of concentrating their 
election campaign on an issue on which they believed they were strong rather than on 
more bread-and-butter concerns; but in 2005, at least, the distraction was provided not 
by Europe - an issue which all parties were happy to ignore - but by immigration and 
asylum' (Bale, 2006a: 388). Howard's policy on Europe cannot be seen as part of a 
coherent broader approach in the way that Duncan Smith's can. Rather it was derived 
from tactical and party management convenience; and a less developed understanding 
of, and response to, the 2001 defeat. 
For Howard, to draw parallels between his 2005 campaign and that led by William 
Hague's in 2001 is unfair. He sees the two as very different, as in 2001 the issue of 
Europe and the Euro had been neutralised by Labour's pledge of a referendum, whereas 
this was not the case with the immigration: 
It [immigration] wasn't at all like Europe in the 2001 election. The problem about 
Europe at the 2001 election, where we concentrated a great deal on the Euro, was that 
everyone knew that they were going to have a referendum on the Euro, so they thought 
understandably that that wasn't really a reason for voting Conservative in a general 
election. If they didn't like the Euro they could perfectly happily vote Labour and vote 
'no' to the Euro. There wasn't going to be a referendum on immigration, so I think it 
was completely different. (Howard Interview) 
In this sense, Howard's understanding of the reasons for defeat in 2001 seems to be 
based around the idea of tactical failure, rather than the more fundamental critique 
informing Duncan Smith's attempts to recast conservatism, and with it the image of the 
Conservative Party. in a 'compassionate' light. Howard therefore either failed to grasp, 
or simply disagreed with. Duncan Smith's assessment of the 2001-5 strategic context. 
One possible explanation for this could be that Howard saw the ConservatiYe Party' s 
in1age problen1s, and electoral failure in 1997 and 2001, as being specifically related to 
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Europe, rather than a broader problem encapsulated by Theresa May's comment that 
the Conservatives were seen as 'the nasty party' (Cowley & Green, 2005: 51). More 
likely, however, is that Howard noted the lack of progress in the opinion polls under his 
predecessor, and made a tactical assessment of what he thought he could achieve in a 
probable 18 months before the next general election. Howard did make some attempts 
to 'reach out' on in the early days of his leadership, for example his 'British Dream' 
speech to Policy Exchange (Howard, 2004). These were abandoned as the election 
neared, and it is possible that had he remained as leader Duncan Smith would similarly 
have been pressured to retreat on to traditional Conservative issue strengths. 
When asked what his key priorities on becoming leader were, Howard replied: 'Impose 
discipline on the party. Work towards achieving a clear message. And attempting to 
convincing the electorate that we were a credible alternative to the government' 
(Howard Interview). His approach to policy on Europe can be understood in these 
terms. Raising the issue's prominence risked exacerbating division and indiscipline in 
the party, and obscuring Howard's message. As such, it would have done little to 
enhance the Conservatives' credibility as a government in waiting. It therefore made 
sense to downplay the issue. 
5.5 Analysis: Conservative positioning and the salience of European integration 
Intertwined with ideational factors such as the ideological positions of Conservative 
MPs, are electoral concerns and calculations, notably relating to the salience of key 
issues. The salience of European integration has declined notably since 1997, 
upholding the logic of Duncan Smith's 'harder but quieter' policy. Oppermann argues 
that this transformation into a low-salience issue was the successful outcome of 
deliberate New Labour strategy. He suggests that as the Blair government's approach to 
Europe was not in concordance with the 'deeply entrenched Euroscepticism' of the 
British public, New Labour had a strong electoral incentive to attempt to reduce, or at 
least contain, its public salience (Oppermann, 2007: 1). Oppermann notes that, 
'Between 1997 and 2006, the approval ratings of New Labour's European policies 
lagged behind those of the Conservative Party's policies in seven out of ten years'. 
Furthermore, at both the 2001 and 2005 general elections, 'voters who ranked 
European issues among the important determinants of their voting decisions again 
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preferred the Conservatives' policies' (2007: 7). Labour has responded to this electoral 
danger through a mix of different strategies, notably by deferring major European 
policy decisions; by pledging referendums on such decisions; by attempting to 
depoliticise such decisions so they appear technical rather than political (for example 
the five economic tests with respect to joining the Euro); and by downplaying the 
apparent differences between government policies and those of the Conservative 
opposition (Oppermann, 2007: 17-25). This effort to neutralise the issue contrasted 
markedly with Labour's strategy in the six years before Tony Blair became leader. 
when the party 'deliberately repositioned itself as a distinctly pro-European alternative 
to the increasingly Eurosceptic Conservative government' (Oppermann, 2007: 17). 
Labour's failure to make a serious effort to re-orientate public opinion in a more pro-
integrationist direction can be regarded as a chief shortcoming of their time in office, 
and a significant missed opportunity. For instance Peter Mandelson has noted that 
'Britain's leaders have done a good job of selling globalisation ... But they have done 
less well explaining the role of the EU in helping Britain defend its interests in a 
globalised world' (Mandel son, 2007: 1). For some, it reflects New Labour's 
predilection for an Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-American) neo-liberal economic model, in 
preference to a more social democratic 'European' capitalism. Jessop, for example, 
argues that the government 'deliberately, persistently, and wilfully' drove forward 'the 
neo-liberal transformation of Britain' (Jessop, 2007: 282). Indeed, the British 
government under Blair was 'far keener to export lessons of US enterprise culture and 
welfare-to-work to the European Union' than they were to facilitate a transfer of ideas 
in the other direction (2007: 287). Numerous other authors see New Labour in similar 
terms: Bauman regards the lasting legacy of the Blair years to be the consolidation and 
'institutionalisation' of Thatcherism (Bauman, 2007: 60); and Fullbrook (2007: 160) 
declares that neo-liberalism 'is the ideology of our time' and characterised the Blair 
governments. From such perspectives, New Labour's adjustment of its stance on 
European policy issues, and its efforts to neutralise them, can be understood as part of a 
wider ideological shift, as the transformative effect of Thatcherism on British politics 
continued to be felt. 2 Whatever the motivations, the outcome does however. appear 
2 Human agency has of course been central to this, and the Labour government has been widely criticised 
for failing to counter neo-liberalism more vigorously since 1997 (see for example, Hall, 1998; 2007; 
Jessop, 2007; Wilson & Macaulay, 2007). 
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clear: the public salience of European integration declined dramatically (Figure 5.1), 
thereby augmenting the space available for the government to pursue a European policy 
at odds with public sentiment at minimal electoral cost. 
However, as Figure 5.1 shows, the salience of European integration did not follow a 
smooth downward trajectory: spikes of public interest occurred at the time of related 
high profile political episodes, for example the assessment of the economic tests for 
joining the Euro in 1997 and 2003, and the 1999 European elections (Oppermann 2007: 
10). Oppermann divides the Blair premiership into 'two distinct phases', either side of 
the 2001 general election. The first phase is marked by a high level of electoral salience 
for the issue of European integration: on average, 24.5 percent of poll respondents 
regarded it as an important issue, and at 'the 2001 general elections, the importance 
attached to European issues was second only to health policy' (Oppermann, 2007: 9-
10). By contrast, during the second phase, Europe 'was considered to be among the 
most important political issues of the day by an average of only 8.60/0 of respondents' 
(2007: 11). For Oppermann, this drop can be partly ascribed to Labour's strategies as 
noted above. However, a factor that he overlooks, which may also have contributed to 
this fall, is the Conservatives' changing approach to European policy. Notably, the 
steep decline in the public salience of the issue only occurs after the 2001 general 
election, when the Conservatives under lain Duncan Smith deliberately chose to 
downplay the issue. This could be interpreted in one of two ways: either the 
Conservatives were responding to Labour's (successful) strategy to defer and defuse 
the issue; or public concern with European integration fell as it was the subject of less 
political conflict, as the Conservatives went quiet on the subject. 
U sing data from the British Election Panel Survey (BEPS), Geoffrey Evans' (1998) 
analysis of Euroscepticism and Conservative electoral support found that the British 
public became more Eurosceptic during John Major's premiership. By 1996, on an 
issue-proximity model, the Conservative Party 'was even closer to aggregate public 
opinion, when compared with its main competitors, than it had been at the time of the 
1992 election' (1998: 573). This failed, however, to translate into increased electoral 
support. The problem was threefold: firstly voters displayed confusion over the 
Conservatives position; secondly the appearance of disunity put voters off~ and thirdly 
they tended to be swayed by other issues. 
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For Evans, by failing to pursue a consistent Eurosceptic line the Conservatives under 
Major squandered 'the potential electoral benefit provided by popular Euroscepticism' 
(1998: 590). The ambiguous nature of the government's attitude to European 
integration under Major actually caused voters to inaccurately place the Conservative 
position on an issue-proximity scale, to the extent that by 1996, voters perceived 
themselves to be closer to the positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats. As Evans 
explains, 'in 1996 people who perceived the Conservatives to be anti-European tended 
to themselves be pro-European, while those who perceived the party to be pro-
European were more likely to be anti-European' (1998: 581-2). No such confusion 
arose with regard to the other major parties. As Evans argues, the palpable reason for 
this was surely the clear public divisions in the Conservative Party over the issue of 
Europe at the time. Disunity therefore had a double-whammy impact, not only on the 
public image of the party (see Chapter 4), but also on the credibility of the party on one 
important issue which should have been a Conservative electoral trump card. 
In the light of this, William Hague's strategy on Europe might be regarded as eminently 
sensible. Hague hoped that a consistent Eurosceptic position would reverse the damage 
inflicted on the party by the image of disunity, whilst as Evans highlighted above, it 
also offered potential electoral dividends. Moreover, on becoming leader he inherited a 
situation where his party was far behind the Labour on all major issues with the 
exception of Europe. As a comparison of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 illustrates, by the 
time of the 2001 election he had failed to make significant inroads into this situation. In 
April 1997, six issues were cited as 'important' by at least 20 percent of the electorate. 
They were health (63 percent), education (54 percent), Europe (43 percent). 
unemployment (28 percent) crime (27 percent) and the economy (22 percent) (MORL 
2008a). As Table 5.1 shows, Labour had large leads on three of these (health, education 
and unemployment); the Conservatives had a small lead on the economy, whilst on 
crime and Europe both had similar levels of public approval. 
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Table 5.1: Best party on key issues, April 1997 
Conservatives % Labour None I Don't Labour 
% know % Lead % 
Crime 28 29 36 +1 
Economy 33 26 34 
-7 
Education 21 40 24 +19 
Europe 25 24 42 - 1 
Health 15 47 28 + 32 
Unemployment 18 42 34 + 30 
Source. Data on best party on key Issues (MORl 200Sc; 200Sd; 200Se; 200Sf; 200Sg; 200Sh). 
Table 5.2: Best party on key issues, February 2001 
Conservatives % Labour None I Don't Labour 
% know % Lead % 
Crime 26 30 38 +4 
Economy 18 44 34 + 26 
Education 17 44 30 + 27 
Europe 26 27 40 + 1 
Health 14 42 35 + 28 
Unemployment 12 48 37 + 36 
Source: Data on best party on key Issues (MORl 200Sc; 200Sd; 200Se; 200Sf; 200Sg; 200Sh). 
The major change between 1997 and 2001 (Table 5.2) was the emergence of a large 
Labour lead on the economy. Labour retained clear leads on health, education and 
unemployment, leaving Hague with two issues, crime and Europe, on which his party 
was in touching distance of the government. Combined with the continued electoral 
salience of European integration (see Figure 5.1), his decision to campaign heavily on 
Europe at the 2001 elections, when he warned the British public that they had just 'two 
weeks to save the pound' (Jones, 2001: 1) appears rational. 
Why did John Major not pursue such a policy? Major's problem was one of internal 
party management. As Evans noted, 'the cost of maintaining a distinctly Eurosceptic 
line is likely to be high in terms of intra-party strife, while Labour's recent evolution 
into an efficient election-winning apparatus has coincided with its position on Europe 
shifting toward a less integrationist line (i.e. the endorsement of a referendum on EMU), 
thus further reducing the benefits that might accrue to a Eurosceptic strategy for the 
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Conservatives' (Evans, 1998: 589). For Major, these costs were too high: he could not 
have followed this strategy without losing key members of his cabinet such as Michael 
Heseltine and Ken Clarke. For Hague, however, these costs were much less. as the 
rump of 165 Conservative MPs remaining in 1997 tended to be more Eurosceptic, and 
his position on the Euro had been legitimised by the ballot of party members. 
Hague's strategy is given further credence by the fact that Europe was one issue on 
which the Conservatives were viewed relatively favourably, particularly amongst 
voters who regarded it as important. As Table 5.3 demonstrates, despite the ideological 
divisions under Major, the Conservatives had a clear lead over Labour as the 'best 
party' on Europe at the time of the 1997 general election amongst voters who regarded 
the issue as important. This disappeared in 1998, but returned clearly in 1999, and has 
generally been maintained since. As Table 5.4 demonstrates, even amongst all voters 
(not just those naming it as an important issue) the Conservatives have largely matched 
Labour as the best party on Europe since 1999. By contrast, on the electorally most 
salient issue of health, Labour held large leads amongst both voters naming the issue as 
important (an average lead of 26 percent) and amongst all voters (an average of 23 
percent) for the entire 1997-2005 period (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). 
Table 5.3: Best Party on Europe, amongst all voters mentioning the issue as important 
Date Cons Labour Lib Dem None/ Cons lead 
Don't 
know 
8 April 1997 38 19 8 29 19 
21-24 May 1998 26 43 9 21 - 17 
23-26 July 1999 38 26 8 24 12 
21-24 Jan 2000 31 29 12 25 2 
20-24 July 2000 37 27 11 22 10 
15-20 Feb 2001 35 33 8 20 2 
11-16 Sept 2003 39 16 18 22 23 
10-14 Sept 2004 29 19 15 24 10 
7 -11 April 2005 32 21 16 22 11 
6 Sept 2006 18 24 10 46 -6 
Source: MORI (2008f). 
131 
Table 5.4: Best Party on Europe, all voters 
Date Cons Labour Lib Dem None/ Cons Lead 
Don't 
know 
8 April 1997 25 24 6 42 1 
21-24 May 1998 16 40 5 38 
-24 
23-26 July 1999 28 28 8 33 0 
21-24 Jan 2000 25 28 8 38 -3 
20-24 July 2000 28 25 7 38 3 
15-20 Feb 2001 26 27 5 40 -1 
11-16 Sept 2003 24 21 11 42 3 
10-14 Sept 2004 19 20 11 43 -1 
6 Sept 2006 20 20 9 47 0 
Source: MORl (2008f). 
Table 5.5: Best Party on Health, amongst all voters mentioning the issue as important 
Date Cons Labour Lib Dem None/ Lab Lead 
Don't 
know 
8 April 1997 13 51 10 26 38 
21-24 May 1998 11 50 10 28 39 
23-26 July 1999 13 46 8 31 33 
21-24 Jan 2000 14 41 8 36 27 
20-24 July 2000 17 43 8 31 26 
15-20 Feb 2001 13 44 8 33 31 
11-16 Sept 2003 17 31 11 40 14 
10-14 Sept 2004 17 29 11 41 12 
7 -11 April 2005 22 36 10 31 14 
6 Sept 2006 25 21 13 39 -4 
Source: MORI (2008g). 
Table 5.6: Best Party on Health, all voters 
Date Cons Labour Lib Dem None/ Lab Lead 
Don't 
know 
8 April 1997 15 47 9 28 32 
21-24 May 1998 11 49 9 30 38 
23-26 July 1999 13 45 7 33 32 
21-24 Jan 2000 15 38 7 39 23 
20-24 July 2000 16 42 7 34 26 
15-20 Feb 2001 14 42 7 35 28 
11-16 Sept 2003 16 30 11 42 14 
10-14 Sept 2004 15 28 10 44 13 
6 Sept 2006 19 23 10 47 4 
Source: MORI (2008g). 
So why did Hague's strategy fail? The conventional wisdom is that this was a core-vote 
strategy that failed dramatically, as illustrated by the outcome of the 2001 election 
result. Leach rehearses the standard critique of Hague's leadership: 
Hague chose to adopt a harder Eurosceptic position which isolated the dwindling 
number of Conservative Europhiles, and drove a few out of the party. It was assumed a 
clear line would banish the ambiguities of the Major years, and appeal to a Eurosceptic 
electorate. Thus Hague fought the 2001 election as a single-issue campaign to 'save the 
pound'. It is now almost universally recognised that this was a mistake. Although the 
majority of voters shared Conservative opposition to the euro, it was well down their 
list of priorities. Hague's obsession with Europe meant that Labour's general record and 
Conservative alternatives never received detailed scrutiny. His tough line with dissent 
meant that the party was perceived as 'dogmatic', and 'extreme' rather than united, 
particularly among those voters who recalled that all the main developments in the 
UK's relationship with Europe had been undertaken by previous Conservative 
governments. The party was effectively denying its own past. (Leach, 2002: 207). 
An alternative view, however, could be that Hague's strategy was a relative success. It 
secured Hague a notable victory at the 1999 European elections, thereby securing his 
position as leader (Chapter 4). And it may have been the optimal vote-maximisation 
strategy available to him: in other words, another leader or another strategy may have 
actually resulted in the Conservatives doing even worse. As Harris comments, 'the 
future of the Conservative Party on May 2nd 1997 was by no means guaranteed: the 
parliamentary party was literally tearing itself apart over the issue of Europe. party 
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membership was rapidly dwindling and it was on the brink of bankruptcy' (Harris. 
2005: 105). In this context, to have stabilised the party so that it did not implode and 
lose further ground electorally, and to have brought a semblance of unity on the most 
divisive issue for the Conservative Party since tariff reform, is no mean achievement. 
As Lord Parkinson commented, 'The big thing was to hold the party together. .. I don't 
think there was a strategy William could have devised that would have increased his 
vote beyond what he got, quite frankly'. In his view, a different leader could have 
achieved no more (Parkinson Interview). 
Andrew Lansley MP, who oversaw policy renewal under William Hague, is dismissive 
of the idea that the focus on Europe at the expense of other issues was a major tactical 
mistake: 'The emerging conventional view is that the Conservative Party did not 
succeed better because we did not talk about health and education over the course of 
the election campaign. This is bunk. If the general election had been nothing more than 
a debate about public services, the Conservatives could have done even worse' 
(Lansley, 2001: 69). By contrast Andrew Cooper, Hague's former Director of Strategy 
(1997 -1999) saw little benefit to the' core-vote' strategy with Europe as its centrepiece, 
so consequently saw little risk in pursuing an alternative, broader agenda. As he 
comments: 
It is indeed highly probable that an election campaign fought wholly on public-service 
issues, and trying to engage positively with the most salient issues, coming at the end of 
a Parliament in which the party had barely touched on these issues, would have made 
only limited difference to the outcome. Yet the notion that such a campaign would have 
achieved a worse result than the core-vote or core-vote-plus strategy is highly 
implausible (Cooper, 2001: 106). 
As this chapter has shown, Europe, as both an ideological influence and electoral issue 
was central to this conclusion. The Hague years were also important in shaping the 
context for his successors. Duncan Smith would have been unable to harden and 
quieten the Conservative Party's approach to European integration so rapidly or with 
such ease had it not been for his predecessor's actions. 1997-2001 marks an important 
phase in the transition by the Conservatives into a firmly Eurosceptic party. As 
discussed, this ideological shift in the party is one (major) element of the Thatcherite 
transformation of British conservatism, but it is one affected and institutionalised by 
key political actors. In this respect, Hague's overtly Eurosceptic policies and rhetoric, 
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enforced with strict parliamentary discipline and sanctioned by the party ballot, marks 
the completion of the process of legitimising opposition to European integration 
signalled by Thatcher's Bruges address. The fundamental settlement of this issue in 
ideological terms, combined, ironically, with its electoral failure as the chief element of 
the 2001 campaign, afforded Duncan Smith the opportunity and autonomy to recast 
conservatism in a new direction and on new ground. Although it failed, the Duncan 
Smith era can thus be seen as the fountainhead of genuinely post-Thatcherite 
conservatism. 
Conclusion: Space for Cameron-ism? 
This chapter began by exploring why European integration has long been a difficult 
issue for Conservatives in Britain. For several decades, Europe was the defining issue 
in Conservative Party politics, and was central to any understanding of it. Damian 
Green suggests that this is no longer the case: 
For most of the 1980s and 1990s, to the enormous damage of the Conservative Party, 
Europe was an issue that defined you. It didn't matter what you thought about anything 
else, if you stood on one or other side of the Europe debate that defined you as right-
wing or left-wing. Well actually now that's not true, it was never completely true, and 
it's now much less important an issue for the party as it was then. (Green Interview). 
Europe was talismanic of the Thatcher legacy, and was emblematic of the party's 
difficulties in the 1990s, when the Conservatives came to be seen as fractious, divided, 
and ideologically obsessive. Yet the chapter ends with the suggestion that the 1997-
2005 period has seen a radical (and little commented on) transformation of 
Conservative politics in relation to Europe, to the extent that it no longer appears to be 
the defining issue it once was. It is no longer the source of significant party 
management problems for the leadership, nor is it the cause of discordant displays of 
disunity. Since 1997, the Conservatives have maintained a broadly consistent and 
unified Eurosceptic position. This has a number of important implications. 
Firstly, it offers the Conservatives the hope that it will yield some electoral benefits in 
the manner suggested by Evans (1998) by being proximate to a largely Eurosceptic 
electorate. The 1999 European elections and the Conservatives' relatively favourable 
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ratings on the issue (Tables 5.3 and 5.4) offer some support for this, although this is 
strongly tempered by the lessons of the 2001 election, and the relatively low (and 
declining) salience of the issue (Figure 5.1). However, should the salience of European 
integration increase significantly in the future, for example if membership of the single 
currency once again became a major point of political debate, the Conservatives are 
well placed to capitalise on this. 
Secondly, the neutralisation of this deleterious subject is a hugely significant 
ideological change in the Conservative Party, and is, in a sense, the final neutralisation 
of the Thatcher legacy. It opens the space for the Conservatives to develop a genuinely 
post-Thatcherite agenda, by developing a new narrative of conservatism based upon 
different priorities and issues. The tentative beginnings of this were seen under Duncan 
Smith and are now being developed more considerably by David Cameron, who has 
pushed a broader Conservative agenda encompassing issues such as climate change and 
social exclusion. On Europe, Cameron has maintained the harder but quieter approach 
established by lain Duncan Smith. He has attacked the government for failing to offer a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, but has not made Europe a prominent campaign issue. 
Thirdly, however, the resolution of the European issue within the Conservative Party 
has occurred upon broadly Thatcherite lines, exemplifying how no Conservative leader, 
including Cameron, has been able to escape the contours laid down by Thatcherism. 
This is well illustrated by Cameron's pledge to withdraw Conservative MEPs from the 
European People's Party (EPP), the main centre-right grouping in the European 
Parliament, which has attracted criticism from some of his natural supporters. For 
example Michael Portillo comments that: 'By and large, Cameron's policy of daily 
saying the opposite of what you expect a Conservative to say is working well and the 
opinion polls reflect his success. There remains a single exception: Europe. On that one 
issue Cameron turns from Jekyll to Hyde, foaming like a Tory reactionary of the old 
school'. Euroscepticism is therefore the 'one survivor' of modernisation, not least 
because many of the leading modernisers emerged from the party's Eurosceptic right-
wing (Portillo, 2006). So for Portillo, Cameron's failure to confront his party's 
Euroscepticism is a strategic error in that it runs counter to his overall approach, and is 
a tactical errOL as by 'blundering into this terrain he will resurrect the party's reputation 
for being divided and self-obsessed' (2006). However, as Portillo himself 
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acknowledges, Euroscepticism actually performs a useful function for Cameron as 'the 
one link between the party leader and that large body of right-wing opinion that did not 
convert to modernisation' (2006). So the maintenance of the firm Eurosceptic line he 
inherited would appear to be a sound judgement by Cameron that has helped him carry 
party opinion into other areas where it may have been reluctant to venture, even if the 
as yet unresolved EPP issue causes him problems. 
The way in which the European issue has been resolved within the Conservative Party 
along broadly Thatcherite lines will therefore be of significance in shaping the nature of 
post-Thatcherite conservatism, as we are beginning to see. In this respect, the 1997-
2005 period is of great importance, as it was the actions of key actors during this time 
that shaped how this came about. 
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Chapter 6 
National Identity and the English Question 
The Conservative Party is the nationalist party par excellence. A Conservative 
Party which cannot present itself to the country as a national party suffers under a 
sever handicap. 
Enoch Powell (quoted in Lynch, 1999: xi). 
6.1 Introduction 
The question of national identity, epitomised by the issue of European integration, has 
been problematic for the Conservatives. This chapter also explores the question of identity, 
through an examination of Conservative Party policy and discourse in two further areas: 
immigration and devolution. The previous chapter showed how since 1997 the European 
question has largely been resolved in the Conservative Party as, with only a handful of 
dissenters, the party has settled on a Thatcherite Eurosceptic position. However, the end of 
bitter internal feuding over Europe has not meant the end of challenges to Conservative 
conceptions of national identity.! 
The debate about both devolution and race/immigration issues is intimately related to the 
'English question' - that is the emergence of a stronger and more visible sense of 
Englishness and its political, cultural, and constitutional implications. Devolution has 
challenged the traditional Conservative view of the British state by fundamentally altering 
its structure, leading some Conservatives to question the historic role of the party as the 
defender of the Union. This debate over how to respond to devolution is traced in the next 
section. Higher levels of immigration have pushed the issue up the political agenda and 
increased its electoral salience, and the way in which Conservatives have sought to 
respond to this reveals a significant dilemma: whether to seek to exploit the issue via 
I There is a wealth of academic literature dedicated to discussing what constitutes 'national identity'. Here 1 
adopt Anderson's (1991) definition ofa nation as an 'imagined community'. Consequently, the key features 
of national identity are an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1991: 14). For further 
discussion in relation to England and Britain see Kumar (2000; 2003), and Mandler (2006a; 2006b). 
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policy and rhetoric, or develop a more inclusive image. In the light of these two areas, the 
final section considers the implications of the Conservatives' reluctant drift towards 
becoming an English party. Once again, this case highlights the importance of multi-
layered contexts. Conservative Party leaders have had to react and adapt to circumstances 
largely beyond their control, such as the establishment of an asymmetric system of 
devolution and the changing composition of society. Strategic choices must also be 
understood in the context of an ideological tradition of unionism as well as in terms of 
electoral dynamics. Political actors retain, however, a vital capacity to shape the terms of 
debate and interpret competing demands in different ways, thus affecting outcomes and 
changing the context faced by their successors. As such, the actions of Hague, Duncan 
Smith and Howard influenced the nature of the 'English question' faced by Cameron 
today. 
6.2 Devolution: from opposition to acceptance 
The Conservative Party has traditionally identified itself as the party of the Union - indeed, 
it is still officially known as the Conservative and Unionist Party. Gamble identifies the 
Union as one of the four pillars of Conservative political hegemony in the twentieth 
century (1995: 13-16). Along with defence of the Empire, the constitution, and property, 
defence of the Union was a key feature of the Conservative Party's identity and electoral 
appeal. However, each of these pillars, Gamble argues, has been undermined, to the extent 
that by the mid-1990s conservatism could be said to be in 'crisis' (1995: 13). 
Conservative commitment to the Union was weakened by the political situation In 
Northern Ireland in the 1970s which led to a breakdown in relations with the Ulster 
Unionists, who opposed the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. This breach was further 
entrenched in the 1980s and 1990s, as 'under both Thatcher and Major the Conservatives 
have pursued a strategy of disengaging Britain from Northern Ireland' (1995: 15). This 
culminated in the 1994 Downing Street Declaration, as Gamble (1995: 15) comments: 
The key passage in the Declaration was the statement that the British Government had no 
selfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland, and that if ever the Ulster people wished to 
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separate from the United Kingdom, the British Government would not oppose it. .. The 
message of the Declaration was not lost on the Unionists. They had to recognize that there 
~as now no party at Westminster which was committed in principle and in all 
CIrcumstances to the maintenance of the Union. 
Conservative commitment to the Union with Northern Ireland therefore no longer rests on 
the presumption that the Union is an inherently good thing which should be defended on 
principle, but rests merely on the grounds that it remains the democratic will of the people. 
In other words, Union with the six counties shall only be maintained for as long as a 
majority of the Northern Irish wish it. This has implications for the Conservative approach 
to devolution in other parts of the United Kingdom. 
At the 1997 general election, the promise of constitutional reform was a key feature of 
Labour's manifesto. The central plank of this was devolution to Scotland and Wales, 
subject to public approval by referendum. The Conservatives campaigned vigorously 
against this, John Major warning that the country had just '72 hours to save the Union', 
claiming that Labour's proposals would mean 'the break-up of the United Kingdom as we 
know it' (quoted in Jones, 1997). This was a consistent theme of Major's, who likewise at 
the 1992 general election had called on voters to 'wake up' to the dangers of devolution 
(quoted in Jones, 1997). Similarly under William Hague, the Conservatives fought against 
devolution in the referendum campaigns in Scotland and Wales. Harris claims 'the Union 
played an important part in Hague's understanding of British national identity' and that 
this opposition stemmed from his belief that 'it would inevitably spark the process of the 
disintegration of the Union' (2005: 129). 
However, once the referendums had been held, and despite the very close result in Wales. 
the Conservatives quickly moved to accept the new arrangements.2 For Harris this revision 
of party policy can be explained, somewhat ironically, by Hague's unionism. She explains: 
'rather than rejecting the will of the people, intransigently opposing the new assembly and 
parliament and refusing to take part in the new tiers of government, Hague steered his 
2 In Scotland, 1,775,045 voters (74.3%) agreed that there should be a Scottish Parliament, whilst 61-l.400 
(25.7%) disagreed. 1,512,889 (63.5%) agreed that it should have tax raising powers, with 870,263 (36.5%) 
against. Turnout was 60.4%. In Wales, 559,419 voters (50.3%) agreed that there should be a Welsh 
Assembly, and 552,698 (49.7%) disagreed, on a turnout of 50. 1 %. (BBe News, 1997). 
140 
party in the direction of working within the system to stop the snowball effect which he 
believed would result in Scotland or even Wales leaving the Union' (2005: 129). In his 
first major speech on the constitution as party leader, Hague acknowledged the dilemma he 
faced: should Conservatives seek to reform, reverse or advance the changes Labour was 
making? And what were the implications for the Conservative Party? As Hague asked, 
'What happens to the defenders of the status quo when the status quo itself disappears?' 
(1998b: 2). Rapid constitutional change is, he acknowledged 'bewildering for many 
Conservatives', not least because 'the public is at best bemused and at worst uninterested' 
(1998b: 2). This public apathy was partly the Conservatives own fault, as 'the merits of our 
existing constitutional arrangements were so self-evident, we believed, that it was hardly 
worth making the intellectual case for them' (1998b: 1). The Conservatives (and the 
nation) were now paying the price for this failure, as public concern about Labour's 
'constitutional vandalism' remained muted (1998b: 1). The question was therefore whether 
the Conservatives could, or should, accept it: 
Some Conservatives believe we will simply have to shrug our shoulders and accept 
whatever arrangements we inherit. But how can we accept constitutional arrangements 
which are unstable and undemocratic and with whose underlying principles we profoundly 
disagree? I do not believe we can or should just put up with them. (1 998b: 2). 
The practical reality however, was that undoing these measures would be impossible: the 
Conservatives could not hope to 'unscramble the omelette' (1998b: 11). The only realistic 
response, Hague claimed, was to develop a programme of further change aimed at 
correcting 'the dangerous imbalances and tensions which Labour's constitutional reforms 
will unleash'. The Conservatives must seek 'to construct a set of constitutional 
relationships which will preserve the key, overarching principles of our existing 
constitution: limited government, the rule of law, the unity of the kingdom and, above all, 
democratic accountability' (1998b: 3). This was a theme that Hague echoed in another 
speech to the Centre for Policy Studies the following year, in which he sought to explain 
how Conservatives could 'strengthen the Union after devolution' (1999b: 2). This debate 
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centred in particular around the asymmetrical nature of the devolution and where this left 
England: the West Lothian Question.3 
Devolution, Hague claimed, 'strikes at the heart of the constitutional arrangement that has 
held our Union together for hundreds of years' (l998b: 11). As a response he suggested 
four possible options for the Conservatives to consider in what Harris labelled an exercise 
in constitutional 'damage limitation' (2005: 135). These were: the creation of an English 
parliament; English votes for English laws (EvfEI); a major cut in the number of Scottish 
MPs; and substantial devolution of power in England to local councils and other bodies 
such as hospital trusts (Harris, 2005: 135; Hague, 1998b: 13-14). Labour's proposal of 
English regional government was rejected as 'such assemblies assume that strong regional 
identities exist in England, which they do not' and 'an extra layer of politicians ... would 
lack legitimacy in the eyes of the voters and would simply confuse accountability still 
further' (Hague, 1998b: 13). Lacking legislative powers, regional assemblies would also 
'fail to ameliorate the West Lothian Question' (Harris, 2005: 135). 
In 1998, Hague warned that the 'dark clouds of nationalism are gathering - not just 
Scottish and Welsh nationalism, but English nationalism too' and pledged that 'a patriotic 
Conservative Party will fight it wherever it seeks to gain support' (l998b: 12). By the 
following year however, he was more confident that this 'flowering of English 
consciousness' could 'play an increasingly important part in our sense of British national 
identity' (1999b: 6). However he also warned: 
Try to ignore this English consciousness, or bottle it up, and it could turn into a more 
dangerous English nationalism that could threaten the future of the United Kingdom. 
Recognise its value and it can actually strengthen our common British identity. I believe 
answering the English Question is vital to the future stability of the United Kingdom. 
Giving the voters of England a fair say is the way to strengthen the Union after devolution. 
(1999b: 6). 
3 The situation whereby Scottish MPs at Westminster were able to vote on legislation that only applied to 
England (or to England and Wales), whilst English and Welsh MPs enjoyed no such right over legislation 
that only applied to Scotland (as it had been devolved to the Scottish Parliament). 
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As Harris (2005: 137-140) summarises, Hague announced in his speech of 15th July 1999 
that the options of creating an English parliament or slashing the number of Scottish MPs 
(to the effect that Scots would be underrepresented at Westminster) had been rejected. 
Elements of the localist proposal to devolve more powers to English councils were 
endorsed, but were not seen as an answer to the West Lothian Question as they did not 
rectify the imbalance of legislative devolution. The fourth option, of English votes for 
English laws was consequently adopted as Conservative Party policy. This was not viewed 
as an ideal solution. Hague had noted in 1998 that each of the four proposals under 
consideration had drawbacks, but that the party was merely seeking 'the least damaging 
answer to the West Lothian Question' (1998b: 14). The adoption of EvtEl did, however, 
usher in a prolonged period of policy stability in this area, and effectively marginalised 
debate on the issue within the parliamentary party. EvtEI featured in the form outlined by 
Hague in both the 2001 and 2005 Conservative election manifestos, with little detailed 
elaboration. For example the 2005 manifesto made just a two-sentence comment: 
Now that exclusively Scottish matters are decided by the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, 
exclusively English matters should be decided in Westminster without the votes of MPs 
sitting for Scottish constituencies who are not accountable to English voters. We will act to 
ensure that English laws are decided by English votes. (Conservative Party, 2005: 22). 
Harris asserts that under William Hague's leadership, the Conservatives 'remained a 
steadfastly unionist party' (2005: 143). For example she quotes Michael Ancram, who 
said: 'I believe that the Conservative Party is the unionist party and that we should never 
do anything that actually remotely is going to undermine the Union'; and Lord Strathclyde 
who stated that English nationalism: 'is of no serious intellectual interest to Conservatives, 
who are a United Kingdom party' (interviews in Harris, 2005: 142). More recently, David 
Cameron has similarly sought to display his unionist credentials, claiming that the 
Conservatives are 'a party of the Union and as long as 1 lead it that is how it will stay', and 
pledging to 'carry out my duty to nurture and support the Union whatever my party's 
political standing in any of the Union's constituent parts' (2007: 1). 
However, although they may have been developed from a unionist perspective, the 
Conservative proposal for EvtEl has been widely criticised as potentially damaging to the 
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Union. Sue Stirling, for example, suggests that EvtEl is fundamentally unworkable, as it 
'raises the prospect of a UK government being unable to govern England, its largest 
constituent part' (Stirling, 2007). From a rather different perspective, the Campaign for an 
English Parliament concedes that whilst it does address the West Lothian Question. EvtEl 
will lead to other difficulties. As well as pointing to the potential for confusion and even 
deadlock in the House of Commons, they also argue that 'it will undermine the Union by 
undermining its Parliament' (CEP, 2006: 11). Even the staunch Conservative loyalist 
Malcolm Ritkind suggested that: 
The proposal on which the Conservative Party fought the last couple of general elections 
had identified the right problem but their solution was too crude. If you simply, without 
further elaboration, say English votes on English business, and whenever the House of 
Commons is discussing English business the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish will not vote, 
that does create two classes ofMP. (Rifkind Interview). 
As an alternative to EvtEI, Ritkind proposes the creation of an English Grand Committee 
to consider 'English only' business. The House of Commons as a whole would then be 
bound by a convention (but not a law) to respect the wishes of the Grand Committee on 
such legislation. Ritkind also denies that Labour has been left as the sole voice of 
Britishness: 
No that's not true. The Conservative Party remains overwhelmingly a unionist party, totally 
committed to the union. What is however true, is that the Labour Party has a much greater 
party political interest in Scotland, and the Tory Party has a much greater party political 
interest in England. That's simply where our strengths are. And therefore for the Labour 
Party to survive at the United Kingdom level, given that England is 85 percent of Britain, 
they are in a much more vulnerable position than we are. It is politically much more 
important for them to emphasise their Britishness, and their opposition to any change. 
Whereas the Tory Party, whether it's Britain or England, will be likely to dominate the 
English scene for most of the time, so the Tory Party can afford to be more relaxed about 
that matter. It is also, in crude political terms, to the Tory Party's advantage if a Labour 
government could not get its legislation through the House of Commons. It's not 
impossible to have a Tory government with a minority in England, but it's obviously highly 
unlikely. Now that's not why I'm arguing what I'm arguing. I'm arguing for constitutional 
reasons to try to protect the future of the United Kingdom, but I have to acknowledge that 
my party would benefit and the Labour Party would lose out. .. 
Some people argue that the kind of ideas that I have been putting forward, or indeed 
the Conservatives have been putting forward. will break-up the United Kingdom. It's 
actually the other way round. (Rifkind Interview). 
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Whether Conservative policy does indeed contain 'the seeds of the break-up of the Union' 
(CEP, 2006: 16) or will help to save it as Rifkind suggests is open to contention. What is 
clear, however, is that the Conservative Parliamentary Party and leadership has remained 
broadly unionist. This needs to be explained, as a number of contextual factors would 
suggest that the Conservatives could have profited from adopting a less unionist, and more 
English-orientated position. Most visibly, the Conservatives have become an almost 
exclusively English party. In the 1997 landslide, they lost all eight of their seats in 
Scotland and all eleven of their seats in Wales. In Scotland their share of the vote was just 
17.5 percent and in Wales 19.6 percent, compared to 33.7 percent in England (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1997: 256). In 2001, they won just one seat in Scotland and none in Wales. By 
2005 there had been little change to this picture. The Conservative vote in England was up 
to 35.7 percent, marginally ahead of Labour on 35.5 percent (although Labour won 92 
more English seats). In Scotland however, the Conservatives languished in fourth place, 
with just 15.8 percent of the vote (although this did deliver one seat to Westminster). In 
Wales they finished second in terms of vote-share (with 21.4 percent) but fourth in terms 
of seats, winning only three (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005: 205). 
Figure 6.1: Conservative vote share at General Elections, 1950-2005 
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This disastrous performance since 1997 is the culmination of longer-term trends (Figure 
6.1). The Conservatives' share of the vote in England and Scotland began to deviate in the 
1950s, with a significant gap appearing in the 1970s. Since 1983, the party has performed 
approximately twice as well in England compared to Scotland in terms of vote share. 
Seawright attributes this to a divergence between mainstream Scottish public opinion 
which moved to the left in the 1970s and Conservative Party ideology, which 
simultaneously swung to the right: 'The laissez-faire discourse gained ground in the party 
at the very time when the Scottish indigenous industrial base was facing an acute crisis of 
survival and it is not surprising that the Scots should have developed a taste for economic 
intervention' (Seawright, 2002: 4). The Conservatives were aware of this disparity and the 
potential electoral danger it posed, and contrary to popular belief, sought to shield Scotland 
from the full force of Thatcherite policies (Gamble, 2006: 27). As McLean and McMillan 
note, public spending levels in Scotland and England did not converge under Thatcher or 
Major, as: 
Scotland continued to pose a credible threat to the Union, which any SNP resurgence would 
bring back to life. Conservative governments were particularly sensitive to this threat. Their 
Secretaries of State continued to protect Scotland from the fuII rigour of the Barnett 
formula until 1997. Secretaries of State Lang and (especially) Forsyth boasted about the 
spending differential in order to warn Scots that devolution would threaten it. 
(McLean and McMiIIan, 2003: 54). 
Clearly however, this strategy failed to placate the Scottish electorate, as despite a small 
upturn in 1992, the Conservative vote in Scotland almost halved between 1979 (31.4 
percent) and 1997 (17.5 percent). One explanation for this is, as the previous chapter 
noted, is that the Conservatives under Thatcher developed a more overtly English 
nationalist discourse (Gamble, 1996: 35). 
Combined with the electoral logic, another clear reason for the Conservatives to embrace 
English nationalism post-l 997 was that following the referendums in Scotland and Wales, 
the Conservatives could claim (as Hague did) that circumstances had fundamentally 
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changed in such a way that they could not be reversed, and that the party should therefore 
adapt, perhaps radically, to the new situation. Indeed, the idea of an English parliament 
was championed by the Conservative backbencher Teresa Gorman, who in late-1997, 
supported by David Davis and Eric Forth, introduced a Private Member's Bill proposing a 
referendum on the creation of such a body, but garnered little support (Harris, 2005: 131-
2). 
Such a move could also be seen as a consistent development of the Powellite themes of 
Thatcher's national strategy. Although Powell himself was an ardent unionist, devolution 
changed the nature of the British state and meant that his vision of national unity based 
around the supreme authority of Parliament could never be realised. Within England, 
however, it still might. Powell's biographer and intellectual disciple, Simon Heffer, has 
been the most forceful exponent of a Conservative Englishness. Heffer's self-proclaimed 
'Toryism' has, at its heart, a concern with the nation. It is perhaps therefore surprising that 
his most prominent contribution to British politics has been his advocacy in recent years of 
English independence, particularly as he acknowledges that 'for much of the last three 
centuries, belief in nation was synonymous with a belief in the Union' (2005: 200). This 
seemingly un-conservative policy is his response to the rise of separatism in Scotland, and 
the acquiescence of the New Labour government in legislating for devolution shortly after 
its election in 1997. His call to break the Union, eloquently stated in Nor Shall My Sword: 
The Reinvention of England (Heffer, 1999), is presented as a pragmatic reaction to this 
new political reality. For Heffer, the union with Scotland has long since lost its strategic 
importance to England: the benefits (particularly financial), run purely in one direction. 'It 
is hard to see what the English have to fear from fragmentation of the Union', as the loss of 
Scotland 'would only be a marginal loss to England, and no loss at all in economic terms' 
(1999: 12). 
This political Englishness is most clearly linked to the constitutional changes in Scotland 
and Wales, but a growing commitment to Englishness, at least in cultural terms, pre-dated 
this legislation. Indeed. 'a new mood of English nationalism was discernible as far back as 
the early 1990s, and was gathering momentum well before New Labour came to power in 
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1997' (Kenny et aI., 2008: 3). Aughey traces this to 1996, when the swathe of St George~s 
flags that accompanied the hosting of the European football championships 'helped to 
dispel the myth of the English being reserved and reluctant to engage in collective 
celebration' (2007: 1). It can also be seen in the upsurge of interest in, and writings about 
the history, sociology, and national character of the English.4 This range of cultural 
reflections offers itself as a potential source of a new identity for Conservatives, 
particularly as their traditional appeal of a national ideal based on Empire, Union and anti-
socialism appears increasingly irrelevant. However: 
Despite the multiplicity of accounts of the English/British past that have been propounded 
from within the media and academy, English historical understanding remains tied to a 
remarkably selective set of (largely mythical) stories and icons. The recurrent mythology of 
the English destined to be an island race defined by hostility to rival European powers -
with Nazi Germany playing the role filled since the late eighteenth century by Catholic 
France - remains remarkably prevalent; and totally ill-equipped as an intellectual template 
for a people seeking to come to terms with its status as one nation in a multi-national 
political structure. (Kenny et al., 2008: 6). 
The nature of these dominant themes of English nationalism, which fail to adequately 
reflect the varied sources of the new Englishness, have made the construction of a modern, 
inclusive, plural appeal based around it difficult for politicians of all parties. For the 
Conservatives, the only viable political Englishness available has been the rather hard-
edged nationalism promulgated by Heffer, which comes with clear political risks. It is 
linked to a belligerent Euroscepticism and comes perilously close to becoming a race-
based argument. By embracing it the Conservatives would risk becoming associated with 
what Cameron (2006b) has labelled 'sour Little Englanders', which could be distasteful to 
many voters and in party image terms an electorally foolish strategy. For Theresa May, to 
make themselves electable the Conservatives both needed to change their image and 
change the party 'in a deeper sense' (May Interview). She explains: 'it's a whole range of 
change. The image in terms of the sort of people we have as candidates is crucial, but 
that's also about tapping into the skills-set that is there beyond simply the stereotyped 
white male MP that the party has been used to having' (May Interview). The narrow 
4 For example: Blunkett (2005); Bragg (2006); Heffer (1999); Hitchens (! 999); Kumar (2003); Mandler 
(2006a); Marr (2000); Paxman (1998); Scruton (2000); Stapleton (2001); Weight (2002). 
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understanding of Englishness espoused by Conservative writers such as Roger Scruton 
(2000) and Simon Heffer (1999) offers a rather nostalgic and mono-cultural version of 
national identity, seemingly out of touch with twenty-first century British society. 
Whilst they have shied away from outright little-Englander populism, the Conservatives 
have also struggled to articulate a convincing narrative of Britishness, or present 
themselves successfully as the party that embodies the British nation. The prevailing 
consensus in the party is effectively summarised by Michael Howard: 
I don't want to turn the clock back on devolution; but I do, however, believe there should 
be English votes for English laws. I think that members of Parliament from Scotland 
shouldn't be able to vote on matters that have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. So 
J look at each issue on its merits. I don't think that the things that I've suggested are a 
recipe for an English party, which I wouldn't like to see. We have three members in Wales 
and one in Scotland, and I'd like to see more of them, and I'm confident that we will at the 
next election. (Howard Interview). 
Howard enunciates the mainstream Conservative VIew, which likes to see itself as 
addressing the English Question pragmatically, within a unionist framework. It is wary of 
presenting itself as an English party, for the reasons noted above. It thus prefers to 
maintain the position (in spite of the electoral mathematics) that it is a party of the whole 
of the UK. This identification is then partly a negative one - lacking a sufficiently 
palatable English-based identity, the Conservatives have attempted to maintain a British-
based national appeal, even as the traditional Conservative understanding of Britishness 
appears to have been losing its relevance. In practical terms however, since devolution the 
Conservative Party in Scotland has become increasingly separate from the organisation in 
England, with effective operational and financial independence. 'All that unites them with 
the London-based party is the brand-name' and there have even been rumours that they are 
to be officially split (Nelson, 2007). Revealingly, the manifesto of the Scottish 
Conservatives for the 2007 Scottish Parliament election (Conservative Party, 2007a) made 
no mention of the Union, and mentioned the UK (or the United Kingdom) only twice in 39 
pages. However, under Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard the Conservatives maintained a 
unionist position. The prospects for this changing are discussed below (section 6.4). 
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The new Englishness has implications beyond the constitutional question of the future of 
the Union and the nature of the relationship between England and Scotland. It also informs 
the broader issue of attitudes to English and British national identities. The Conservatives' 
uncertainties about what form these should take can be further revealed and explored 
through the examination of the politics of immigration and race. 
6.3 Nationhood and the politics of immigration 
I don't wish to have what they call a multicultural society. I hate these phrases. 
Multicultural society! A multicultural society will never be a united society. 
Margaret Thatcher, 22 May 2001 (quoted in Walters, 2001: 174). 
A patriotic attachment to nation and empire was the cornerstone of British conservatism 
for much of the twentieth century, and, as noted above, can be seen as one of the pi llars of 
Conservative hegemony. However, the position of Britain as a great power was challenged 
by relative decline and the disintegration of empire, whilst the traditional view of 
Britishness was further brought into question by immigration from the New 
Commonwealth. As Lynch notes, 'The conservative nation is constructed around ideas of 
authority, patriotic allegiance, national character and the organic evolution of institutions, 
which sit uneasily with a plural society' (1999: 152). Immigration and race thus form an 
important part of the politics of nationhood, and have been at the heart of the debate about 
what the conservative nation should look like. However, the fervour of this debate in 
British politics has varied over time, both in terms of the level of public interest and the 
attention paid to it by politicians. 
As Layton-Henry (1980: 50-52) notes, the legacy of empire is important not only as the 
source of Commonwealth migrants to Britain, but because the imperial ideal contributed to 
a reluctance amongst many Conservatives to restrict immigration. Empire placed 
obligations on the mother country, including the notion of common citizenship with a right 
to free movement and settlement. The reaction to the first wave of Commoll\\ealth 
immigration 'was initially subdued', not least because it helped meet a serious labour 
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shortage, and it did not become an election issue in the 1950s (Layton-Henry, 1980: 52. 
52-55). However, public concern was on the increase: by 1961, polls showed 73 percent of 
the population in favour of immigration control, with just 6 percent in favour of continuing 
the open regime (Layton-Henry, 1980: 56). A series of nationality acts (1962. 1968 and 
1971) followed, progressively tightening immigration controls. The 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act was justified by the Conservative government at the time on the grounds 
that 'Britain was a small island, in danger of becoming overcrowded' (Geddes, 2003: 33). 
However, the real reason for introducing the legislation, Geddes argues. was 'concerns 
about the "racial" character of some immigrants' (2003: 34). It was during this period that 
'race card' politics emerged, as the Conservative Party gained an electoral advantage over 
Labour by being seen as tougher on immigration (Saggar, 2000: 174-183). 
Concern that immigration was destroying the British way of life was voiced in apocalyptic 
tones by Enoch Powell in his infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech in April 1968. Edward 
Heath immediately sacked Powell from the shadow cabinet, but it was clear that his views 
had resonated with a sizable proportion of both the Conservative Party membership and the 
electorate. Powell's campaign on immigration was 'in essence an opportunistic appeal to 
an ethnocentric nationalism' (Rich, 1986: 53), but his speech 'tapped the widespread 
popular frustration with the bipartisan approach to immigration and race relations which 
had existed since 1965' and consequently Powell and his views became . a factor that the 
party leader could not ignore' (Layton-Henry, 1980: 62). The bipartisan consensus held at 
the 1970 general election, even though immigration was considered the fourth most 
important issue facing the country and opinion polls indicated the popular appeal of a 
tougher line (Layton-Henry, 1980: 63). Although his views were disowned by the party 
leadership Powell had a significant impact on the election, to the Conservatives' benefit 
(Saggar, 2000: 187). 
The bipartisan accord on immigration was one of the victims of Thatcher's suspicion of 
consensus. and was abandoned in 1976 (Lynch, 1999: 134). Populist Powellite rhetoric 
was employed by Thatcher in the early years of her leadership. In an interview with 
Granada television in 1978, she expressed people's fears that indigenous culture was being 
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"swamped' by immigration, "echoing Powell's belief that such prejudices were legitimate 
and had to be addressed' (Lynch, 1999: 134). Here, the debate about the number of 
migrants was crucial. Thatcher argued that "if you want good race relations, you have got 
to allay people's fears about immigration'. She went on: 
We must hold out the clear prospect of an end to immigration because at the moment it is 
about between 45,000 and 50,000 people coming in a year. Now, I was brought up in a 
small town, 25,000. That would be two new towns a year and that is quite a lot. So, we do 
have to hold out the prospect of an end to immigration except, of course, for compassionate 
cases. (Thatcher, 1978). 
The first Thatcher government did legislate to reduce immigration, introducing the British 
Nationality Act (1981) to tighten citizenship criteria. However, the Powellite rhetoric did 
not result in fully blown Powellite policy, and some immigration continued. "The most 
fervent imaginings of the anti-immigration lobby - repatriation and the dismantling of race 
relations legislation - never came to pass' (Geddes, 2003: 37-38). After playing a 
significant role in the first Thatcher administration the issues of race and immigration 
subsided, as the party leadership decided to play them down (Layton-Henry, 1986: 73, 95-
7). The effect of Thatcher's first term was to depoliticise the issue, as "there was nowhere 
else for ostensibly liberal politicians to go and little scope for the racist extreme right to 
make a breakthrough ... Both the rhetorical and physical limits of control appeared to have 
been reached' (Geddes, 2003: 39-40). Thus, race questions were progressively 
marginalised, to the extent that in the 1987 general election, only 1 percent of voters 
regarded them as amongst the most important (Rich, 1998: 100). This trend was continued 
under Major. Some further restrictions on entry to the UK were introduced, particularly 
with regard to asylum seekers, whose numbers had markedly increased (Lynch, 1999: 
140). In terms of political debate however, "it would be fair to conclude that the whole 
question of ethnic and race issues were put on hold in the Conservative Party under Major' 
as other subjects, notably Europe, took centre stage (Rich, 1998: 103). 
On becoming leader, Hague was keen to present himself as embodying a "fresh start' for 
the Conservative Party (Chapter 4). One of his first (and most publicised) acts was to 
attend the Notting Hill Carnival, in a conscious effort to display his multi-cultural 
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credentials (Nadler, 2000: 212). For Alibhai-Brown, although much derided, this visit 'was 
a phenomenal act of support for multiculturalism and a first not only for the Tories, but for 
any of the main political parties' (2000: 26). This visit in many ways symbolizes the 'Fresh 
Conservatism' propounded by what Kelly labels 'Hague Mark I', and which was 
abandoned in favour of the more populist 'Common-sense Conservatism' by 'Hague Mark 
II' (Kelly, 2001: 197-203; Chapter 4). It also exposes the dilemma faced by the 
Conservatives since 1997: whether to try to rebuild electoral support with strong messages 
on populist 'core vote' issues, or whether to deliberately downplay such issues in an effort 
to demonstrate that Conservative Party has changed, and to allow space for a new narrative 
of conservatism to emerge. As Chapter 4 (pp. 85-91) discussed, Hague sided firmly with 
the traditionalist 'rockers' in mid-1999, in the light of the reaction to Lilley's Butler 
Memorial Lecture and the European election results. Central to this shift was Hague's 
message on Europe and the single currency, but it also involved more emphasis on 
appearing tough on asylum and immigration. 
Was this a strategic mistake? In 1998, Rich argued that 'by the early 1990s the electorate 
appeared only marginally interested in the immigration issue, and appeared far more 
concerned about Europe', and as such, 'the debate over nationhood in Britain has not lived 
up to predictions that it would connect up with issues of race' (1998: 106). Similarly 
Lynch suggested that any attempt to play the race card would be unlikely to reap much 
electoral reward, as 'immigration does not have the electoral potency it had in the 1970s 
and a tougher Conservative line would further reduce the Conservatives' chances of 
increasing their support among ethnic minority voters' (Lynch, 1999: 153). As such, the 
major focus of debate and concern in the politics of nationhood, both in the Conservative 
Party and the wider public, has been on the issue of Europe, not immigration or race. The 
blurry amalgamation of the two issues was illustrated by the rhetoric of Hague's (2001) 
'foreign land' speech, which was attacked by Gurbux Singh, the chairman of the Campaign 
for Racial Equality for undermining the fight against racial discrimination, but was 'spun' 
by party officials as an attack on the European Union (Walters, 2001: 147). Consequently, 
whereas a clear and unified Eurosceptic position had the potential to benefit the 
Conservatives electorally in the 1990s (Chapter 5; Evans, 1998), the same cannot be said 
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for immigration. However, the immigration issue was brought to the fore during the 2005 
campaign, to the extent that it completely overshadowed European integration as the main 
focus of the politics of nationhood. It is therefore worth tracing its salience in order to 
discover to what extent this was a response to an upsurge in public interest and concern. 
In April 2008, MORI (2008b) conducted an opinion poll of attitudes towards race and 
immigration to mark the 40th anniversary of Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech. 
This found that 79 percent of the population regard themselves as 'not prejudiced at all' 
against people from other races. However, 58 percent of respondents agreed that 'parts of 
this country don't feel like Britain any more because of immigration', and 59 percent 
agreed that 'there are too many immigrants in Britain'. This figure has been relatively 
stable however, varying between 54 and 68 percent between 1989 and 2008. The idea that 
government should encourage immigrants to return to their country of origin was 
supported by 49 percent. Analysing data from the British social attitudes survey, 
Somerville suggests that 'the trend over the course of Labour's administration is one of 
rising resentment' as the proportion of the population believing the number of immigrants 
should be reduced has risen from approximately two-thirds to three-quarters (2007: 130). 
Polling evidence also shows that in recent years there has been a clear upsurge in the 
proportion of the population who regard immigration as one of the major issues facing the 
country (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2: The Salience of Immigration to the British public, 1997-2007 
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Percentage of respondents ranking race relations/immigration/immigrants amongst the most important 
political issues, based on data from Jpsos Mori Political Monitor: Long Term Trends. The Most Important 
Issues Facing Britain Today. Unprompted, combined answers to the questions: 'What would you say is the 
most important issue facing Britain today?' and 'What do you see as other important issues facing Britain 
today?' www.ipsos-mori.comlpolls/trends/issues.shtml (MORl, 2008a). 
Over the longer term, immigration has not been a major issue of public concern. MaRl 
data on what people regard as the most important issues facing the country is available 
from September 1974. Concern with immigration was pronounced in the late 1970s, 
peaking with 27 percent naming it as an important issue in August 1978. It was 16 percent 
when Margaret Thatcher entered Downing Street, but had dropped to 4 percent by the time 
of the 1983 general election. It rose again briefly in 1985, reaching 17 percent, but then 
declined and stayed below 10 percent until August 1999 (MaRl, 2008a). As Figure 6.2 
illustrates, since then the trend has been upward, not dropping below 10 percent since 
December 2000 or below 20 percent since November 2002. The figure peaked with 46 
percent naming it as an important issue in December 2007, making it the issue of most 
concern that month, ahead of crime (37 percent) and the NHS (33 percent) (MaRl, 2008a). 
The increased importance of immigration to the public can be seen in part as a response to 
rising net migration to the UK since 1997 (Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1: Immigration, emigration, and net migration from and to the UK, 1997-2005 
Year Immigration (OOOs) Emigration (OOOs) Net migration (OOOs) 
1997 326 279 +47 
1998 390 251 +139 
1999 454 291 +163 
2000 483 321 +163 
2001 480 308 +172 
2002 513 359 +153 
2003 513 362 +151 
2004 582 359 +223 
2005 565 380 +185 
Source: Data from ONS (2008). 
Conservative policy and rhetoric on immigration can be contextualised by these figures. 
Making it a major campaign issue at the May 2005 election, when the importance of the 
issue to the public had averaged 29.5 percent over the preceding two years, can be seen as 
a sound electoral calculation in response to public concern (by contrast in the two years 
prior to the June 2001 election, the figure was 10.5 percent). Indeed, Cowley and Green 
suggest that the Conservatives 'had little choice' but to focus heavily on immigration in 
2005, as its salience had risen substantially whilst the Conservatives had maintained a clear 
lead over Labour as the best party on the issue (2005: 61). In April 2005, 52 percent of 
voters named the Conservatives as the party with the best policies on asylum and 
immigration, whilst just 11 percent selected Labour (MORI, 2008c). Consequently, 'by 
focussing on this issue the Conservatives' strategy was consistent with salience theory: to 
raise the salience of your own issue strengths and neutralise or downplay the strengths of 
your opponent' (Cowley & Green, 2005: 62). The Conservatives also hoped that their 
tough policies and rhetoric would prevent them being outflanked by UKIP, whose voters 
tended to be concerned about immigration (Cowley & Green, 2005: 62). In Bercow's view 
this was Howard's strategy: 'I think he thought he would try to neutralise our 
disadvantages on the public services and show that we were reasonable. and then get on to 
the "red meat" of taxation, crime and immigration'. He recalled how at a meeting of the 
1922 committee about six months into his leadership, Howard 'said that he thought that he 
had addressed those issues and that the time had come "to move onto potentially fruitful 
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territory for the Conservative Party" namely taxation, immigration and Europe. That was a 
mistake' (Bercow Interview). 
As Bercow implies, the apparent logic of Howard's strategy has to be weighed against the 
wider implications of it, particularly the risk that it reinforced negative aspects of the 
party's image, the problem captured in Theresa May's comment that the Conservatives are 
seen as the 'nasty party' (Chapter 4). lain Duncan Smith explained how for the 
Conservatives this could be a difficult issue to handle during elections, and how he had 
sought to manage it as leader: 
We had made a clear policy position on this, but we hadn't banged-on about it. Immigration 
came up, asylum came up, but I always felt that it was one of those subject areas that during 
an election campaign could probably bear two or three days, but you need to move on after 
that, because after that it just gets nasty. You can do it objectively and with a certain 
amount of decency when you launch reasons why it has gone wrong, what you would do in 
its place, you can talk about that - that would last 2 or 3 days. (Duncan Smith Interview). 
Commenting on the 2005 election campaign, he noted that 'We got terribly bogged-down 
with asylum and immigration, which was a mistake' (Duncan Smith Interview). He 
suggested that under his successor the party had handled the issue poorly and let it get out 
of control, and that this had damaged public perceptions of the party: 
What happened was, I think they lost control of the process. I think there was a prisoner 
who was an asylum seeker who was released and who had stabbed someone to death, and 
during the election campaign it all came out. At that point I felt there was a crossroads, a 
fork in the road: you can either go off down the crime issue, or you could continue down 
the asylum road. And whether they chose to or not we ended-up going down the asylum 
road, and that meant that probably for the next week we were stuck in this rut. It's not that I 
don't think asylum is important, it is important because you need to be able to demonstrate 
to the public that you are in control, and that these sort of things are not being forgotten 
about, because they worry about them particularly, and it's a difficult area that can lead to 
lots of problems. So having clear policies at that stage would always be a blessing, and you 
will then be able to focus on how you will resolve them, but then you move on. If you get 
into that subject for too long it just confirms lots of opinions about you and makes you feel 
a touch uneasy. So there's nothing wrong with the subject, it's quite legitimate to deal with 
it. It's quite legitimate for a government or a would-be government to raise it as an issue 
during the course of a campaign, but you need to do it in the wider context of elections and 
governing generally. (Duncan Smith Interview). 
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Duncan Smith's efforts to stop the Conservatives 'banging-on' about immigration \\ere 
part of a more general strategy to challenge people's preconceptions about the party by 
downplaying issues traditionally associated with the core-vote, and to move into ne\\' 
territory. As he commented: 
I made an edict, 'I will not speak about Europe' ... We didn't talk about immigration for a 
good year while I was there. I think it was about a year, maybe slightly less, when we had 
an issue on Sangatte, the camp in France. So immigration wasn't really talked about either. 
We didn't talk about tax at that stage, well, we didn't talk about tax reductions - we were 
going to talk about that later. So all-in-all I think we did keep off the main subjects, I hate 
the phrase dog-whistle too, by the way. So we didn't talk about those subjects, because I 
knew what people knew about us on those subjects, and I didn't think there was any need. 
What they needed to understand was that there was something wider about us, something 
bigger, so that's why we stayed off them. David Cameron seems to be pursuing much the 
same strategy now, which is a good thing. (Duncan Smith Interview). 
As Chapter 4 discussed, this strategy failed, due to his poor leadership skills and inability 
to manage the party and therefore present his agenda in a disciplined and coherent manner. 
Pursued successfully however, Duncan Smith's approach may have avoided some of the 
pitfalls encountered by his successor. According to Peter Lilley, a particular problem faced 
by Michael Howard was that his policy on immigration, whilst popular, was viewed 
cynically by the electorate. Lilley explained: 'partly because he [Howard] was only there 
towards the end, there was a feeling that everything was opportunist. Immigration policy 
seemed to be opportunist, although about 70 percent of the population agreed with it, about 
20 percent thought he would do it' (Lilley Interview). 
For Ann Widdecombe, the way in which immigration came to dominate the 2005 
campaign was symptomatic of a wider problem, as the public were no longer sure, beyond 
this issue, what the Conservatives actually stood for: 
If you asked people in the 1980s 'what do Conservatives stand for?' - the very simplistic. 
the ones who wouldn't go into great political theory would say: grammar schools, as 
opposed to comprehensives; small businesses, as opposed to vast state monopolies: lower 
tax. They would have a series of things that they associated in their minds with the 
Conservatives. Now I challenge anybody today to tell me even in the most prosaic terms a 
series of six things which they associate with the Conservatives. They would probably say 
immigration control, I doubt if they could say anything after that. (Widdecombe Interview). 
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This partly reflects the role of the media in setting the agenda, particularly during general 
election campaigns, but that is something that the party leadership must respond to: 
You cannot stop, in the end, the media homing in on whatever it wants to home in on. You 
can call a press conference on one thing, but if all they want to talk about is another, that is 
what will be reported. And I think Michael [Howard] was in that bind, William [Hague] 
was in that bind. (Widdecombe Interview). 
Michael Howard denied that it was a mistake for the Conservatives to campaign on 
immigration, and dismissed the characterisation of the 2005 campaign as one that 
concentrated almost exclusively on core-vote issues (particularly immigration). He did, 
however, acknowledge the role of the media in shaping which of the Conservatives' 
messages were communicated most forcefully to the electorate: 
It is not a fair characterisation at all. It's quite ridiculous to suppose that the only people 
who are interested in immigration are core Conservative voters. Very many people were 
concerned about immigration, and I think that it was right that we responded to those 
concerns and put forward sensible policies to deal with that problem, which was out of 
control, as we have seen very vividly in recent weeks. It was only one of our five themes. I 
think the media gave it disproportionate attention, but I only devoted one press conference 
to immigration, although of course I was asked a great deal about it in various interviews 
that I did . 
... So I think the characterisation that you put to me is completely unfair, and for all 
those reasons I don't think it was a mistake. (Howard Interview). 
In this sense, Howard conceded that he was caught in something of a bind, as Widdecombe 
suggests. He noted that: 
I didn't think that I had much alternative but to respond to questions that were put to me, 
and it was part of our campaign, and I didn't want to pretend that it wasn't. If I had 
attempted to deflect questions on immigration I can see the headlines the next day saying 
'Howard backtracks on immigration'. I didn't want to have those kinds of headlines; I 
didn't want to backtrack on immigration. I believed in the policies we were putting 
forward. It was one of our five key points. But only one of them. You can't control the 
extent to which the media highlight one or other of the key messages that you are trying to 
put forward. (Howard Interview). 
The only way out of this difficulty, Widdecombe argues, is to forge a clearer alternative 
image of your party over a much longer period. If the 'nasty party' image could be 
dispelled, the Conservatives would be able to talk about issues such as immigration during 
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election campaigns without reviving voters' negative preconceptions about the party. This, 
in essence, was what Duncan Smith tried but failed to do whilst leader, and what Cameron 
appears to be doing rather more successfully: 
What David [Cameron] has tried to do, which I actually think is quite clever, is he's tried to 
set mood music. He's talked about things like the environment, and a whole load of other 
stuff, so that when the time quite inevitably comes, as it will before the next party 
conference, when we have to set out what I suspect will be quite tough policies on things 
like law and order, health, immigration, the things that we can't ignore come the election; 
when we have to set out those policies, nobody will ever be able to say this is all the Tories 
talk about. He could come out now with the toughest policy ever seen on immigration, but 
nobody would say that is all the Tories talk about, because he has actually spent a couple of 
years talking about other things. It has been clever, and it has set a different kind of mood 
music, the crucial test will be when we have to come out with the other stuff. He analysed 
correctly what had happened in 2001 and 2005, which is that the press control the agenda 
during an election, therefore set your agenda before it. (Widdecombe Interview). 
With just 18 months as party leader before the general election, Howard's opportunity to 
change the 'mood music' and set the agenda was more limited than that enjoyed by 
Cameron. He could have chosen to continue Duncan Smith's strategy (namely his focus on 
public services and social justice, and relative silence on 'core vote' issues) which if 
implemented successfully may have altered the electorate's impression of the 
Conservatives. However, he saw his priorities as imposing discipline and making the party 
appear credible (Chapter 5: 123), two things that had been lacking under his predecessor. 
One source of indiscipline under Duncan Smith was that a large section of the party was 
unconvinced by his strategy. Therefore for Howard, the easiest way to rapidly create the 
appearance of a united and disciplined party was to offer clear leadership on familiar 
Conservative themes. To do otherwise was to risk appearing implausible to both the public 
and his party: as he candidly admitted, he probably was not 'the best person to convince 
the country that the Conservative Party had changed' (Howard, interview in Portillo, 
2008). Moreover, he was 'ambivalent' about modernisation, and in his own words 
conceded that: 'I didn't feel that I could really be true to myself and present an appeal to 
the country based on the fact that the Conservative Party had changed' (Howard, interview 
in Portillo, 2008). Howard thus calculated that to shun issues such as immigration would 
not only mean that the Conservatives were passing up the opportunity to capitalise on high 
160 
salience issues on which they had a clear lead over Labour, but would also breed public 
suspicion. As he commented: 'I was very reluctant not to talk about things which 1 thought 
were very important to people. 1 didn't stop talking about Europe or crime or immigration, 
and 1 think that if 1 had people would have realised 1 wasn't being true to myself (Howard, 
interview in Portillo, 2008). 
If the prominent role of immigration in the 2005 Conservative campaign can be understood 
as a strategic calculation consistent with salience theory, how can its role in 200 I be 
accounted for, when its salience was substantially lower? As previously noted, race and 
immigration issues played much less of a role in the 200 I campaign, when it was very 
much secondary to Europe in the politics of nationhood. As Somerville comments, in 200 I 
both Labour and the Conservatives 'were virtually silent on immigration' although asylum 
policy did receive some attention (2007: 127). When asylum was discussed by the 
Conservatives, the language used emphasised their tough approach. The 2001 manifesto 
pledged to end the 'chaos' in the asylum system by interning all asylum seekers in 
reception centres, and blamed the government for giving Britain 'a reputation as a soft 
touch for bogus asylum seekers' (Conservative Party, 2001: 31). This language was echoed 
by Hague (2001) in his 'foreign land' speech, when he claimed that his policy was 'not 
bigotry' but 'plain common sense' and reflected the wishes of the people. The Party 
Chairman at the 2001 election, Michael Ancram, also argued that the Conservative 
campaign agenda reflected public concerns, particularly those communicated to the party 
via focus groups: 
When the election came we talked about immigration, we talked about asylum, we talked 
about Europe and saving the pound. Immigration and asylum we largely talked about 
because every time we asked our focus groups - we were flat-lining in the polls, and we 
kept on saying to our focus groups what should we be talking about? Guess what they said? 
Immigration and asylum. Over, and over, and over again. If I was Party Chairman now, I 
would junk focus groups, because it turned out they were wrong. I'm afraid the present 
administration of the Conservative Party has gone back to them, which makes me nervous! 
Focus groups are not necessarily the best test of public opinion. (Ancram Interview). 
Ancram also identified a wider problem at the 2001 election, namely that people were not 
interested in listening to Conservative messages on other issues, particularly public 
services. As he states: 
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T.her; was anot.her proble~, which was .that the electorate were comfortable and simply 
dIdn .t want to hst~n. The bIggest expendIture I had as Chairman in the run-up to the 2001 
electIOn was a serIes of posters which said: 'You've paid your taxes, where are the nurses 
~ou':e paid your taxes, where are the police?' And those were not, what you have jus~ 
IdentIfied as the core issues, and we had them plastered all over the country for t\VO 
months, and we didn't get a single move in the polls from that. So when it got to the 
election in a sense we were trying to find anything that was going to shift what was a very 
rigid political situation, not because people were determined not to move, but there was an 
inertia, they were comfortable, so anything that was going to make them sit up a bit. 
(Ancram Interview). 
This frank admission that the Conservatives were fumbling around in a rather desperate 
search for anything that would grab public attention encapsulates the inconsistent and 
incoherent nature of party strategy for much of this period, as well as the rather disj ointed 
approach to the issue of immigration. Since 1997 Conservative policy and rhetoric on race, 
asylum and immigration issues has at times been contradictory, and has not demonstrated a 
clear and consistent approach to the politics of nationhood, being driven by short term 
electoral strategies and calculations, which themselves have been disputed within 
Conservative ranks. The next section considers the identity question more broadly, by 
considering whether the issues under review here (devolution and immigration) show 
whether the Conservatives have become a party of English (rather than British) 
nationalism over the past decade. 
6.4 An English Party? The Conservatives and the politics of nationhood since 1997 
On both the constitutional question of the future of the post-devolution Union, and the 
cultural question of immigration and national identity, the Conservatives' approach to the 
politics of nationhood since 1997 has been mixed. In respect of both issues, the party has 
appeared unsure whether to seek to exploit them in the hope of gaining political advantage 
over their opponents, or to downplay them to reduce their political temperature. This 
reflects the absence of a dominant, coherent view of national identity in contemporary 
Conservative thought to provide clear answers to these policy questions. 
The lack of such a perspective is perhaps unsurprising. The traditional Conservative vie\\ 
of Britishness and the state has been brought into question by contextual factors largely 
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beyond their control, and in some cases (notably devolution) which they fought vigorously. 
albeit unsuccessfully, against. The numerous reports of the death of Britain may have been 
exaggerated, but it is undoubtedly the case that a range of social, cultural. economic and 
political factors have undermined the traditions, values and beliefs associated with 
Britishness for much of the twentieth century.5 Writing in 1995, Philip Dodd saw British 
identity as 'in turmoil' (1995: 5). Five years later, Alibhai-Brown noted that: 'Over the 
latter half of the twentieth century there has been a considerable weakening of the most 
abiding myths which have created this sense of nationhood in Britain' (2000: 27). As both 
authors note, this occurred despite the efforts of Mrs Thatcher to resist this trend and hold 
on to the traditional pillars of the Conservative nation. 
The Conservatives' conception of nationhood is an important one for their identity as a 
party, and has also been a primary aspect of their electoral appeal. However, as the 
traditional view of Britishness has weakened, so has the Conservative appeal that was built 
around it. As discussed in the context of devolution above, one distinctively Conservative 
narrative of nationhood has offered itself as a potential response to these changed 
circumstances. However, to declare Britishness and the United Kingdom as defunct and 
embrace English nationalism in the way that Heffer (1999) has suggested would involve a 
number of pitfalls. It would provide a clear-cut conception of national identity across the 
issues of Europe, the Union, and immigration and race, but as Cameron (2006b) and other 
Conservatives have recognised, carries with it the risk that it would have only a narrow 
appeal and damage the image of the party. This dilemma is neatly summarised by Lynch 
(1999: 168): 
Pragmatic moves towards a reforming, pro-European centre ground would have political 
benefits and mark a development of themes evident in an earlier Conservative national 
strategy: but it would erode the distinctiveness of the Conservative politics of nationhood. 
Alternatively, further moves in the direction of a nationalist strategy built around 
Euroscepticism and English nationalism would establish a clear Conservative vision of the 
nation-state and national identity, but would consign the party to a reactive and outdated 
view of the nation-state and might allow Labour to establish predominance in the politics of 
nationhood. 
5 On the 'death', 'abolition' and/or 'break-up' of Britain, see: Nairn (1981); Preston (1994); Haseler (1996): 
Redwood (1999); Hitchens (1999); Marr (2000); Scruton (2000); Weight (2002). 
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This latter approach would be consistent with the ideological trajectory set by Thatcherism, 
and the party has moved partway there by embedding a solidly Eurosceptic position 
(Chapter 5). However, it is perhaps a slightly unfair caricature to suggest that the 
Conservatives have 'progressively ceased to be a Unionist Party of the whole of the United 
Kingdom and become instead largely a party of English nationalism' (Rich, 1998: 97). 
Ironically, Mrs Thatcher's vigorous nationalism, pursued in the name of Britain against 
'threats' such as Europe, Argentina, and devolution, actually helped to fertilise Scottish 
and Welsh nationalism, and took on an English nationalist character. It is also true that the 
reforming zeal of her administration and that of her successor radically reshaped the 
British state, and in the process 'massively undermined the principal remaining props of 
Britishness: the National Health Service, state education, trade unionism, British Rail, the 
Post Office, the BBC and the nationalized industries' (Kumar, 2003: 264). Further to this, 
in terms of its geographical representation the trend since 1997 has continued the drift 
towards becoming an English party. As Weight noted, the 1997 election result meant that 
'the Conservatives were now truly the party of One Nation - England' (2002: 721). 
However, the analysis of both case-study areas in this chapter demonstrates the reluctance 
of the party to embrace fully the English nationalist position, although at times (perhaps 
out of desperation, and for want of better alternatives) the party has sought to exploit it. At 
the 2001 general election, for example, the 'race card' appeared opportunistically on the 
political scene (Saggar, 2001). As Clarke commented, 'When it became obvious we 
weren't going to win the election, they kind of panicked, and decided that we'd better start 
"blowing the dog whistles" and getting the core vote back' (interview in Portillo, 2008). 
The Conservative approach to Englishness and Britishness has become entangled with the 
wider debate over how to reinvigorate the party's electoral appeal. The message of 
'change' that David Cameron wishes to promote requires a new identity for the party, and 
this sits uneasily with the sectional appeal of English nationalism. This was recognised by 
the party leadership before Cameron: witness Hague's early attempts to embrace 
multiculturalism; Duncan Smith's attempt to move away from core vote issues such as 
immigration: and the willingness of senior figures such as Michael Portillo and Kenneth 
Clarke to question the electoral sense of the tone taken on asylum during the 2001 election 
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campaign (Saggar, 2001: 767). As William Hague recently noted, the Conservatives 
needed a new identity to persuade the electorate that they had really changed, the problem 
was presenting one convincingly: 
Clearly people found that this was not a believable thing about the Conservative Party. The 
leader who went to the Notting Hill Carnival wasn't believable. That the Conservative 
Party was open to ethnic minorities, and that we were genuinely young - there must be 
something phoney about this, some pretence. And so that did make it quite hard to carryon 
with a 'change' message. (Hague, interview in Portillo, 2008). 
The difficulty of appearing credible whilst presenting a message of change was also 
recognised by Michael Howard (above), and used to justify his focus on more traditional 
Conservative messages at the 2005 election. This dilemma, and the awareness of it 
amongst the party leadership, illustrates why the party has not pursued one approach to the 
politics of nationhood consistently over the past decade, but has offered contradictory 
messages at different times. David Cameron has, so far, been more successful than his 
three predecessors in consistently pursuing a message of change and modernisation of the 
party, and presenting it credibly. His major advantage in this regard is that after three 
heavy election defeats both the parliamentary party and the wider membership is more 
easily persuadable of the importance of changing its image, messages, and strategy. After 
all, by his own admission, Howard had 'tested the alternative theory to destruction in the 
2005 election, and lost!' (interview in Portillo, 2008). As Michael Portillo dryly observed: 
'maybe even the Conservative Party reacts after three defeats' (Portillo Interview). 
However, as he also noted, the 2005 leadership election did not demonstrate that even then 
the parliamentary party was wholly convinced of the need to radically alter course: 'I 
observe that more members of parliament voted against David Cameron than voted for 
him. There were two candidates who were no-change candidates and one candidate who 
was a change candidate - more people voted no-change than change, even in 2005' 
(Portillo Interview). 
Cameron has been able to sustain his modernising agenda and mute criticism from sceptics 
in his own party as under his leadership the Conservatives have performed relatively well 
in the opinion polls and in local elections. Without these indicators of success, his project 
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may well have foundered. In terms of the politics of nationhood, the challenge for 
Cameron has been to articulate a vision of national identity that supports his agenda of 
presenting the Conservative Party as modern, inclusive, and best placed to solve 
contemporary social and economic problems. However, this has mainly involved a change 
of language, tone, and rhetoric, rather than any substantial shift in policies. For example 
Cameron has expressed his faith in the future of the Union not only as a constitutional 
arrangement, but 'as something much deeper' which embodies 'the bonds of kinship and 
the strength of our individual, and community, relationships which span the border' 
(Cameron, 2007b). However, he looks likely to enter the next general election with a 
manifesto pledge to introduce some form of English votes for English laws, as he is also 
committed to resolving the West Lothian Question. As he commented: 
We cannot ignore the asymmetrical nature of the situation in which Scottish MPs may vote 
on legislation that affects England, but neither they nor English MPs can vote on subjects 
that have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The answer is not a separate English 
parliament, with more politicians spending more taxpayers' money. Instead, we need a 
balanced approach that ensures that MPs for English constituencies have the final say on 
issues that only affect England. (Cameron, 2007b). 
The precise mechanism to be adopted has yet to be announced, and is being reviewed 
under the auspices of Kenneth Clarke's Democracy Taskforce, but the parameters have 
been set. Clarke recently commented that the current constitutional arrangements may lead 
to nationalistic English resentment towards Scotland, and that he 'would like to nip that in 
the bud by some sensible constitutional minor change, in my opinion, to finish the business 
of devolution'. To do this, a means to tackle the 'niggle that sometimes English matters are 
settled against the majority votes of the English MPs' is required (HC 75, 2008). To 
preclude this possibility from occurring again in the future would necessitate some way of 
preventing Scottish MPs from voting on English-only legislation at some point in its 
passage: fundamentally the same policy (perhaps more subtly implemented) as that 
adopted by the Conservative Party under Hague in 1999. 
On immigration too Cameron has changed Conservative language, tone, and presentation, 
but made no significant changes to the policy the party took into the 2005 election. The 
2005 manifesto pledged to introduce 24-hour surveillance at ports and create a Border 
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Police Force; implement a points-based system for work permits; withdraw from the 1951 
Geneva Convention on refugees; and' set an overall annual limit on the numbers coming to 
Britain' (Conservative Party, 2005: 19). The actual limit was not specified, but was to be 
set annually by Parliament. For Portillo this was 'the most narrow-minded, nationalistic 
manifesto and agenda of all time - written by David Cameron. But I assume, that even 
then he knew it was all rubbish in terms of being completely the wrong way to go' (Portillo 
Interview). However, with the exception of withdrawal from the Geneva Convention, 
where current policy remains unclear, this is essentially still the Conservatives' policy 
position. Cameron has not disguised this, arguing in a speech on 'the challenges of a 
growing population' that: 
Non-EU migration, excluding British citizens returning to live here, accounts for nearly 
seventy per cent of all immigration. Of course overall non-EU migration includes asylum 
seekers, students and family members as well as economic migrants. But non-EU economic 
migration is something we can and should limit, and I cannot understand why this 
government has not done so ... we need explicit annual limits on non-EU economic 
migration, set at a level substantially lower than the current rate. Enforcing such controls, 
and preventing illegal immigration, requires a proper Border Police Force, equipped with 
powers to track down immigrants who over-stay or illegally enter the country. 
(Cameron,2007c). 
A policy document written by the Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, and the Shadow 
Immigration Minister, Damian Green, outlines these policies and predicts that if 
implemented, immigration would 'be significantly less than current levels from the rest of 
the world outside the EU' (Davis & Green, 2006: 4). However, Cameron has generally 
used more positive language than his predecessor when discussing immigration, for 
example emphasizing the 'many benefits' of immigration, and that 'Britain has so much to 
gain from being open to the world' (Cameron, 2007c). The Conservatives have also steered 
the language they use when discussing immigration firmly away from any notion of race or 
national identity. Rather it is now an issue of the 'general well-being' of society, meaning 
that consideration of 'the various social and environmental pressures that rapid population 
growth can bring' must underpin policy (Cameron, 2007c). Controlling immigration thus 
becomes just one element of the Conservatives' agenda to mend Britain's 'broken society' 
encompassing issues such as family breakdown and social exclusion (Jones, 2007). As 
Cameron argues: 
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~ur curre~t level of population growth and atomisation is unsustainable. Immigration is too hl~h. FamIly break?own i~ too high. Unsustainable demographic change makes it harder to 
buIld the opportumty socIety I want to see, where young people can get on the housing 
ladder and where everyone has more power over their own lives. It makes it harder to build 
the r~sponsibl~ society I want to see, with strong families, communities and public services. 
And It makes It harder to build the secure society I want to see, with our quality of life and 
our environment protected in equal measure. (Cameron, 2007c). 
Cameron has thus sought to associate the Conservative Party with an inclusive national 
identity based on the Union and disassociate immigration from the identity debate. Other 
factors, however, may continue to push the Conservatives further towards becoming an 
English party. Most obviously, the popUlarity of the SNP administration in Scotland 
increases the possibility of the Scots voting to leave the Union. Ironically, the Conservative 
electoral revival in England may increase the chances of a Scottish vote for independence, 
as the nationalists might seek to portray it as a referendum on the return of Tory rule. If a 
future Conservative government were to introduce some form of English votes for English 
laws, the chaotic situation which could result - of a government with legislative 
responsibility for England but unable to command support amongst a majority of English 
MPs - might also add to the pressure for a separation (Hayton & Kenny, 2008). 
6.5 Conclusion 
Beneath the political debates, the broader cultural trend of the emergence of a stronger felt 
and more clearly defined sense of Englishness looks unlikely to abate (Kenny et al., 2008). 
This chapter demonstrates how party strategy is embedded in, and needs to be responsive 
to, these contextual factors. The challenge for the Conservatives in the early twenty-first 
century is to find a way to engage with this growing sense of English identity in a 
pluralistic and inclusive manner, which does not limit the party's electoral appeal by 
drawing on the exclusivist Powellite English nationalism that currently permeates much of 
this discourse on the right. Such a treatise need not be incompatible with unionism, or a 
form of Britishness shorn of its imperial past. However, the chapter has also highlighted 
the way in which the effect of the ideological legacy of Thatcherism is to pull conservatism 
in the Powellite direction, whilst statecraft favours a more moderate Britishness. 
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Examining this question in relation to two key policy areas, devolution and immigration, 
demonstrated how these ideological debates impact upon the formulation of party strategy. 
These two issues indicate that party leaders do not face simple choices between optimal 
electoral strategies and an 'ideological' path. Ideology is not crudely juxtaposed with 
electoral concerns, acting as an obstacle to moving towards the position of the median 
voter, but is an integral feature of the way in which actors understand their context and 
seek to develop strategies. The question of whether the Conservatives should reposition 
themselves as an overtly English party is a classic example of this. The party leadership 
demonstrated uncertainty and disagreement over whether this would be an electorally 
beneficial strategy, and consequently vacillated over its approach. However, this variance 
of opinion was not merely about electoral calculation, but also reflected ideological 
differences. For example, some of the most forceful exponents of the electoral benefits of 
fully embracing an English identity (such as Heffer, 1999) are clearly ideologically 
motivated. The eventual Conservative position on devolution and the West Lothian 
Question - proposing EfvEI in an effort to assuage perceived English concerns, but 
presented in a unionist discourse - surely reflects the history, ideology and tradition of the 
Conservative Party as a unionist party as much as electoral reckoning. As Wellings has 
argued, English Conservatives are 'instinctively British' (2007: 398). Devolution, for 
them is thus another reason to defend the British state, rather than to embrace English , 
nationalism. 
Ideology therefore plays an important role in the interpretation of the electoral context, and 
consequently in the strategies pursued. As a key site of ideological difference in 
contemporary conservatism, the national identity question demonstrates how the debate 
about such issues can impact on leadership strategies, illustrating their complexity. and the 
difficulties caused to the party by a lack of a coherent conception of nationhood. 
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Chapter 7 
A New Moral Agenda? 
Just as I felt that the party was beginning to relax over the European Issue it 
decided to have an explosive internal row about something else. 
John Redwood MP (2004: 143). 
7.1 Introduction 
A widely accepted and often repeated belief, both amongst Conservatives and many of 
their critics, is that on the issue of the economy the Conservatives have been victorious in 
the 'battle of ideas'. The case for the free market over statist socialist planning has been 
comprehensively demonstrated, they argue, by the failure of Keynesianism and the success 
of Thatcher's economic revolution, a success vindicated at the polls by four Conservative 
election victories and the emergence of New Labour. Whilst enjoying the taste of this 
triumph, some Conservatives actually see it as the root cause of their electoral problems. 
They are the victims of their own success: by forcing Labour to accept their agenda, they 
have created a new consensus and neutralised one of the most compelling reasons for 
voting Conservative. Indeed, after the collapse of the Conservatives' reputation for 
economic competence after 'Black Wednesday' in September 1992, Labour were able to 
argue that they are the party best able to manage the economy, and polls have until recently 
demonstrated that the public believe this to be the case. l Shortly after becoming party 
leader, David Cameron acknowledged this problem, claiming: 
We knew how to rescue Britain from Old Labour. We knew how to win the battle of ideas 
with Old Labour. We did not know how to deal with our own victory in that battle of ideas. 
That victory left us with an identity crisis. Having defined ourselves for many years as the 
anti-socialist Party, how were we to define ourselves once full-blooded socialism had 
disappeared from the political landscape? (Cameron, 2006). 
The consequence of this difficulty, Cameron argued, was that 'as Labour moved towards 
the centre ground, the Conservative Party moved to the right. Instead of focusing on the 
I In March 2008, ICM found that the Conservatives (40 percent) led Labour (32 percent) as the best party on 
the economy (The Guardian, 2008). 
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areas where we now agreed with Labour on our aims... we ended up focusing on those 
areas where we didn't agree'. The Conservatives in opposition therefore emphasised 
taxation, immigration, and Europe as areas of policy difference from Labour, but this left 
them lacking a clear message on the 'common ground' of British politics, namely Blair's 
agenda of 'social justice and economic efficiency' (Cameron, 2006). 
Cameron claims that under his leadership the Conservatives 'have at last come to terms 
with our own victory in the battle of ideas', presenting the opportunity to combine this 
triumph and the preservation of its fruits with 'the resolution of the social problems which 
were left unresolved at the end of our time in government' and which Labour has also 
failed to cure (Cameron, 2006). To this end, Cameron has spoken of the need to mend 
Britain's 'broken society', citing problems such as poverty, drug abuse, debt, family 
breakdown and educational failure (Jones, 2007). This chapter will explore the extent to 
which this agenda of social rather than economic reform now offers fertile terrain for a 
Conservative electoral revival. It will examine party policy and rhetoric on social and 
moral issues since 1997, particularly gay rights and family policy. It will consider whether 
the key dividing line within the Conservative Party is no longer between Eurosceptics and 
Europhiles, but between social liberals and traditionalists. How this division has informed 
the strategies of Hague, Duncan Smith, and Howard and the debate over modernisation 
will be explored. The chapter will end with an assessment of Cameron's claim that the 
Conservatives have come to terms with this dilemma, and evaluate whether his efforts to 
appear socially liberal whilst also emphasising the centrality of family policy constitute a 
distinctively Conservative answer to it. 
7.2 Mods and Rockers: Conservative divisions over social and moral issues 
In an effort to map the ideological composition of contemporary conservatism and explain 
ideological discord within the Conservative Party a number of different typologies have 
been developed. These have highlighted divisions between 'wets' and 'dries' on economic 
policy and conflict between Europhiles and Eurosceptics (Heppell & Hill, 2005). For 
Heppell and Hill, Europe and economic policy are 'the two most significant ideological 
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policy divides' (2005: 347). However, Heppell's (2002) model also mapped the 'social. 
sexual and moral policy divide', distinguishing social liberals from social conservatives to 
create a three-dimensional typology (2002: 312). Social and moral issues have long been 
of concern to Conservatives, and form a distinctive aspect of conservatism. The notion that 
positioning on such issues is an important divide for Conservatives is an increasingly 
prevalent one, linked to the need to develop a post-Thatcherite agenda. Such issues have 
also come to form a more central feature of Conservative identity as self-identification as 
the anti-socialist party (as Cameron highlights above) has diminished. At the same time, 
Conservative ideology has failed to establish the degree of hegemony enjoyed in the 
economic arena. As Pilbeam notes, 'modem Conservatism has signally failed to close 
down contestation over moral issues in the same way that it has done over others'. Whilst 
the traditional Left has been defeated 'on the battleground of economics, Conservatives 
continue to face an array of opponents, such as feminists and gay rights activists, fiercely 
challenging them in the moral arena' (Pilbeam, 2005: 158-9). 
For the Conservative MP John Hayes, 'the most important challenges we face are not 
economic, they are social and cultural'. Future economic success, he argues, is dependent 
upon the nourishment of 'the social capital upon which a successful marriage between civil 
society and free enterprise depends' (Hayes, 2002: 71). Consequently, Conservatives need 
to redefine their mission: 
For too long politicians have assumed that good economics equals good politics; they have 
behaved as though standard of living and quality of life are synonymous. The view that 
endless material advance is the utopia to which all policy should be directed has dominated 
political debate for fifty or so years. This is a reductionist view of politics that ignores all 
those components necessary to a balanced quality of life that do not relate to economic well 
being. (Hayes, 2002: 68). 
These sentiments have been echoed by Cameron's calls for politicians to focus 'not just on 
GDP, but on GWB - General Well-Being' and his claim that: 'It's time we admitted that 
there's more to life than money' (2006c). For Hayes, the reluctance of most politicians to 
address such issues can be explained by the fact that they have 'awkward associations with 
values and morals', so 'it became convenient for politicians to retreat to the safer ground of 
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managing the public purse and advocacy of ever greater material consumption' (2002: 68). 
In the case of the Conservatives this reluctance can partly be explained by the ill-fated 
'Back to Basics' campaign of 1993-94. This effort to re-Iaunch John Major's government 
sought to divert attention to social issues after the economic debacle of withdrawal from 
the ERM, but quickly unravelled in the face of allegations of sleaze and immoral behaviour 
on the part of Conservative MPs. In Gary Streeter's words, it left a 'scar' on the party. and 
'made people cautious about those kind of value-laden statements and directions' (Streeter 
Interview). John Bercow similarly agreed that memory of the 'very damaging' Back to 
Basics campaign meant the post-1997 party 'was rather more wary under successive 
leaders of sounding too shrill or judgemental on that whole set of issues' (Bercow 
Interview). 
For Streeter, reengaging with social and moral issues is a necessary if daunting task, on a 
scale 'similar to the economic battles that faced the incoming Conservative government of 
1979' (2002: 4). However, in his view, the party 'is ready for it again, big time' (Streeter 
Interview). A future Conservative government, he suggests, would face numerous 
challenges such as public service reform, terrorism, and relations with the EU, but Streeter 
claims that 'none will be greater than the social challenges of drugs, rising crime, 
alienation and intergenerational poverty' (2002: 3). David Willetts has similarly argued 
that Conservative politics should be about more than economics, and a vibrant civil society 
is a central component of his 'civic conservatism' (1994). He argues that 'what really 
matters most of all to Conservatives is everything in between the individual and the state'. 
For him, 'how we sustain and support that rich social architecture ... is the real challenge 
for politics today' (2002: 58). Likewise Oliver Letwin (2003) has called for Conservatives 
to foster a 'neighbourly society' in which social duties and obligations have the same 
importance and recognition as the pursuit of material gain. 
For Pilbeam (2003) it is a profound mistake to see Conservative politics as merely about 
economics. He points to the lack of confidence amongst Conservatives that cultural and 
moral concerns are being sufficiently addressed by intermediate institutions such as 
families, churches, and schools: 'There is thus good reason for them to concern themselves 
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with the condition of the wider . I .c. b . h . . . SOCIa la rIC, even to t e extent of questIOnIng Its neglect 
by conservatives of the past' (2003: 87). Some, such as the commentator Peter Hitchens 
(1999) have gone as far to suggest that the Thatcher governments were complicit in this 
national moral decline, despite Thatcher's professed desire to re-instil 'Victorian values'. 
In contrast to Shirley Letwin (1992), who championed the moral strength of Thatcherism 
for its emphasis on the 'vigorous virtues', Hitchens argues that the neo-liberal policies of 
the Thatcher years, whilst not the cause of permissiveness, did nothing to counter it and 
most likely worsened it, by neglecting the social and moral agenda. The common portrayal 
of the right as being largely concerned with economic liberalism is thus partly the fault of 
Conservative politicians, but for Pilbeam it is also a caricature which it has been in the 
interests of the Left to maintain: 'this distortion clearly serves ideological purposes', as it 
leaves social issues as the preserve of the Left (2003: 87). 
Whilst Conservatives appear increasingly keen to re-associate themselves with social and 
moral issues, how to do so has been the cause of disagreement between social liberals and 
social conservatives, as the typologies of conservatism illustrate (Heppell, 2002). In 1998 
The Times argued that the key dividing line in the Conservative Party is no longer over 
Europe or between Left and Right, but that: 'the real division is between liberals and 
reactionaries, modernisers and traditionalists, those armed primarily with principle and 
those whose first instinct is to take shelter in institutions'. Furthermore, for the 
Conservatives to regain power, the 'liberals must first win the battle of ideas within their 
party' (The Times, 1998). The leader went on: 
The more important argument the Conservative Party still needs to have is between those 
sensitive to changing times and those inclined to nostalgia. It is a battle, we believe, 
between Tory Mods and Rockers. In the Sixties the former were those comfortable with 
change, the latter those who followed old fads. It is the difference between those with a 
gaze fixed on new horizons and those either blinkered or still dreaming. 
Regardless of their personal preferences, electoral necessity demanded that Conservatives 
recognise the changing society in which they had to operate .. Wise Conservatives deal 
with the world as it is, not as it should be or once was. They respect the changing 
landscape and are sensitive to its contours'. The Conservatives could demonstrate this 
pragmatic attitude 'by showing a liberal face to the electorate and extending an 
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emancipating hand to all voters', and by taking 'government out of the boardroom and the 
bedroom', contrasting themselves with an interventionist statist Labour Party (The Times. 
1998). 
The version of modernisation sponsored by The Times in 1998 bears a notable resemblance 
to that advanced by David Cameron since he became Conservative Party leader in 
December 2005. However, as Denham and O'Hara note, despite a long-running intraparty 
debate about modernisation, there 'is still no consensus' amongst Conservatives that this 
denotes either the only viable or the most appropriate modernising strategy open to them 
(2007a: 167). Indeed, during the 2005 leadership contest, three of the four principal 
contenders (David Cameron, David Davis and Liam Fox) explicitly committed themselves 
to modernising the party, but it 'meant very different things' to each (2007a: 186). 
Arguably this represented an advancement on the position during the leadership election of 
2001, when the two candidates presented to party members (Ken Clarke and lain Duncan 
Smith) both eschewed the 'modernising' label (its chief advocate (Portillo) having been 
eliminated by the final ballot of MPs). However, as Denham and O'Hara note elsewhere, 
as a consequence of this lack of consensus Cameron's legitimacy and mandate for 
modernisation remain conditional on his ability to deliver electoral success, both "in 
practice and in prospect' (2007b: 422). Failure to do so could therefore lead to significant 
pressure to adopt a different, more right-wing, version of modernisation, more akin to 
those expressed previously by Davis and Fox. 
Michael Portillo transformed himself into a leading 'Mod' after losing his seat in the 1997 
election, and argued that embracing social liberalism must be central to any modernising 
strategy and offered the best hope for electoral recovery. He saw doing so as a way to give 
the party a clear and distinctive narrative with a sufficiently broad and centrist appeal: 
One of the things that I would like to see is the Conservative Party positioning i~self as a 
liberal party, partly because I think it would provide tremendous coherence - .If people 
understood that the Conservative Party tended to believe that you should keep a bIt more of 
your own money, if that were possible; and a bit more of your own civil liberty, ~fthat were 
possible: and ifit also believed that what you did in your own house was ~o.busmess of the 
state· and if it also believed that it would be better for fewer people to be hvmg off the state , . 
and more people to be exercising their own freedom of choice and so on, all those thmgs 
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~ould ~e very coherent. One of the curious things about the Conservative Party in recent 
~~~tory IS .that is has been economically liberal and socially authoritarian. A lot of those 
mgs I thmk, would provide a coherent framework that would run through the responses to 
these things. There would be those who would argue that these would not be very popular 
responses, but I'm not so sure about that. You never quite know when people are going to 
feel ~hat the. government has gone too far, in the sense of its interference in our daily lives 
and ItS ommpresence in our lives. So I think the Tory Party could have some answers to all 
?f t~at, ~ut it would have to be quite brave. At a time when the tide is probably flowing in 
ItS dIrectIOn, I think this would be worth doing. (Portillo Interview). 
Streeter, by contrast, does not see embracing social liberalism as the way onto this territory 
for Conservatives, or as a prerequisite for electoral success. For him, the agenda for 
helping the vulnerable 'is not about extending laissez-faire doctrines throughout society', 
but about representing 'the small platoons' against big business as well as against big 
government. As such, 'Conservatives must not stand for social liberalism, but social 
justice' (2002: 9). He also argued that the distinction between mods and rockers is no 
longer as useful for understanding the contemporary Conservative Party as it was when it 
was first applied by The Times, suggesting that 'the boundaries have become much more 
fluid' (Streeter Interview). Whilst acknowledging the existence of a 'spectrum' of views on 
social and moral issues, Streeter argued that a liberal position is not a prerequisite for 
modernisation. He explained: 
I think it was more true then, but it wasn't just about being socially liberal or conservative. 
I am quite socially conservative, but I knew that the party had to modernise and that we had 
to be dramatically radical and different otherwise we would never win again. I certainly fell 
into that camp which was why I supported Portillo in the 2001 leadership election. I just 
wanted us to be modernised, and Portillo was a class act, although I wouldn't have voted 
with him on a number of moral issues. (Streeter Interview). 
For Bercow too, whilst 'there is a dividing line between people who fall into those 
different categories' it is not a distinction that 'defines the party on a daily basis'. Nor is it, 
he suggests, the source of an 'unbridgeable and dangerous gulf' (Bercow Interview). 
Nonetheless, it has been the arena for significant disagreement within the party, interlaced 
with the strategic question of how to broaden the Conservatives' appeal. This debate 
reflects the ideological legacy of Thatcherism in the Conservative Party, which has 
continued to frame party positioning since 1997. For Heppell, 'Thatcherism constituted a 
self-conscious ideological strategy to redefine the Conservatives as a party of economic 
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liberalism, national independence and moral authoritarianism' (2002: 302, original 
emphasises). Whilst the doctrines of economic liberalism and national independence (at 
least in terms of Euroscepticism) now appear to be firmly embedded in the party, the case 
study period demonstrates that moral authoritarianism does not have the same grip. It has, 
however, been a significant feature of the debate over gay rights and family policy since 
1997. 
7.3 Hague: Bandwagon politics? 
There are millions of people in this country who are white, Anglo-Saxon and 
bigoted, and they need to be represented. 
Eric Forth MP, 24 October 2000 (quoted in Walters, 2001: 86). 
During his leadership campaign and in the early part of his tenure William Hague was keen 
to present himself as embodying a fresh face for conservatism (Chapter 4: 79-85). This 
involved presenting himself and his party as at ease with modern British society, including 
its non-traditional and multicultural aspects (Chapter 6: 149-150). Another element of this 
strategy was a more liberal approach and softer tone on sexual and moral issues such as 
gay rights. In this respect, Hague could point to his own record as having voted to equalise 
the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts at 16. He also sent a message of 
support to a Gay Pride event and publicly rebuked members of the 'old guard' such as 
Norman Tebbit who criticised his stance on homosexual rights and multiculturalism 
(Jones, 1997b). In his first conference speech as leader, Hague noted his wish to lead 'a 
new, united, inclusive, democratic, de-centralised, and open party'. He spoke of his desire 
to articulate 'an open conservatism, that is tolerant, that believes freedom is about much 
more than economics, that believes freedom doesn't stop at the shop counter' and argued 
that Conservatives are 'caring'. Compassion, he argued 'is not a bolt-on extra to 
conservatism' but is 'at its very core' (Hague, 1997). 
However, this socially inclusive and liberal-minded conservatism, even if it reflected 
Hague's own personal preferences, was short-lived. The most obvious reason for this is 
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that it did not reflect the opinion of the majority of Conservative MPs, and Hague failed to 
convince them to alter their approach. For example in the 1998 vote on reducing the age of 
consent for gay sex to 16, only sixteen Conservative MPs voted in favour of equalisation 
(Dorey, 2003: 134). Although this vote was passed by the Commons, it was subsequently 
defeated by the votes of Conservative hereditary peers in the Lords, after a campaign led 
by the Conservative Baroness Young (Waites, 2001: 496). The government reintroduced a 
similar measure during the next parliamentary session and it was again defeated in the 
House of Lords. Sexual equality was finally achieved in November 2000, but only after the 
government had invoked the Parliament Act to overrule the House of Lords (Waites, 2001: 
497). 
Hague had avoided the appearance of party disunity over the age of consent by allowing a 
free vote on what he described as 'a matter of conscience' (Brogan, 2000). This liberal 
approach was abandoned, however, on the issue of Section 28. This clause in the Local 
Government Act (1988) was introduced by the Thatcher administration to forbid councils 
from promoting homosexuality or promoting its acceptability as a family relationship 
(Durham, 2005: 98). The Conservatives imposed a three-line whip against the 
government's proposal to abolish Section 28, and successfully prevented repeal in the 
House of Lords. For Bercow, this decision was a 'great mistake' as 'it made us look and 
sound very unattractive'. It was also, Bercow thought, driven by populism: whilst it may 
have reflected Hague's personal views 'I suspect he thought the government's position 
would be unpopular with large swathes of the population and that the Conservatives should 
capitalise on that' (Bercow Interview). Once again this Conservative victory was only 
possible with the votes of hereditary peers (Waites, 2001: 498), but on this occasion the 
government was unable to invoke the Parliament Act (which only covers legislation 
initiated in the Commons) as the Bill had initially been introduced in the House of Lords 
(Dorey, 2003: 135). 
The retention of Section 28 was just one element in a panoply of populist positions adopted 
by Hague throughout 1999 and 2000, on issues such as asylum. Europe. and the Tony 
Martin case (Walters, 2001: 64). Theresa May, who as a member of the Shadmv Cabinet 
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supported the party line, candidly admits that 'I think 1 was wrong on Section 28. and ha\e 
changed my view on Section 28'. She acknowledges also that the stance taken on this 
Issue, and on the strong defence of grammar schools, appealed to 'the traditional image of 
the party rather than to the more modern image of the party' (May Interview). For \\'aites. 
these kind of issues were deliberately linked together by the Conservatives in an effort to 
define the party under Hague, and 'may be interpreted as including partially-coded appeals 
t '. . 
o certam raCIst and homophobIc elements of the electorate, presenting Conservatives as 
defendants of the imagined British nation beloved of traditionalists. in contrast to the 
modernising multiculturalist Blairites' (Waites, 2001: 503). The language of fear and 
'threats' was echoed in the party's 2001 election manifesto, which pledged to retain 
Section 28 and argued that 'the common sense wisdom of the mainstream majority. on 
crime, or on taxes, or the family, or on Europe, is under threat as never before' 
(Conservative Party, 2001: 2). 
Hague's hard line on Section 28 led to the defections to Labour of MP Shaun Woodward. 
who had been sacked from the frontbench for refusing to support it; and Ivan Massow, the 
prominent Conservative businessman who had sought the party's nomination as candidate 
for Mayor of London. Writing in the New Statesman, Massow lambasted the 'skinhead 
conservatism that has marked the "tabloidification" of the Conservatives [and] highlighted 
the cancer eating away at the very lungs of the party'. He claimed that on issues of race 
and sex Hague had been manipulated against his own wishes by the party membership: 
'the core members, the Baroness Youngs and loony right-wingers, who actually do the 
dirty work of door-to-door campaigning for their party ... These are the people who, 
although literally dying out, set the tone of the party by their sheer dedication to "the 
cause" ... Theirs is the politics of the taxi driver'. The prospect of a Hague premiership, he 
claimed, was 'a nightmare' (Massow, 2000). 
Popular appeal, as Waites suggests, was undoubtedly a factor in the Conservative 
leadership's decision to oppose the repeal of Section 28 during Labour's first term. Party 
pressures. as Massow argues, were also a factor, although the picture he presents of a 
leader powerless to resist the wider membership is overdone. Historically the Conservatin? 
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Party leadership has been seen as relatively autonomous (Bulpitt, 1986), and to the extent 
that this autonomy waned in the 1980s and 1990s this was largely in relation to dissenting 
backbench MPs (Kavanagh, 1998: 39-42). The wider membership did for the first time 
gain a role in selecting the party leader as a result of Hague's Fresh Future reform, but this 
package can be seen as an effective centralisation of power, legitimised by plebiscite 
(Chapter 4: 82-3; Kelly, 2003: 82-106). A more telling factor on Hague's decision was 
opinion within his own shadow cabinet and parliamentary party, illustrated by the free 
votes on the age of consent. The position on Section 28 can also be seen as part of a wider 
move towards a more traditionally Conservative stance on family life and marriage, which 
quickly encroached upon Hague's early flirtation with a socially liberal agenda. By the 
time the government began its legislative attempts to repeal Section 28 in 1999, the 
Conservatives' traditional stance on family values was firmly embedded. Indeed, the first 
hints of this agenda were contained in Hague's 1997 conference speech, when he declared 
that: 'I personally believe that it is best for children to be brought up in a traditional family. 
That means their mother and their father in their home'. In this speech, he attempted to 
combine a pro-family stance with a liberal agenda. He noted that Conservatives should 
show 'understanding and tolerance of people making their own decisions about how they 
lead their lives' (the extension of liberalism on economics to social issues, as advocated by 
Portillo above), whilst also claiming 'that doesn't alter our unshakeable belief in the 
enduring value of traditional family life' (Hague, 1997). 
Hague outlined his vision of family life further in January 1998, in a speech to the Social 
Market Foundation. In this speech he developed the thesis (echoed by Hayes and Streeter 
above) that a key factor in the Conservatives' 1997 defeat was that they appeared solely 
interested in economics, and that to counter this (false) image the party should once again 
'dare to speak on the family' (Hague, 1998c). Reflecting arguments made elsewhere by 
Willetts (1992; 1994; & 1996), he sought to defend the free market agenda of Thatcherism 
against the charge that it undermines family life and is 'at loggerheads with true 
conservatism' (Hague, 1998c). He again noted that Conservatives should not be 
judgemental about people's sexuality~ and welcomed (without commenting on the very 
small minority of his MPs who had actually voted to equalise the age of consent) what he 
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described as 'our more tolerant attitude towards homosexuals' (Hague, 1998c). However, 
he also stated that 'tolerance is not the same as indifference' and put a practical and moral 
case in favour of marriage. Economic liberalism should not be extended into social 
libertarianism as: 
Libertarianism easily descends into a refusal to recognise that social policy means more 
than simply being a referee in a match fought between opposing ways of living. We know 
that some of those ways of living are better for children than others. We know that some 
have social consequences, the cost of which are borne by the rest of us. No Government can 
be neutral in those circumstances, and certainly not a Conservative Government. (1998c). 
The aim of government policy should therefore be 'to encourage permanent commitment 
between parents', and to that end, recognise marriage as 'the best means of doing that' 
(Hague, 1998c). One way the state could do this is through the tax system. In this regard, 
Hague suggested the previous Conservative government had failed to do enough to support 
traditional families (Dorey, 2003: 135). They had been wrong, he suggested, to begin the 
phasing out of the married couple's tax allowance 'without at least replacing it with an 
allowance focused on married families with children' (Hague, 1998c). This had rightly 
damaged the party's credibility on the issue, and had caused the electorate to overlook 'one 
of the very best ideas' in the party's 1997 manifesto - namely the proposal for transferable 
personal allowances for married couples (which would primarily have benefitted couples 
with only one breadwinner). Hague thus sought to restore this credibility, and present the 
Conservatives once again as a pro-family party. The Conservatives under Hague made a 
clear case in favour of the 'traditional' family, and opposition to the repeal of Section 28 
was a consistent element of this. As Dorey notes, 'greater acceptance of alternative 
lifestyles and sexual relationships did not mean moral neutrality or indifference' (2003: 
136). 
These themes were reiterated by Hague in his party conference speech later that year, when 
he argued that 'strong and stable family life is the cornerstone of a healthy society' and 
pledged to 'develop policies on welfare reform which strengthen family responsibility and 
support for the institution of marriage' (Hague, 1998a). The flagship policy adopted on the 
family was a commitment to introduce a new married couples' tax allowance, replacing 
181 
that which had been finally abolished in the April 2000 budget. This would, the manifesto 
claimed, be worth £ 1000 a year to married couples. In addition, Child Tax Credit for 
families with a child under 5 would be increased by £200 a year, and those with children 
under 11 and not using all or part of their personal tax allowance would be able to transfer 
it to their working spouse (Conservative Party, 2001: 3-4). 
Hague's approach to social, moral, and sexual politics was a consistent part of the core 
vote strategy he adopted from the October 1998 conference onwards, initially under the 
'British Way' label, and later as the 'Common Sense Revolution' (Chapter 4: 85-91). As 
Nadler argues, his populist line on Section 28 demonstrated that 'he had effectively 
abandoned his earlier attempts to reposition the party' (2000: 284). This strategy was 
premised on the belief, expressed by Norman Tebbit, that substantial numbers of 
Conservative voters were 'out there' waiting to be persuaded back to the fold by more 
strident policies (Tebbit Interview). Tebbit pointed to the 'relatively low' turnouts at the 
1997 (71.50/0), 2001 (59.4%), and 2005 (61.2%) elections as evidence of a consistent 
failure by the Conservative Party to do this (Tebbit Interview). Hague's promises of tax 
cuts for families, support for marriage, retention of Section 28, a crackdown on 'bogus' 
asylum seekers, calls for tougher sentences for paedophiles, and his suggestion of a change 
in the law to protect homeowners defending their property (in response to the Tony Martin 
case) were designed to chime with this forgotten 'silent majority' and encourage them back 
to the polling station. Nadler claims that for Hague this phase was 'about more than 
shoring up his core vote' - it flowed from 'his own convictions', reflected his 'gut 
instincts' and in this sense represents the authentic voice of William Hague (Nadler, 2000: 
288). One problem with it, however, was that it appeared inauthentic, contradicting his 
earlier attempts to paint himself as liberal-minded and socially inclusive. Hague thus found 
himself the target of criticism from both modernisers and traditionalists in his own party. 
Interviewed by Michael Portillo in 2008, William Hague acknowledged his own 
preference for the core vote issues he adopted, and defended his approach as derived from 
practical necessity: 
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We had to be able to blow the trumpet, we had to show that the Conservative Party did 
stand for certain things, and we had to have some things on which to fight an election, as 
simple as that. And also I suppose I was going with some of my own instincts on those 
subjects. So there was undoubtedly tension in the senior reaches of the Shadow Cabinet, 
but I think once you arrive at an election you have to fight with the tools that you have got. 
I think in retrospect you [Portillo] were right in many of the things you said at the time, 
that we had to stop talking about other things to get any attention for certain subjects, but 
the huge risk at that time, stopping talking about those things - the traditional subjects -
was that the Conservatives would have gone even further down. The 2001 result could have 
been worse, even worse, than it was. (Hague, interview in Portillo, 2008). 
Hague's strategy was post-Thatcherite in that it sought to address the perception (which 
was an inaccurate interpretation of the Thatcher years in his view) that the Conservatives 
were not interested in society, and were merely concerned with economics. This would be 
a dominant concern of the party in the years that followed his departure as leader, as 
illustrated by Streeter, Letwin, Hayes, Willetts, and Cameron above. In this respect, Hague 
was engaged with 'one of the most important imperatives of post-Thatcher conservatism', 
namely the attempt to balance the Thatcherite legacy with the construction of a 
Conservative politics that 'could escape the allegations of harshness and economic 
monomania' that had dogged Thatcherism (Durham, 2001: 471). The form that this took 
however, illustrated the enduring hold of the traditional values promoted by Thatcher on 
the Conservative Party. For Waites, 'Thatcherism signalled the resilience of homophobia 
on the political right' (2001: 502), and Hague's stance on Section 28 was consistent with 
this. His prescriptive stance on marriage and the desirability of 'traditional' families was in 
harmony with the socially authoritarian aspects of New Right thinking, and parallels can 
be drawn with the 'compassionate conservatism' of George W. Bush (Ashbee, 2003: 43-6). 
In this sense Hague's offering at the 2001 election - of economic liberalism, vigorous 
nationalism, and traditional social values - was not post-Thatcherite at all. For Portillo, this 
agenda was 'arguably to the right of Margaret Thatcher' (2008). As Hague acknowledges 
above the Conservatives needed some sort of message, and lacking a coherent new 
narrative they comforted themselves with rehashed old themes. 
A final consequence of Hague's strategy may have been to increase division within the 
party on the social, sexual and moral policy divide, and to highlight the emerging rupture 
between mods and rockers. His initial dalliance with social liberalism gave credence to the 
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modernising view that embracing societal change was essential for Conservative electoral 
revival, and his abandonment of it provided the modernisers with ammunition with which 
to attack his leadership. Redwood notes that before the Hague years, social liberalism 'was 
not a cause of a great deal of tension within the party' (2004: 144). By the time of the 
October 2000 conference, the degree of polarisation between the two camps was clear, 
embodied by the modernising Shadow Chancellor, Michael Portillo, and the traditionalist 
Shadow Home Secretary, Ann Widdecombe. Widdecombe used her speech to announce a 
'zero tolerance' policy on drugs, which delighted conference delegates but was rapidly 
condemned by police, drug charities and human rights groups (BBC News, 2000). Portillo, 
by contrast, distanced himself from traditional Conservative themes, declaring: 'We are for 
people whatever their sexual orientation' and arguing that difference should not merely be 
tolerated, but respected. It was not, contra Widdecombe, the role of the state to promote 
certain lifestyle choices. Why, he asked, 'should people respect us if we withhold respect 
from them?' (Portillo, 2000). At the end of Hague's tenure social, sexual and moral issues 
were arguably the most potent cause of internal party discord, and would playa key role in 
the battle to succeed him as leader. 
7.4 Duncan Smith: the rocker who modernised? 
In the case of lain Duncan Smith it is repeated slightly tragically, because he begins 
as an arch-conservative but ends up as a moderniser, but by then it's too late. 
Michael Portillo (Interview). 
Two factors were pivotal in Duncan Smith's election as leader of the Conservative Party. 
The first was that he was not Michael Portillo, the second that he was not Kenneth Clarke. 
In the final ballot of party members, Clarke was comprehensively defeated because of his 
pro-European views (Chapter 4; Redwood, 2004: 152). In the parliamentary contest, 
Duncan Smith was able to beat Portillo into third place (by one vote) because of unease 
amongst a substantial number of Conservative MPs about both Portillo personally and his 
plans to remodel the party. Unlike in 1997, when the right of the parliamentary party failed 
to coalesce behind a single candidate, once David Davis had been eliminated Duncan 
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Smith became the standard bearer for traditionalists. Whilst Davis adopted a more 
reformist tone and promised 'a fundamental policy review', Duncan Smith rejected 
modernisation, opting for 'neoliberal generalisations such as the need for more choice in 
education and health' (Alderman and Carter, 2002: 577). In a direct challenge to Portillo's 
agenda, he explicitly rejected all-women shortlists or any possibility of relaxing the law on 
drugs. Portillo commented that: 'too many MPs disliked me, and/or my uncompromising 
agenda for modernisation. One offered me his vote if I'd water down my plans for change. 
I refused, and lost by one vote' (Portillo, 2008). For Streeter, this mix of personal and 
political factors explained the result: 'some people didn't like the message, and some 
people didn't like the messenger' (Streeter Interview). To understand the result, Bercow 
suggests, 'for Ken's Europhilia substitute Michael's socially liberal credentials'. For him, 
Portillo 'was clearly the modernising candidate in 2001' but the party 'wasn't ready for 
and wasn't signed-up to the idea that it needed fundamentally to change its approach' 
(Bercow Interview). 
According to John Redwood, Portillo 'did not define a distinctively social liberal agenda 
which made any sense' (2004: 152). Michael Ancram echoed this sentiment: he felt unable 
to support Portillo because 'I had no idea where he intended to take the Conservative Party 
and I don't think he did either'. Ancram thus joined the leadership contest as an anti-
Portillo candidate, and was also 'seen has having the advantage that he would not be 
divisive' (Alderman and Carter, 2002: 573). He recalled that: 'I simply thought you don't 
put the party in the hands of somebody who doesn't seem to have a clear idea of what they 
want to do with themselves' (Ancram Interview). Ancram also felt unable to support 
Clarke, because 'his stance on Europe would have split the party' (Ancram Interview). 
Almost by default, therefore, he supported Duncan Smith. After his preferred candidate 
(Portillo) failed to reach the final ballot, Bercow also supported Duncan Smith as he feared 
'there was a serious chance' that Clarke's views on Europe 'would rip the party in two' 
(Bercow Interview). 
Portillo noted how both tactical mistakes and animosity towards him personally played a 
part in the failure of his leadership campaign: 
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I think that there were quite a lot of objections to me. I was thought too flash, and 
obviously a lot of people had had issues with me in the past. Comparing myself with 
Cameron, Cameron is a creature with much greater charm, which is very important. And 
also of course we got all the tactics wrong from the beginning. I entered the election race on 
the advice that I would be a shoo-in, and then, as we got down to it, the advice was that 
winning amongst the MPs was not a problem, the problem was going to be with the 
constituencies. Actually I think that both halves of that were wrong. I really think that if we 
had managed to win with the MPs we could probably have won in the constituencies, either 
against lain Duncan Smith or against Ken Clarke. But in fact when we first totted up the 
number of MPs we had about 50, and at the end we had about 50. We had made no 
progress at all. I was told that in 1995 I looked hesitant, so in 2001 you must be first out of 
the starting blocks. Well I was first out of the starting blocks and I was alone for about two 
weeks, there were no other candidates! And of course that means that you are the sole 
target for those two weeks. (Portillo Interview). 
The modernising agenda Portillo promoted had become intertwined with his own 
personality and life since losing his Enfield Southgate seat at the 1997 general election. 
Shortly before re-entering Parliament at the Kensington and Chelsea by-election in 
November 1999, Portillo admitted to having had gay experiences in his youth (Jones, 
1999). He later described this admission as a 'big mistake' for his standing in the party, 
and it resurfaced in the leadership campaign (Portillo, 2008). One former member of the 
shadow cabinet commented that 'an element of homophobia' had counted against Portillo 
(Anonymous Interview). Portillo believed that 'the party needed to change radically, and 
accept the social changes it had resisted, especially sexual, racial and cultural equality' 
(Portillo, 2008). 
Ken Clarke also offered a prescription for change at the 2001 leadership election, but his 
was limited to addressing the issues of greatest public concern (public services) and a 
critique of Hague's focus on Europe and the Euro (Denham and 0' Hara, 2008: 59). Clarke 
also made much of his ability to 'carry the fight to Labour' to win back lost voters 
(Alderman and Carter, 2002: 576). Portillo's message was much more wide-ranging, 
leaving him vulnerable to attack and unable to establish a hold on 'solid Tory ground' 
(Denham and O'Hara, 2008: 60). In spite of this, many of his Shadow Cabinet colleagues, 
he claimed, were also convinced of the need for a modernisation strategy by mid-2000 
(Porti 110 Interview) and at the launch of his 2001 leadership bid he received public 
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endorsements from eleven, making him the clear frontrunner. 2 For Theresa May~ the 
decision to back Portillo was straightforward: she supported him 'because he was the 
change candidate. I thought he was the one who understood the depth of change that was 
needed'. Portillo's failure to win the election is also relatively easily explained: 'the party 
didn't want change' (May Interview). Lilley suggests that Duncan Smith's victory may 
have been partly accidental, and the result of a miscalculation by some MPs who wished to 
caution future-leader Portillo against an all-out modernisation strategy: 
There was a feeling that people were making a statement by voting for lain Duncan Smith, 
but didn't really expect him to become leader as a result of it. It was more a way of saying 
to Portillo, 'remember, there are lots of us' ... The Right wanted a choice between lain 
Duncan Smith and Portillo, not lain Duncan Smith and Ken Clarke. Their second choice of 
choices would have been Portillo versus Clarke. (Lilley Interview). 
Ultimately, however, the result of the final round of the parliamentary ballot (Clarke 59, 
Duncan Smith 54, Portillo 53) demonstrated that with less than one-third of them 
supporting him, Conservative MPs 'were not persuaded by Portillo' (Ancram Interview). 
The debate between mods and rockers did not end there, however. Duncan Smith 
attempted change the policy focus of the party towards public services and social justice 
(Chapter 4) but did not regard this as 'modernisation': 
I hate the phrase modernise because I don't think it really means very much. Everyone 
obligatorily uses it but I don't think it means anything at all really, today's modern is 
tomorrow's old-fashioned so it's best to talk about change in a more structured sense. So I 
knew that the party needed to change. It needed to change, however, not - and this is where 
I disagree with Michael Portillo about this - his sense of change was almost to reject its 
central beliefs, its tenets, and almost adopt what we now saw in front of us - what I would 
call the metropolitan Labour Party, the sort of fashionable aspects of New Labour that are 
popular in the metropolitan sense, that is amongst those who live in these rather rarefied 
zones around the City through into Westminster, rather than what I call change, which was 
change to stretch it out to relocate it in the hearts of minds of people that live beyond that. 
(Duncan Smith Interview). 
Duncan Smith soon found himself in the unfortunate and somewhat curious position of 
being attacked by both modernisers and traditionalists, having failed to please either camp. 
As Ann Widdecombe saw it, he 'tried to ride two horses. We all knew where he stood. he 
2 The eleven were: Francis Maude, Peter Ainsworth, Edward Garnier, David Heathcoat-Amory, Oliver 
Letwin, Andrew Mackay, Tim Yeo, Gary Streeter, Archie Norman, David Willetts, and Theresa 1\ lay (BBe 
News, 2001 a). 
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was a strong traditionalist, but he tried to go for a slightly modernising agenda' 
(Widdecombe Interview). His first shadow cabinet demonstrated a clear Eurosceptic bias 
(BBC News, 200 1 b) - he even included his co-conspirator in the Maastricht rebellion, Bill 
Cash - but his efforts to downplay the European issue were seen by Redwood (2004: 153) 
as a victory for the modernisers. Duncan Smith's move away from 'core vote' issues such 
as Europe and immigration did not, however, insulate him from criticism from 'the mods' . 
Duncan Smith's deputy and shadow Foreign Secretary, Michael Ancram, saw much of the 
internal feuding emanating from disgruntled supporters of Portillo: 
I think the flak largely came from - it might have been a bit from the Eurosceptics, but he 
put quite a lot of them into his shadow cabinet, notably Bill Cash and Bernard Jenkin - I 
think it came rather more from the Portillistas. Their agenda, as much as they had one, was 
modernisation, and lain was not a moderniser. (Ancram Interview). 
In the same way that Duncan Smith did not see himself as modernising the party but 
changing it, the modernisers did not regard him as 'one of them': 
It wasn't their change, and I think they felt very bitter. The sad thing about Michael Portillo 
was that had he won his seat in 1997 he would have probably walked it [the leadership 
election], and there were a lot of people who had invested heavily in Portillo shares for 
many years before that and who saw their investment go, and couldn't believe in 2001 it 
had disappeared again, and they were very unhappy bunnies. I think it was factional, that 
was my impression. (Ancram Interview). 
Disagreement turned to warfare in November 2002, over the ostensibly minor issue of the 
passage of the government's Adoption and Children B ill. The House of Lords had 
amended the legislation to the effect that only married couples could adopt children, and 
the government sought to repeal these revisions in the Commons to allow unmarried and 
same-sex couples the same rights. For Labour and the Liberal Democrats, this was 
relatively uncontroversial (Dorey, 2004: 376). For the Conservatives however, it went to 
the heart of the debate over the status of marriage that had featured heavily during the 
Hague years. Should they take a liberal view and accept these different forms of family 
life, or continue to advocate their preferred traditional model for raising children? The 
easiest way out of this difficulty for Duncan Smith would have been to allow a free vote, 
but he instead chose to impose a three-line whip against the changes. The result was a 
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public split and a leadership crisis that was 'almost entirely self-inflicted and eminently 
avoidable' (Cowley & Stuart, 2004a: 357). Thirty-five Conservatives absented themselves 
from the Commons, and eight MPs defied the whip and voted against the party line. These 
eight included ex-leadership challengers Clarke and Portillo; four former Shadow Cabinet 
members (David Curry, Andrew Lansley, Andrew Mackay and Francis Maude); and most 
damagingly, John Bercow, who resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in order to rebel 
(Cowley & Stuart, 2004a: 357). 
Bercow resigned because he both felt strongly about the issue and was unhappy with the 
direction of the party under Duncan Smith's leadership. As he explained: 
I felt very strongly that the party was wrong to do what it did. It could of course be argued 
- and it was, by some - that I should have simply gone missing that night and abstained, 
rather than make a huge fuss about it, but I felt strongly that the party had got it completely 
wrong. And it was also the case that I was disillusioned on several other fronts: I felt that 
the party was not really making any great progress and I didn't want to be part of that 
frontbench team. I thought we weren't going anywhere as a party and I didn't want to be 
part of it, and this issue was the final straw. (Bercow Interview). 
Duncan Smith interpreted this rebellion as a conspiracy designed to destabilise his 
leadership. The next day he made a statement on the steps of Conservative Central Office 
calling for the party to 'unite or die'. In it, he claimed that he had 'begun to reconnect the 
Conservative Party with the views and attitudes of contemporary Britain'. Equally, he 
asserted that he was leading the party with unity in mind, 'respecting those who would like 
me to move faster and those who feel threatened by our moving at all' . However: 
Over the last few weeks a small group of my parliamentary colleagues have decided 
consciously to undermine my leadership. For a few, last night's vote was not about adoption 
but an attempt to challenge my mandate to lead this party. We cannot go on in this fashion. 
We have to pull together or we will hang apart. (Duncan Smith, 2002e). 
This marked a turning point both for Duncan Smith's leadership and for party management 
of sexual/moral political issues. In terms of issue management, the lesson for the 
Conservatives was clear: the party was divided, and free votes on 'conscience' issues 
offered the most effective means to prevent them from attracting media interest and 
becoming public displays of disunity. Duncan Smith adopted this tactic when, in March 
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2003, the government once again brought forward legislation to repeal Section 28, and it 
has also been used by Cameron and Howard (see below). 
The 'gay adoption' episode exposed both Duncan Smith's ineptitude as a party leader and 
the problematic context he faced. The party was clearly divided, and a modernising leader 
would have faced similar (or perhaps even more acute) difficulties in terms of keeping the 
party together. However, the incident also exposed Duncan Smith's personal failings and 
the barely-muffled murmurs of discontent with his leadership became thunderous. One 
Conservative MP claimed that a desire to oust Duncan Smith played a significant role in 
the rebellion, on an issue that would not normally have been expected to stir such emotions 
(Anonymous Interview). Another commented that the parliamentary party was 'a seething 
mass of discontent. .. People were gathering in corridors saying "we can't go on like this, 
this guy hasn't got it".' (Anonymous Interview). Gary Streeter noted the presence of 
'disgruntled modernisers' but 'was not actively aware of any plots' against the leader 
(Streeter Interview). 
The fact that Duncan Smith even felt the need to make an extraordinary appeal to the party 
barely a year into his leadership illustrated the perilous nature of his position, and it was 
strongly rumoured that he was on the brink of resignation (Hoggart, 2002; Brogan & 
Helm, 2002). The normally sympathetic Daily Telegraph described it as 'the most 
desperate day in the history of the Conservative Party' (Young, 2002). Kenneth Clarke 
attacked the party leader's handling of the 'entirely self-induced' crisis (Jones et aI., 2002), 
and within days a YouGovlTelegraph opinion poll revealed that 52 percent of 
Conservative voters thought that the election of Duncan Smith had been a mistake. 
Moreover, 81 percent of supporters and 75 percent of party members thought he had 
mishandled the adoption issue by failing to allow MPs a free vote (Helm and Sylvester, 
2002). 
The issue of adoption by unmarried and same-sex couples was an ideal tool for the 
modernisers to use in order to attack Duncan Smith's leadership. They were able to argue 
not only that it should be subject to a free vote; but that the position taken by the leadership 
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only served to highlight how 'out of touch' with contemporary society the party had 
become. Garnett and Lynch (2003b: 14) observe that the modernisers may well have 
exaggerated the electoral salience of the party's stance on sexual questions, but the wider 
impact on the party's (poor) public image, exacerbated by the revolt over the three-line 
whip is harder to quantify. Duncan Smith's firm line on adoption also went against other 
moves apparently aimed at softening the party's image after the failure of Hague's core-
vote approach and the 2001 election. In early 2002, for example, Oliver Letwin signalled 
that the Conservatives were willing to shift their position to give more legal rights to gay 
couples. He called for homosexual partners to be given certain property rights similar to 
those enjoyed by spouses, but stopped short of embracing either civil partnerships or 
adoption rights. Letwin claimed that whilst he wanted to devise practical measures to help 
gay couples, he didn't want to do anything to undermine the sanctity of marriage, 
commenting: 'We don't want to create a pale imitation of marriage, but we do recognise 
that there are real grievances' (BBC News, 2002). This reflects the general theme of 
Duncan Smith's leadership, namely his effort to steer a middle-course which reflected 
some of the concerns of the modernisers, without disavowing his own (ill-disguised) 
traditionalist leanings. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from his handling of Section 28. Keen to avoid a repeat 
of the rebellion over adoption, Duncan Smith and his party Chairman, David Davis, 
devised a compromise whereby Conservative MPs were ordered to vote for a Conservative 
amendment to replace rather than abolish the Clause (The Guardian, 2003). An 
amendment to retain Section 28 was also tabled by the traditionalists Edward Leigh and 
Ann Widdecombe. On a free vote, 71 Conservatives supported this amendment (including 
Duncan Smith and Michael Howard) whilst just 23 voted against (BBC News, 2003; 
Durham, 2005: 99). On this occasion the Clause was finally scrapped. 
This pattern was repeated under Duncan Smith's successor, Michael Howard. On 
becoming leader Howard's priority was to 'impose discipline' on the party (Howard 
Interview). To this he might have added: 'and counter the public image of disunity'. 
Howard's strategy reveals an effort to downplay party divisions on a number of 
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controversial social, sexual and moral questions by allowing free votes. Notably, he opted 
for free votes on the Civil Partnership Bill, which gave gay couples entering into a civil 
partnership the same rights as married couples; and on the Gender Recognition Bill, which 
gave transsexuals legal recognition and the right to marry in their adopted sex (Cowley and 
Stuart, 2004b: 1-2). One effect of the free votes was that many Conservative MPs did not 
vote at all, but those that did vote revealed the depth of the split on such issues in the party. 
On the Gender Recognition Bill, a total of 36 Conservative MPs voted in favour of either 
Second or Third Reading (or both) and a total of 44 Conservative MPs voted against either 
Second or Third Reading (or both). Combining the votes on the Second and Third 
Readings of the Civil Partnership Bill reveals 'similarly stark splits', with a total of 74 
voting in favour on at least one occasion, and 49 opposing it at least once (Cowley & 
Stuart, 2004b: 2-3). 
Howard's relatively brief tenure as leader of the Conservative Party can therefore be 
regarded as period of better party management tactics on the social, sexual and moral 
policy cleavage, but it was still characterised by significant internal division on such 
questions. Howard also lacked a clear strategy to improve the image of the party by 
moderating positions on such issues: whilst morality/individual behaviour has remained a 
low salience issue in terms of having a direct impact on how people vote/ such issues may 
affect a party's image (Chapter 4). Quinn argues that the major problem the Conservatives 
have faced in opposition since 1997 is not that they have been too right-wing in their 
policy positions, but that they have suffered from a severe image problem. In short, the 
Conservatives were seen as 'angry, stuck in the past, and socially intolerant'. Electoral 
revival, therefore, requires them to revitalise their image rather than reinvent their policy 
programme. 'Shifting to the centre ground' can thus be achieved by 'softening the 
Conservatives' image, toning down their language, and appearing more socially inclusive, 
rather than [by] the wholesale sale abandonment of policies that were not particularly 
different from those of Labour' (Quinn, 2008: 179). Under Howard, the party gave the 
3 Since 1997, morality/individual behaviour has never been regarded as one ofthe most important issues 
facing the country by more than 10 percent ofthe electorate. It has averaged 4.6 percent (MORl 2008a). 
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impression that it was reluctantly conceding to social change, rather than welcoming and 
adapting to it enthusiastically. 
The next section considers whether David Cameron has finally solved this problem 
through a new approach to the Conservative politics of the family. Cameron is considered 
in this way as it appears that he may be forging a distinctive position on the social, sexual 
and moral policy divide. This perspective may therefore offer us an additional lens through 
which to view the 1997-2005 period. Further, if Cameron has been able to resolve this 
question, it will mark an important conclusion to the ideological differences highlighted by 
this case study, and indicate strategic learning from past mistakes by the party leadership. 
7.5 Cameron: The family man 
I am unashamedly pro-family. For me it comes absolutely first. 
David Cameron (quoted in Grice, 2007). 
David Cameron has repeatedly sought to emphasise his credentials as a 'family man'. He 
has put the family at the heart of his policy agenda and his public image, and has stated on 
a number of occasions that his family is more important to him that his political ambitions 
(Sky News, 2006). In some key respects, Cameron's policy on the family represents a clear 
continuation of the direction set by lain Duncan Smith, who he appointed as Chairman of 
his Social Justice Policy Group. Cameron has frequently claimed that his priority as Prime 
Minister would be to 'mend Britain's broken society' (Jones, 2007), and has argued that 
strengthening families is central to this. Yet in contrast to Duncan Smith, Cameron has also 
sought to portray himself as a social liberal, at ease with contemporary British society. The 
central message of his leadership campaign was that the party must 'change to win' 
(Cameron, 2005). He has described himself as a 'liberal Conservative', has deliberately 
gone 'out of his way to strike a very different note about asylum seekers', and has given 
strong support to civil partnerships for same-sex couples (Rawnsley, 2005). This liberal 
element of Cameron's approach conforms to Quinn's strategy of changing party image by 
moving closer to groups not traditionally part of the Conservative support base. The 
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question for Cameron is whether this socially liberal image can be successfully balanced 
(or maintained) with a strong family policy. 
Cameron gave a speech entitled 'Stronger Families' to Relate, the family counselling 
service, in June 2008. In it, he echoed William Hague's comments a decade earlier, when 
he noted that 'for too long, politicians here have been afraid of getting into this territory, 
for fear of looking old-fashioned or preachy' (Cameron, 2008). His message that he wished 
to see marriage once again as a 'positive social norm' was one that could have appeared in 
a speech by any of his three predecessors as leader of the opposition. The family, he 
observed, is the 'best institution' for raising children, and (again echoing policy under 
Hague) reiterated his commitment to delivering a tax break for married couples, a pledge 
he first made during his leadership campaign. 
Yes, I do think it's wrong that our benefits system gives couples with children more money 
if they live apart - and we will bring an end to the couple penalty. And yes, I do think it's 
wrong that we're the only country in the western world that doesn't properly recognise 
marriage in the tax system - and I will ensure that we do. So we will change tax and 
benefits to make them more family-friendly. (Cameron, 2008). 
He also made clear, however, that any tax cuts for married couples would also apply 
equally to people in civil partnerships. This represents a significant shift in the 
Conservatives' attitude towards homosexuality, and fits with Cameron's efforts to rebrand 
the party as more socially inclusive and tolerant. To this end, the Conservatives have also 
actively recruited gay prospective parliamentary candidates and given them priority in 
winnable seats (Woolf, 2006). The party has also signed an agreement with Stonewall (the 
gay rights pressure group) to become part of its 'Diversity Champions' programme of gay 
friendly employers (Grimston, 2006). 
In essence, however, Cameron's position remams fundamentally Conservative and 
consistent with that of his predecessors, in that he regards marriage as the best model of 
family life and believes that the state should recognise and promote it in some way. For 
some modernisers this is the cause of unease. John Bercow, whilst pleased with Cameron's 
broadly socially liberal disposition, sees 'some tension' between this and his family policy: 
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He takes what I think would be regarded as a traditionalist view of marriage and the 
family. That is reflected in some of what he has said about wanting to reward 
marriage through the tax system, and I have grave reservations about that. But 
overall, he is very much more socially liberal than his predecessors. 
(Bercow Interview). 
Bercow also notes how to-date, Cameron 'has managed to maintain both positions without 
incurring any political penalty' and offers two explanatory factors for this. Firstly, it 
reflects Cameron's 'impressive presentational skills'; and secondly, 'it may also be a 
reflection of that fact that we have not yet got to specifics' (Bercow Interview). In other 
words, once detailed tax changes are revealed and the winners and losers calculated, the 
Conservatives might face a backlash, either from, or on behalf of, the penalised groups. 
Tim Yeo also questioned the fairness of weighting the tax system in favour of marriage, 
and warned that effectively discriminating against many families with single or unmarried 
parents 'would be seen as wrong' and would thus backfire on the Conservatives (Tory 
Diary, 2006). A report for the Centre for Policy Studies found that this apprehension 
amongst Conservative MPs was widespread, as many saw the electoral risk of being 
perceived as 'victimising single mothers'. This timidity, the report's author cautioned, 
meant that 'there is a serious danger that, in this area at least, the "modernising" of the 
party's image ... could simply be a cover for political cowardice and a retreat from what 
elected politicians personally believe to be right for the well-being of society' (Daley, 
2006: 3). 
However, as his recent speech to Relate demonstrates, Cameron has not been timid on this 
issue and has stuck consistently to his pledge to recognise marriage in the tax system, 
although he has still to reveal the details of how this will be implemented. As under lain 
Duncan Smith, supporting marriage has been explicitly linked by Cameron to the issue of 
social justice and his stated aim to renew the societal fabric. Commenting on the 
publication of the Social Justice Policy Group's report Breakthrough Britain (SJPG, 2007), 
Cameron said: 'I welcome this report's emphasis on the family, and on marriage. as the 
basis for the social progress we all want to see' adding that: 'If we can get the family right, 
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we can fix our broken society' (Conservatives.com, 2007). The report itself argues, in 
effect, that unmarried couples are damaging society, as 'the ongoing rise in family 
breakdown affecting young children has been driven by the dissolution of cohabiting 
partnerships', the majority of which 'are less stable than marriage' (SJPG, 2007: 3). 
Family breakdown is correlated with crime, drug abuse, educational failure and anti-social 
behaviour. The state should therefore 'create a positive policy bias in support of marriage' 
and end the 'downgrading' of marriage in official discourse which fails to recognise the 
'marked discrepancies in the stability of married and cohabiting couples' (SJPG, 2007: 5-
6). 
For Toynbee, this represents a return to traditionalist, socially authoritarian conservatism 
designed to appease the Daily Mail. She argues that: 'His marriage policy is their victory, 
boxing him into their own moral agenda without any idea yet how it can be done, at what 
cost - and with what collateral damage'. It is 'reactionary mood music' that risks 
alienating supporters attracted to the fold by Cameron's ostensibly liberal outlook 
(Toynbee, 2007). To portray Cameron as having sold out to the traditionalists is a little 
strong, however, as it represents only one element of his strategy. The question is more one 
of whether he can successfully balance potentially competing objectives. Widdecombe 
praises his focus on the family, but also concedes that this is part of a two-pronged 
approach by Cameron which also involves changing the party's image: 
He [Cameron] is doing two things. You heard him a couple of weeks ago in the wake of 
lain Duncan Smith's paper on the family saying that the best background against which to 
bring-up children is marriage, here are the statistics which prove it, we just have to go on 
saying that - it doesn't matter if you distort that into being an attack on the single mothers -
we're going to go on saying it. That speech would have resonated with just about 
everybody who has ever voted Conservative and who is over 35 or so. But he is also at the 
same time, for example, (and I don't approve of it, but he is) espousing the causes of civil 
partnerships, and of shortlists which have equal numbers of men and women. I regard the 
second as ludicrous. If you look at the list, it's about three-quarters male and a quarter 
female, roughly speaking. Therefore you cannot have a list drawn-up on merit which is 50-
50. It doesn't make any sense at all. So it is real positive discrimination, I hate it. But as far 
as I am concerned, that isn't worth keeping Blair in power for. So I think it's a question of 
proportionality. To do anything about anything, you've got to get there [into power]. I've 
been nagging on about that for a very long time, but I think generally now it's an accepted 
view, you've got to get there. (Widdecombe Interview). 
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What Widdecombe highlights is the broad nature of Cameron's modernisation strategy. It 
not only involves modifying the party's stance on moral and sexual issues such as gay 
rights and civil partnerships, but goes beyond this to a much broader transformation of the 
party's image. For Bercow, 'quite apart from the fact that it is right in itself to be socially 
inclusive, it was important for the Conservative Party to become so in order to gain 
permission to be heard on a much wider range of issues' (Bercow Interview). To the 
irritation of traditionalists such a Widdecombe, this has involved attempts to change the 
public face of the party through priority selection of female, gay, and ethnic minority 
candidates, but it has also encompassed a major push on issues not traditionally associated 
with the Conservatives such as the environment. For example, Cameron's focus on the 
issue of climate change has been a major feature of his message that 'there's more to life 
than money' and his 'General Well Being' agenda (Cameron, 2006c). Central to 
Cameron's policy modernisation has been 'an explicitly avowed departure from 
Thatcherism' on the grounds that however vital it was to solving the problems of the 1970s 
and 1980s, it is no longer the most appropriate tool for addressing contemporary 
challenges (Dorey, 2007: 142). For Dorey, this has been signalled in two ways: through a 
return to the centre ground via the assertion of a 'new mode of Conservatism' which is 
plural, tolerant and compassionate, and 'by openly disavowing particular policy stances 
adopted by the Thatcher Governments during the 1980s and acknowledging that these 
were, at least with the benefit of hindsight, unnecessary or unwise' (2007: 142-3). 
Whereas Cameron's three predecessors had all, to varying degrees, experimented with 
elements of this approach, none were able to do so with his apparent conviction or 
authenticity, so tended to slip back onto more familiar territory when opinion poll ratings 
failed to improve (Dorey, 2007: 139). The fragility of Cameron's project was briefly 
exposed in summer 2007, when Gordon Brown's arrival in Downing Street substantially 
cut the Conservatives' opinion poll lead. Cameron's wide lead had 'kept the diehards quiet 
for a while' but as it faded away they began to argue more forcefully that his project was 
failing (Portillo, 2007). 'Lamentably', Portillo noted, 'the signs are that Cameron is now 
caving in to Tory pressure' (2007). Crucially for Cameron, Conservative fortunes revived 
in the autumn, when Brown failed to call the general election and was hit by a series of 
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negative headlines. The maintenance of this poll lead has been a key factor enabling 
Cameron to stick to a modernising agenda, and is a luxury that was not enjoyed by his 
predecessors. 
Widdecombe argues that in policy terms, Cameron does not represent a rejection of 
Conservative tradition, but can be better understood as a new application of core 
principles. To represent Cameron's agenda as a victory by modernisers over diametrically 
opposed traditionalists is therefore inaccurate, but (damagingly in her view) is an 
interpretation that has seduced many Conservatives: 
If you look at Conservative policy through the ages it has always been mixed. There are 
some policies which inevitably appeal more to very traditional Conservatives, and some 
which appeal more people who are not necessarily Conservatives, there is absolutely 
nothing new about that. But I think it became a major issue for us, almost as if there was no 
choice, you had to be either A or B. In a way we were driven by the press, particularly 
people like Gove, who had his 'Mods versus Rockers' nonsense. And so you never actually 
assessed policies on their merits, it was always which of these two categories do they fall in 
to. I don't think we had to go along with that, but we did, rather too much. (Widdecombe 
Intervi ew). 
Cameron has offered some reassurance to Conservative traditionalists with his strong 
message on the importance of the family. This aspect of his policy programme remains 
compatible with the fundamental tenants of Thatcherism, and has thus been the cause of 
some unease amongst the modernisers. Where he differs from his predecessors, however, 
is that to date, it appears that his broader programme of modernisation to change the 
Conservative Party's image has allowed him to make marriage and the traditional family 
the centre of his social policy without appearing intolerant to other groups, and thus 
undermining the whole project. The risk remains for Cameron that as the details of a future 
Conservative government's policy programme become clear, and the winners and losers of 
proposed tax reforms are calculated, voters may react against this and his modernising 
efforts will be undermined. This is the essence of Brown's charge that Cameron is 'all 
style and no substance' and that in fundamental policy terms he is no different to his 
predecessors. The extent to which the electorate will study party policy is doubtful 
however, so Cameron's success in changing the 'mood music' is likely to prevail. This 
affords him the opportunity to succeed where Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard failed, 
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namely by satisfying his own party and core support with a Conservative approach in key 
policy areas such as the family, whilst also rebranding the party to reach out to a much 
wider constituency. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The most significant division in the Conservative Party is now along the social, sexual and 
moral policy divide. Cameron's rebranding of the party as more tolerant and inclusive 
cannot disguise the fact that over the past decade on issues such as Section 28, civil 
partnerships and gay adoption the Conservatives have been deeply divided. Unlike in the 
economic sphere, the ideological ascendency of Thatcherism is far from complete, but 
socially authoritarian spokespeople for 'Victorian values' remain vocal on the party's 
backbenches. 
Over the past decade the debate between modernisers and traditionalists on social issues 
has also become inextricably intertwined with the wider question of how the party should 
seek to revive its electoral fortunes. A consensus quickly emerged in the party that a key 
factor in the electoral success of New Labour was the perception that Conservatives were 
disinterested in, and unable to offer solutions to, problems beyond the economic sphere. 
Conservatives did not agree, however, on how to address this problem. Should they seek to 
extend the economic liberalism of Thatcherism into the social sphere, or aim to 
'remoralise' politics in a manner akin to American Republicans? (Ashbee, 2003). 
Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard all quickly abandoned initial tentative moves towards 
social liberalism when they failed to yield positive opinion poll results and came under fire 
from within the party. A renewed emphasis on the family did occur under Hague's 
leadership, although along strictly traditionalist Conservative lines, involving an implicit 
(and occasionally explicit) criticism of the Thatcher and Major governments for failing to 
do enough to support marriage, particularly through the tax system. Combined with his 
hard-line on Section 28, this amounted to a populist appeal to the Conservative core vote. 
Under Duncan Smith, a significant broadening of the party's agenda on social issues 
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occurred, particularly in terms of his efforts to position the party as concerned with 
poverty, social exclusion and 'championing the vulnerable' (Chapter 4). If this strategy had 
been pursued for longer, it may have helped dispel the Conservatives' image as selfish and 
socially exclusive. However, in some ways the socially conservative approach taken on 
these issues (for example the emphasis on marriage) may have actually reinforced public 
perception that the party was old-fashioned and stuck in the past, and risked alienating 
support amongst excluded groups such as single parents. Duncan Smith was also 
undermined by his tactical ineptitude, particularly his disastrous handling of Adoption and 
Children Bill. Howard's policy of free votes saw the party attempt to downplay divisions 
on the social, sexual and moral policy divide, and although it did not solve them it was 
more successful in party management terms. Public disunity between mods and rockers 
subsided, and the party went into the 2005 election with the vague pledge to 'govern in the 
interests of everyone', whether they be 'black or white, young or old, straight or gay, rural 
or urban, rich or poor' (Conservative Party, 2005: 1). 
Cameron has enjoyed a more favourable context than his three predecessors for the 
successful pursuit of a modernisation strategy. Most of New Labour's legislative 
programme for sexual equality was complete by the end of their second term, so he could 
reasonably argue that the Conservatives simply have to accept this new reality, as it would 
be very difficult to reverse it. Failure at three previous general elections also gave him 
more room for manoeuvre by undermining the argument that the party simply needs to do 
what it has been doing previously. Most fundamentally however, Cameron has benefitted 
from a much more propitious electoral context - firstly with the final years of the tired 
Blair premiership, and latterly with the extraordinary implosion of Brown's. It has been 
these auspicious circumstances and the accompanying Conservative poll leads that have 
muted criticism from traditionalists and allowed Cameron to maintain his modernising 
course. 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
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This study has focused on the Conservative Party leadership in opposition, between 1997 
and 2005. The aim was to comprehend and explain the strategies employed by elite party 
actors in this period, in order to develop a better understanding of the Conservatives' 
electoral failure. Central to this was the role of ideology, and the research examined key 
areas of ideological tension in contemporary conservatism, and how the party sought to 
reconcile these into viable political strategies. To make sense of this complex picture, the 
thesis advanced and deployed an appropriate theoretical framework - the strategic-
relational approach - which informed the analysis throughout. In conclusion to this 
research, the wider analytical implications of this approach are considered. The chapter 
then returns to the key arenas highlighted by the strategic-relational approach in Chapter 2, 
namely the parliamentary party, the wider party (membership), the electorate, and 
ideology. Strategy in relation to each of these across the 1997-2005 period is considered. 
Finally, it reflects on what this may tell us about the future direction and prospects for the 
Conservative Party under Cameron in the years ahead. 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
The first chapter of this thesis considered how the academic literature has studied the 
Conservative Party in the past. It concluded that whilst it contains a great deal of value, 
Conservative historiography has tended to be heavily agency-focused, whilst the more 
recent political analytical tradition is more structurally inclined in its mode of explanation. 
It suggested the need for a more nuanced theoretical approach able to draw on the strengths 
of both sets of literature. By directing our analytical attention to the contextualised and 
reflective nature of strategic political action, the SRA has provided just such a framework 
for this case study, and helped to overcome the agency-structure divide identified in 
201 
Chapter 1. As such, it highlights the worth of this approach to future studies of the 
Conservative Party. The discussion of leadership strategy below (section 8.3) notes how it 
needs to be considered in relation to different contextual arenas. The SRA provides the 
conceptual tools to identify and analyse this multi-layered context. An appreciation of this 
was required for this case study of the party's electoral failure in opposition, but would 
also be requisite for any understanding of the development of a future governing statecraft, 
should the Conservatives succeed in this regard under Cameron. 
Ideology has been an important feature of the analysis undertaken here. As Chapter 2 
discussed, actors are not privileged with unmediated access to the strategically selective 
context in which they operate, and ideology is a key feature of the way in which they 
understand and interpret their reality. Political actors are engaged in a constant, dynamic 
process of reflecting on and reacting to context, as they seek to develop and implement 
effective strategies. By stressing the importance of these interpretations in strategic 
decision-making, the SRA provides an analytical mode sensitive to the ideational 
dimension without assigning ideologies an independent causality divorced from political 
actors. For analysts interested in the role of political ideas, the SRA therefore offers a 
hugely valuable frame for empirical analysis. 
This research has also served to signal the importance of this approach more generally. The 
SRA offers a valuable theoretical basis for researchers interested in examining and 
understanding political action in a variety of contexts. The study of politics is, in large part, 
the study of decision-making processes. It examines how and why decisions are taken, and 
their implications. Consequently, the utility of the SRA is not confined to studies such as 
this which focus on party elites, but has the potential to be operationalised by analysts in 
many fields, who are interested in appreciating and unpacking the complex and contingent 
nature of political reality. 
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8.3 Leadership Strategy 
Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard all failed to develop an effective statecraft. The' art of 
winning elections' eluded them, denying them the opportunity to try their hand at the 
premier objective identified by Bulpitt, namely 'achieving a necessary degree of governing 
competence in office' (1986: 19). During this eight-year stretch in opposition, the 
Conservatives were unable to present themselves as a credible and competent alternative 
governing force to Labour, and their leaders were unable to present themselves as serious 
and viable alternatives to Blair as Prime Minister. In spite of several attempts, they failed 
to articulate a new or convincing narrative of conservatism. In short, the party lacked a 
clear understanding of its rationale in the post-Thatcherite era, and was consequently 
unable to fulfil the basic requirements of opposition (Chapter 4). 
As Heppell highlights, this may be part of a longer-term Conservative decline. In the 
modern era, the party's history can be split in two halves: a period of undemocratic leader 
selection by the party elite (1922-1964), and a period of elected leaders, since the 
resignation of Alec Douglas-Hume. During the former the party had seven leaders, all of 
whom at some stage served as Prime Minister; during the latter, a further seven have led 
the party, but only three (Heath, Thatcher and Major) have reached Downing Street, and 
only Thatcher was able to sustain an effective statecraft (Heppell, 2008: 195-6). 
Contextualised in terms of the troubles of Heath (who lost three general elections and won 
one) and Major, whose government was almost paralysed by intra-party divisions, the 
difficulties since 1997 perhaps appear less exceptional. 
Heppell identifies three key themes from his analysis of the post-1964 period. These are a 
failure of process (in terms of how leaders are elected); a failure of outcome (in terms of 
electing leaders who lack legitimacy and authority); and an obsession with ideology, which 
has clouded the judgement needed for leadership selection (2008: 197-8). In Heppell's 
view: 
When debating who their party leader should be, the Conservative parliamentarians (and 
latterly party members), should have been guided by one over-riding objective: which 
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Conservative candidate being presented to them is the best equipped to acquire and retain 
power ... Rather than adhere to this outward looking consideration of what would appeal to 
the electorate the most, Conservatives have often been overly influenced by what was most 
acceptable to themselves first. (Heppell, 2008: 197-8). 
This is undoubtedly a pertinent critique: in both 1997 and 2001 the party passed over 
candidates with greater electoral appeal (Clarke in 1997, and Clarke and Portillo in 200 I) 
in favour of less well-known, less-experienced, and less adept media performers. This 
research confirms that of Heppell in that ideological considerations played an important 
part in these elections. However, to account for the broader strategic failure of these 
leaders once elected we need to look beyond this to the multi-layered context they sought 
to address. 
As Chapter 4 demonstrated, Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard all made some initial 
efforts to devise a narrative of conservatism to widen the party's electoral appeal. To 
differing extents, they each signalled their desire to 'reach out' to voters disillusion by the 
Conservatives in 1997. However, in all three cases these endeavours were abandoned in 
favour of more traditional messages designed to appeal to the core vote. Under Hague and 
Howard, these were inchoate efforts, which were rapidly ditched. Duncan Smith's more 
sustained effort to develop the themes of renewing the public services and helping the 
vulnerable also came under pressure as the party's poll-ratings failed to improve. Had he 
won the vote of confidence in his leadership and stayed on until the 2005 election, the turn 
towards the core vote signalled shortly before his departure may have become much more 
deeply embedded, to the extent that a Conservative campaign under Duncan Smith might 
have been little different to that which was eventually fought by Howard. 
All three leaders exhibited signs of strategic thinking, but ultimately failed to stick to the 
course of action that this implied. What has been referred to as 'core vote' strategy 
throughout this research, namely policies and rhetoric designed to appeal to the mainstay 
of Conservative Party support, has therefore been revealed as the Conservatives' default 
position. In this sense, 'core vote strategy' is not a strategy at all, but what the party reverts 
to when it lacks a clear direction or purpose, or when the party's leaders fail to convince it 
of the merits of an alternative strategic direction. This tells us something about the nature 
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of contemporary conservatism and how Conservative politicians both understand their role 
and view their support. The essence of contemporary conservatism, when not being 
purposefully led elsewhere, is pungently Eurosceptic, socially illiberal and narrowly 
nationalistic. In policy terms, this has translated to opposition to the single currency and 
the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon (as well as Lisbon's defunct predecessor. the 
proposed European constitution); calls for significantly tighter controls on asylum and 
immigration; and a defence of traditional social values such as marriage against 
I iberalising tendencies. Conservative leaders, despite their lack of support in some areas of 
the United Kingdom and amongst some social groups, continue to view themselves as 
national figures with a duty to defend the nation's sovereignty, constitution, and cultural 
homogeneity. As such, the politics of nationhood remains a central component of 
conservatism. Their actions suggest a belief that these themes retain a potent electoral 
appeal, although divisions in the party between mods and rockers, and the sporadic 
concern to develop a more inclusive narrative, indicate that at least some Conservatives 
recognise the diminishing relevance (and potential unattractiveness) of traditional 
messages. 
The default core vote position also illustrates the continuing hold of Thatcherism on the 
party. Its central components are firmly Thatcherite, based around a strong but limited state 
and economic liberalism (most commonly illustrated in policy terms by calls for the party 
to promise tax cuts), and social authoritarianism. The main objective of Thatcherism -
reversing national economic decline - is no longer of primary concern, but the perceived 
need to defend national sovereignty (against encroachment from the EU) and address 
social and moral decline draw directly from the party's Thatcherite heritage. The 
continuing hold of Thatcher's aura on the party was illustrated by the significance of her 
endorsements in the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections, and her expression of displeasure 
with Lilley's R. A. Butler lecture in 1999. The importance of the manner of Thatcher's 
eviction from office cannot be understated, and is a lesson plotters against Gordon Brown 
would do well to heed. It left a scar on the Conservatives' collective psyche, and ironically 
reinforced the ideological hold of Thatcherism on the party. As Kenneth Clarke 
commented: 
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I think the Conservative Party's problems really stem from the fall of Margaret Thatcher 
and the circumstances of it. .. That's what destroyed the equilibrium of the party. Of course, 
the disputes became about other things, but we never came to terms with that. The wound 
was quite dreadful, it caused bitterness on all sides. (Clarke, interview in Portillo, 2008). 
As Michael Portillo graphically stated, some Thatcherites 'feel that a murder was 
committed, and I think that has made them cling all the more dearly to this very literal and 
unreconstructed idea of Thatcherism' (Portillo Interview). Significantly, David Cameron is 
the first of her successors not to receive Thatcher's public endorsement, and he may be the 
first to step out of her shadow. For Heppell, Cameron's election, over the more 
ideologically pure David Davis, suggests the Conservatives are 'ending their self-
destructive obsession with ideology' (Heppell, 2008: 206). 
When measured against the most important outcome for a political party - electoral 
success - the leadership of Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard falls short. As Chapter I 
noted, agency-centred analyses that stress the importance of leadership thus tend to 
ruthlessly condemn this failure. However, a better understanding of the circumstances and 
process that led to these displays of strategic inconsistency and confusion can be gained by 
considering the different contextual arenas that leaders seek to address. 
8.3.1 The Parliamentary Party 
The parliamentary party is a key arena which any Conservative leader must successfully 
manage. Leaders are dependent upon parliamentary support for their legitimacy. This is 
particularly the case for leaders of the opposition, who cannot claim the electoral mandate 
conferred by victory at a general election. Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard each 
expended significant energy managing the parliamentary party. 
Hague enjoyed some success in managing his parliamentary colleagues. Firstly, he kept the 
party together as a single entity. This was vital if the Conservatives are ever to return to 
office a recognisable party, but their survival in this form was far from guaranteed in 1997. 
The most divisive issue facing the party when Hague became leader was European 
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integration. As Chapter 5 discussed, Hague hardened Conservative resistance to the single 
currency, stating that the party would oppose British membership in the current parliament 
and the next, effectively ruling it out for a decade. This policy attracted derision, as Hague 
could neither say that he opposed joining the currency on principle, or that he would offer 
a referendum even if the case for membership appeared compelling. However, it was a 
success in that it was a position (possibly the only position) that the vast majority of his 
MPs could subscribe to at that time. 
Hague was unable to convince the bulk of the parliamentary party, or even his shadow 
cabinet, of the merits of his early attempts to reach out to a wider constituency of voters, 
notably the proposal for 'Kitchen Table Conservatism' (KTC). As Harris notes, the demise 
of this strategy 'can be attributed to its non-acceptance within the party leadership'. Even 
Hague himself 'did not sufficiently believe in the strategy to force its implementation' 
(Harris, 2005: 270). Traditionalists were unhappy with this early approach and sought to 
undermine it. However, Hague's later strategy was successful in party management terms 
in that modernisers (notably Portillo) were accommodated within the shadow cabinet. 
Hague reduced dissent by not making the core vote strategy explicit. In the run up to the 
general election, Hague 'paid lip service to the demands of the modernisers by including 
but not emphasising, the party's policies on social inclusion and the public services' 
(Harris, 2005: 276). A degree of public unity was thus maintained. 
Duncan Smith failed to manage the parliamentary party, and was eventually unseated by it. 
Like Hague with KTC, he was unable to persuade either his shadow cabinet or the 
parliamentary party of the virtues of his strategy. He was undermined by a lack of 
legitimacy, having secured the support of less than one third of his parliamentary 
colleagues in the 2001 leadership election (Heppell, 2008: 148). Following the more 
Eurosceptic line instituted by Hague, Duncan Smith was able to successfully harden the 
party's position on the single currency to one of opposing membership in principle, and to 
reduce the prominence of the politics of nationhood in Conservative discourse. Whilst 
leader, he was also able to successfully guide party strategy away from a focus on core 
vote issues. However, his handling of the question of adoption rights for gay couples was a 
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cataclysmic failure of party management, and became symbolic of the wider sense of his 
failure as leader. His tactical ineptitude brutally exposed ideological divisions and led 
directly to the end of his leadership. Despite his efforts to widen electoral appeal by 
developing the party's policies on public services and social justice, Duncan Smith was 
unable to gain support from the modernisers. This reflected his own limitations as a leader. 
As David Cameron's success has shown, Conservative MPs can be led into unfamiliar 
territory if they have been convinced of the electoral benefits of doing so. However sound 
the logic of his approach, Duncan Smith was hampered by his poor communication and 
media skills. On what Hay (2008: 6) labels the 'performative dimension' of political action 
Duncan Smith was a failure. Encumbered by his own rebellious past, he could not inspire 
the confidence or loyalty of his colleagues. 
Howard, by contrast, was a successful party manager. He made instilling discipline his 
overriding priority, and under his leadership the Conservatives enjoyed a degree of public 
unity not seen for a decade. Howard's professional manner earned him the respect, if not 
the affection, of the parliamentary party. His approach to leadership was premised on the 
belief that unity was an essential prerequisite for electability. Whilst he has been strongly 
criticised for failing to develop Duncan Smith's agenda on the public services and social 
justice (Chapter 4), he balanced both modernisers and traditionalists in his shadow cabinet 
and kept public dissent to a minimum. He also managed moral issues much more 
effectively than his predecessor, offering free votes on potentially divisive subjects such as 
civil partnerships. Like Hague, he paid lip service to the modernisers' concerns. He won 
some plaudits for his decision to vote in favour of civil partnerships, which was interpreted 
as a signal to his colleagues that he favoured a more liberal conservatism. Similar signals 
were given in his speech announcing his candidature for the party leadership, delivered in 
the ultra-modern setting of the Saatchi Gallery and penned by Francis Maude. Then, 
Howard stated that the Conservatives are at their best when 'broad in appeal and generous 
in outlook' and pledged to 'lead this party from its centre' (Howard, 2003). 
Howard's approach was to address the concerns of the modernisers early in his tenure so 
that he could then move on to more traditional Conservative concerns as the election 
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approached. This did not enable him to develop a wider electoral appeal and did not satisfy 
the demands of the modernisers: as one commented, in 2005 'we came across as limited in 
our ambition and unattractive' (Bercow Interview). However, Howard conceded enough 
ground to mute criticism and maintain unity, allowing him to fight a disciplined election 
campaign. With the benefit of hindsight, Howard's style of leadership and focus on 
discipline (if not Howard himself) was perhaps what the Conservatives required in 1997. 
In party management terms, he laid a solid foundation for his successor, and in this respect 
marked a substantial turning point in the Conservatives' recovery. 
8.3.2 The party membership 
With his first Party Chairman, Cecil Parkinson, William Hague oversaw a substantial 
internal reform programme. This radically changed the position of the membership, who 
gained the final say in leadership elections. In the short-term, Hague's strategy in this 
arena was very successful. One of his first initiatives after becoming leader was to subject 
his leadership and 'principles for change' to a ballot of party members. With no other 
candidates on offer, unsurprisingly this was overwhelmingly endorsed.! However, this 
strengthened Hague's position, allowing him to claim the dual legitimacy of backing from 
both members and the MPs who had elected him. He used a similar tactic to gain backing 
for his Fresh Future reforms, single currency policy, and draft manifesto. Hague used 
these plebiscites to enhance his legitimacy and authority over his MPs and wider party. On 
Europe in particular this was an important step along the road to becoming a firmly 
Eurosceptic party. 
However, Hague's reforms were criticised for failing to stimulate an enduring 
reinvigoration of party organisation. His target of doubling the number of party members 
was not met, with numbers actually dropping. For Kelly, the reforms were part of the 
problem: 'Hague's reorganisation may well have exacerbated Tory losses by demoralising, 
and thus diminishing, the party's constituency membership' (Kelly, 2002: 38). The new 
I The 1997 ballot on Hague's leadership and 'principles for change' saw a turnout of 45.1 percent, with 80.8 
percent backing him. 
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structure failed to attract new members or support. Hague hoped that by reforming the 
party he would demonstrate that it was inclusive, modem, and changing in response to new 
challenges. In the event, it did nothing to change the image of the Conservatives as old-
fashioned and out of touch; it was not his 'Clause Four moment'. This wider aspect of 
Hague's party management strategy was not a success. 
The most commented on aspect of Hague's organisational changes were the new rules for 
electing a leader, under which lain Duncan Smith was chosen. After the field of candidates 
had been reduced to two by the parliamentary party, an all-party ballot made the final 
choice. Duncan Smith won this convincingly, securing 60.7 percent of the vote to Ken 
Clarke's 39.3 percent (Heppell, 2008: 147). The margin of this victory over the pro-
European Clarke helped Duncan Smith to both harden party policy on Europe, and reduce 
its prominence, with little dissent. However, he was unable to use this mandate to secure 
his own legitimacy and authority with his parliamentary colleagues, although he appealed 
to this 'overwhelming' endorsement in his call for the party to 'unite or die', after the 
rebellion over gay adoption (Duncan Smith, 2002e). Unlike Hague, he did not seek to use 
party ballots to bolster his position. This was a tactical mistake, but lacking the confidence 
of his parliamentary colleagues and shadow cabinet his leadership was always doomed. 
Duncan Smith's leadership serves to illustrate the power imbalance between the 
parliamentary party and the membership, even after Hague's One Member, One Vote 
reforms. A leader may garner extra legitimacy from the membership, but this does not 
provide an independent source of authority enabling the leader to act without 
parliamentary support. 
Michael Howard originally signalled his intention offer the membership a formal ballot on 
his appointment as leader, even though no challengers came forward. In the end however, 
it was subject only to an 'informal consultation' (Tempest, 2003). He drew his authority 
from his support amongst MPs and his own performances and political stature. Having lost 
the 2005 election, he also attempted to change the party's rules to return the final say in 
future leadership elections to MPs. This proposal, although supported by a majority of 
Conservative MPs and party members, failed to gain the necessary two-thirds support in a 
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constitutional college, so the election went ahead under the system that had elected Duncan 
Smith (Heppell, 2008: 176-7). 
8.3.3 The electorate 
Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard all failed to devise a successful electoral strategy, as 
the general election results and poor opinion-poll ratings showed. Hague looked to exploit 
the European issue, calculating that on the question of closer integration the Conservatives 
were closer to public opinion than the government. His populist stance led the 
Conservatives to a dramatic win in the 1999 European Elections, a significant achievement 
just two years after the 1997 landslide. However, as Chapter 4 discussed, despite being 
achieved on a very low turnout, this was a key event convincing Hague of the electoral 
potential of a core vote strategy and his abandonment of efforts to develop a more 
inclusive appeal. 
To the surprIse of many observers, Duncan Smith showed an appreciation of the 
limitations of Hague's later strategy. In April 2002, Kenneth Clarke, who had branded his 
rival 'a hanger and a flogger' during the leadership election campaign, expressed his 
'surprise and delight' with the direction his vanquisher was leading the party, which he 
contrasted favourably with Hague's approach (Murphy, 2002). However, as noted above, 
Duncan Smith's limitations as a political performer hindered his ability to communicate 
his approach to the electorate. A good strategy is of little use without the necessary skills to 
implement it, and he could not survive to put it to test at a general election. 
Michael Howard's approach to the electorate was tactical rather than strategic. He lacked 
the time to develop a long-term strategic vision for conservatism of his own, but chose to 
move away from the agenda set by Duncan Smith. He perceived this to be failing as it had 
not been accompanied by improvements in the opinion polls, and doubted his own 
likelihood of making it work. Instead, he utilised the expertise of Australian election 
strategist Lynton Crosby to develop a tightly focused campaign aimed at neutralising 
Labour's strengths and exploiting the highly salient issue of immigration (Chapter 6). In 
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this respect Howard had some success: intensive targeting of certain seats reaped rewards, 
adding 33 MPs to the Conservative benches, despite little advance in terms of vote share. 
In one of the most dramatic gains, Justine Greening regained David Mellor's former seat of 
Putney for the Conservatives, with a swing of 6.5 percent. However, they were unable to 
repeat this performance on a wide scale, recording just a 3 percent swing nationally. 
largely due to a fall in the Labour vote (BBC News, 2005). 
Agency-focused analyses have strongly criticised Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard for 
failing to develop the Conservatives' electoral appeal, with Howard being especially 
blameworthy (Chapter 1: 4-5). Certainly, the caustic nature of the 2005 campaign cannot 
be denied, and was clearly ineffective in advancing the Conservatives' vote-share. 
However, the evidence from David Cameron's leadership is that this has not done lasting 
damage to the party. Cameron has been able to pursue a different course and change the 
image of the party. Notwithstanding his own role in devising the 2005 manifesto and 
campaign, he has successfully portrayed it as 'the past' in contrast to his seemingly new 
Conservative prospectus. Perversely, Howard's leadership may actually be advantageous 
to Cameron as it serves to highlight the dissimilarity with his own, accentuating his claim 
that under him the party is changing. 
For Quinn (2008), the key electoral problem facing the Conservatives since 1997 has been 
their party image. The fact that the party had an image problem was recognised early on. 
Hague's baseball cap, his visit to the Notting Hill Carnival, and his Fresh Future reforms 
were all aimed, in part, at changing the Conservatives image. Similarly, Duncan Smith's 
efforts to downplay the issues of tax, Europe and immigration were derived from his 
recognition that even if Conservative policies were in line with a significant swathe of 
public sentiment, highlighting them reinforced the negative image of the party as right-
wing, extreme, and out-of-touch. It is puzzling that the Conservatives did not stick more 
doggedly to a strategy aimed at shedding their 'nasty party' image. That they did not 
suggests an unwillingness to acknowledge the scale of the problem, and a lack of a clear 
idea of how it could be effectively addressed. Both William Hague and lain Duncan Smith 
struggled to present themselves as in touch with modern Britain. In this respect Michael 
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Howard's strategy was perhaps more realistic. He sought to portray the Conservatives to 
the electorate as united, disciplined, and competent, which reflected his own strengths. 
As noted above, between 1997 and 2005 Conservative leadership strategy was confused 
and inconsistent. In part this reflects the competing demands faced by party leaders, 
particularly the high priority that must be ascribed to party management. It also reflects 
uncertainty and disagreement about how best to communicate with the electorate, and what 
sort of messages potential Conservative voters would respond to. This was illustrated by 
the case studies of the party's approach to Europe, national identity and the English 
Question, and social and moral issues. On Europe, Hague allowed the Conservatives' own 
fixation with the issue to override the fact that other issues were accorded much higher 
priority by the electorate. The national identity question betrayed the party's doubts over 
whether to exploit or ignore an increasing sense of English identity. Debates such as the 
retention of Section 28 exposed disagreement between mods and rockers in the party. 
These differences were not merely strategic but ideological, as the next section explores. 
8.3.4 Ideology 
Ideology cuts across all aspects of the strategic context faced by political actors, and also 
influences their interpretation of it. Leaders must manage the ideological demands of their 
parliamentary colleagues and party members, and project a narrative of their political ideas 
that is electorally appealing. As Chapter 1 noted, Conservative Party historiography has 
traditionally emphasised its non-ideological, pragmatic approach to politics. This reflected 
the sympathetic disposition of many Conservative historians, and their view of 
conservatism as a practical creed. However, later work on Thatcherism highlighted its 
ideological nature, and the importance of ideas in achieving political hegemony. Since 
1997, academic analyses have tended to point to ideology as a factor inhibiting the 
leadership's room for manoeuvre, harming party image and inhibiting electoral recovery. 
Stephen Evans, for example, argues that even David Cameron has had his hands tied hands 
tied . by the hosti I ity of local Conservative associations and the prevai I ing balance of power 
within the parliamentary Conservative Party' (Evans, 2008: 313). 
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Resistance to change in the Conservative Party has undoubtedly been ideologically 
motivated. However, as Cameron has demonstrated, change is not impossible, if a clear 
lead is offered. Cameron has also been careful not to repudiate Thatcherism; rather he has 
tried to present himself as moving on from it in order to address contemporary concerns. In 
a sense he is presenting himself as emulating Thatcher's radicalism, just in different 
circumstances. Thatcher, he argued, offered 'an absolutely modernising futuristic message' 
and his objective is 'to do the same thing in very different circumstances, where a lot of the 
future changes are about dealing with social problems rather than economic problems, but 
also understanding a fantastically rapidly changing world' (Cameron, interview in Portillo, 
2008). 
Whilst Cameron has enjoyed much more favourable circumstances (in the face of three 
consecutive defeats, even the most ardent traditionalists are more inclined to concede the 
need for change) his record is an indictment of his predecessors. Under Hague, the 
Conservatives were not constrained to core vote themes and rhetoric simply by ideology, 
but by a lack of commitment to change by Hague and other members of the shadow 
cabinet, who failed to clearly articulate an alternative approach. Duncan Smith showed a 
greater degree of personal commitment to his own vision of how the Conservatives needed 
to change, but failed to communicate it effectively and persuade others of his case. Howard 
enjoyed a much more authority than his predecessors, making his failure in this respect 
greater. Rather than challenge the party to change its ideological parameters, he chose to 
work within them. 
Either by accident or design, the leadership of Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard oversaw 
significant ideological change in the Conservative Party. Most strikingly, as Chapter 5 
highlighted, European integration has ceased to be the source of a major ideological 
schism. As noted above, this was the result of relatively successful management of the 
issue by the leadership. It also reflected the fact that with the prominent exception of 
Kenneth Clarke, very few pro-Europeans remained on the Conservative benches after the 
1997 landslide. Even under David Cameron, who is deliberately amorphous about his 
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ideology on other issues, the Conservatives remain firmly Eurosceptic. The issue retains 
the capacity to cause difficulties, such as the recent dispute over whether Conservative 
MEPs should be in or out of the European People's Party (EPP), and will inevitably cause 
some friction if and when the Conservatives return to office. However, it no longer has the 
destructive virulence seen in the 1990s. The debate in the Conservative Party is now about 
degrees of Euroscepticism, not Europhiles versus Eurosceptics. In the long-term the party 
leadership may face backbench pressure to move towards a policy of withdrawal from the 
European Union, but for now that remains very much a minority position. 
The other highly significant and increasingly noted ideological change in this period has 
been the intensification of the debate between social liberals and social conservatives, 
along what Heppell labelled the 'social, sexual and moral policy divide' (2002: 312). This 
is not a new division amongst Conservatives: the party has always encompassed a variety 
of views on such matters. However, wider societal changes since 1997, driven in part by 
New Labour's progressive liberalism on social issues, served to accentuate the 
Conservatives' image as a divided, old-fashioned and out-of-touch party. As Chapter 7 
noted, these disagreements became linked the debate about electoral recovery, as leading 
modernisers argued that social liberalism was a prerequisite for any Conservative revival. 
These divisions increased under William Hague, characterised by his own mixed-messages 
on social and moral issues. They peaked under Duncan Smith, and eventually contributed 
to his downfall. His own social conservatism was a key factor in convincing modernisers 
that he was not, as he claimed, intent on changing the Conservative Party. However, 
Michael Howard and David Cameron have shown more effectively how these divisions 
can be diffused and contained through effective party management, particularly free votes 
on moral and sexual legislation. 
Cameron has also succeeded in maintaining his own liberal image whilst placing the 
family at the heart of his politics. Key to this has been his redefinition of family, most 
notably his willingness (unthinkable for a Conservative leader a decade earlier) to extend 
any tax benefits offered to married couples to gay couples in civil partnerships. However, 
this is likely to emerge as a political difficulty in the future. Any tax change generates 
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relative losers: those excluded from the benefit. If Cameron advances specific proposals to 
promote marriage through the tax system, he risks the accusation that he is discriminating 
not against gay couples but against single parents. It is thus a risky political calculation as 
to whether the electorate, after a decade of Labour's relative social liberalism, are ready for 
such a change. This is unlikely, however, to be the source of a intra-party dispute on 
anything like the scale caused by Europe in the 1990s. Whilst ideological divisions on 
social, sexual and moral issues have increased, the evidence is that these can be managed. 
Positioning on these issues, unlike for American Republicanism, is not a central defining 
feature of contemporary British conservatism. 
Linked to the question of tax cuts for married couples, another possible source of 
ideological friction in the Conservative Party under Cameron is the economic policy 
divide, over the wider question of the overall level of public spending. This has been a 
muted debate of late, and is unlikely to re-emerge in the short-term as the worsening 
economic situation means that any incoming Conservative government is unlikely to enjoy 
much scope to either increase expenditure or reduce taxation. However, since 1997 Labour 
have overseen a sustained increase in spending, bringing about a quiet revolution in public 
sector investment. The Conservatives' Economic Competitiveness Policy Group, chaired 
by John Redwood, argued that this has resulted in a 'lack of tax competiveness' and argued 
that cuts are essential to sustain economic growth (Redwood and Wolfson, 2007: 78). They 
suggested cuts in income tax, stamp duty, corporation tax, capital gains tax, and the 
abolition of inheritance tax. The Shadow Chancellor, however, fearful of the charge of 
cutting public services, made it clear that the Conservatives would not go into a general 
election offering upfront tax cuts unless they were paid for by increases elsewhere. In other 
words, the overall tax burden would remain the same (Montgomerie, 2007). Whilst this is 
unlikely to satisfy the party's right-wing, this debate does not rival that seen in the 1970s. 
The party leadership'S caution in offering tax cuts reflects pragmatic electoral calculation 
rather than fundamental ideological difference - neo-liberalism reigns supreme. 
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8.4 The Conservatives under Cameron 
In his analysis of the transformation of the Labour Party into New Labour, Adam Lent 
suggested that important early causes and aspects of that transformation are often 
overlooked. Typical analyses, he claimed, 'begin in the period after the 1987 election 
defeat, and less commonly after the 1985 conference' (Lent, 1997: 9). By contrast, Lent 
argued that the initial signs of transformation could be found much earlier, in the period 
immediately following the party's nadir at the 1983 general election. There is a risk that if 
and when the Conservatives return to power, analysts of their electoral recovery may make 
a similar error, dating the beginning of the process to Cameron's victory in the 2005 
leadership election, or perhaps to the return of party discipline under Howard. 
In fact, although the 1997-2005 period has been one characterised by strategic mistakes 
and electoral failure, it is vital to any understanding of the trajectory of the party under 
Cameron. One effect of this time in opposition was to make Cameron's leadership pitch of 
'change' more attractive in 2005. Thatcherism was made possible by the fact that Heath 
was seen to have failed. To the discomfort of traditionalists, electoral failure in 1997 and 
2001 once again made the party open to a more radical agenda. The seeds of this message 
can be seen further back however, in the debates the party has been having since 1997. A 
modernisation strategy based on acceptance of difference, social liberalism and tolerance 
owes something to Hague's early efforts to forge an inclusive approach, as well as to 
Duncan Smith's efforts to downplay traditional Conservative strengths in favour of social 
justice and public services. The genesis of Cameron's family politics and call to fix 
Britain's 'broken society' can be found in this agenda. The need for the parliamentary 
party to be more representative of modern society was highlighted by Hague in 1997. 
The Conservatives have faced a rapidly transforming political, social and economIC 
context since 1997, so it is perhaps unsurprising that they have struggled to keep up. The 
party Cameron inherited had shifted significantly from that bequeathed by Major to Hague. 
Since then, the party has accepted the minimum wage; tax credits; independence for the 
Bank of England; greatly increased public spending levels: constitutional reform. including 
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devolution to Scotland and Wales and House of Lords reform; the abolition of Section 28; 
and civil partnerships and adoption rights for gay couples. The expansion of the European 
Union has led to higher immigration from the new member states, whilst New Labour's 
embrace of globalisation changed the terms of the economic debate. Cameron has thus 
been able to argue (correctly) that the party faces a different set of challenges compared to 
twenty years ago, and thus requires a different set of solutions. 
One of the most distinctive aspects of Cameron's conservatism IS its focus on the 
environment. This has been at the forefront of his efforts to detoxify the party's brand 
image, and portray Conservatives as compassionate and caring. In this respect, Cameron's 
success has been remarkable compared to his predecessors. He has presented the 
Conservatives, for years defined by their approach to the economy and taxation, as being 
concerned with social as well as economic well-being. As Reeves has noted, Cameron's 
mantra that 'there is such a thing as society, it is just not the same thing as the state' is a 
'deliberate wedge between himself and Thatcher' (Reeves, 2008: 64). Focusing on 
environmental issues, particularly climate change, is an effective way for Cameron to show 
his concern for the good of society as a whole, countering the supposition that 
Conservatives are preoccupied with individualistic self-interest. 
Cameron has already achieved the most important part of his strategy for Conservative 
electoral revival. Indeed, this was largely complete by the time of Gordon Brown's arrival 
in Downing Street. He has persuaded the electorate that he (if not his party) is a credible, 
viable alternative, and worth listening too. By July 2008, 50 percent of people polled 
regarded Cameron as 'a good leader' of the Conservative Party, and 37 percent named him 
as their preferred Prime Minister (over 18 percent for Brown and 7 percent for Nick 
Clegg). Cameron was regarded as 'caring' by 52 percent, 'effective' by 44 percent, 
'competent' by 51 percent, and 'likeable' by 57 percent (YouGov, 2008: 3). In part, these 
figures reflect Cameron's charisma and skills as a politician: on the performative 
dimension he outranks his three immediate predecessors. But it also reflects the success of 
a comprehensive and sustained rebranding strategy since Cameron became leader. This has 
distanced Cameron from Thatcher, emphasised issues not traditionally associated with the 
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Conservatives, and sought to present the party as contrite about past mistakes. As Reeves 
notes: 
This first stage of the Cameron project has been like a sorbet between courses, intended to 
cleanse the electorate's palate oflate Thatcherism. Now that the bitter taste is gone, tougher 
policies on welfare, immigration and public services can be pursued without being 
dismissed as typical products from the 'nasty party' (2008: 64). 
Once achieved, the Conservatives are able to move back onto their traditional issue 
strengths without appearing extreme, old-fashioned, or out-of-touch; and are better placed 
to take advantage of events such as government failure. Cameron has effectively earned 
the right, which eluded his predecessors, to be listened to by the electorate. Hague, Duncan 
Smith and Howard never broke through this carapace, so were poorly positioned to 
capitalise on Labour's unpopularity. This was most visibly demonstrated at the 2005 
general election, when Labour's share of the vote fell substantially whilst the 
Conservatives' remained almost static. 
It would be wrong, however, to regard Cameron as un-Conservative. On the economy he is 
essentially neo-liberal, and on Europe as sceptical as Thatcher before she left office. As 
Finlayson has noted, he 'combines his acceptance of contemporary standards in personal 
morality, and his embrace of do-gooder liberalism, with familiar Conservative 
commitments: to the family, to social entrepreneurs rather than the state, to individual 
freedom, aspiration and national pride' (2008: 4). What Cameron adds to Thatcherism 
(whether genuine or contrived) is a focus on society and social problems. His difficulty is 
in providing convincing answers that do not involve centralised direction and state 
intervention, which has been at the core of his critique of the New Labour decade. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis opened with a simply stated question. Why has it taken the Conservative Party 
so long to get back into a position to challenge for power? It has sought to shed light on 
this through an examination of the party in opposition over two full parliaments, between 
1997 and 2005. The strategic-relational analytical approach directed our attention to the 
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contextualised nature of leadership strategy. This has exposed the complex and contingent 
nature of political events, and the difficulties inherent in devising effective political 
strategies. Explanations which ascribe culpability solely to party leaders are inadequate. 
The equation of electoral failure with leadership failure only paints a partial picture, as 
leaders orientate strategy towards various (and sometimes competing) aspects of the 
multilayered context they face. 
Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly the case that between 1997 and 2005 the Conservatives 
have been characterised by uncertainty of strategic direction, and this can be seen as a 
failure of leadership. This stems, however, not merely from the inadequacies of key 
personnel, but from a wider ideological malaise in Conservative politics after Thatcher. 
The party has struggled to redefine its purpose and message: it has lacked a clear 
understanding and narrative of what post-Thatcherite conservatism is for. This lack of a 
shared vision led to disagreement over the causes of defeat and the appropriate response. In 
part, this reflects the success of New Labour under Tony Blair. By monopolising the 
political centre-ground Blair neutralised weaknesses on issues such as taxation and crime 
that had previously been susceptible to Conservative attack, whilst at the same time 
denying them issue space on the key battleground of the public services. It also reflects the 
party's own unwillingness and inability to challenge the parameters of Conservative 
politics set by Thatcherite statecraft. 
The 1997-2005 period was not one of absolute leadership failure. William Hague 
succeeded in holding the party together as a single entity, a status which was far from 
guaranteed. We shall never know whether, as many Conservative MPs believe, the party 
would have split under the leadership of the Europhile Kenneth Clarke. But by choosing 
instead the candidate closest to the party's centre they may have avoided this fate. lain 
Duncan Smith began the policy renewal and process in earnest, and began to forge a new 
statement of conservatism. Michael Howard restored party discipline and some sense of 
unity and professionalism. These were all essential prerequisites for an electoral revival, 
but it is remarkable that it took three different leaders and eight years to achieve such 
relatively modest steps. 
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Since Thatcher, the Conservatives have taken the long road to renewal. Whether Cameron 
can rebuild Conservative hegemony on anything like the scale of Thatcherism is yet to be 
seen. The challenge for the left will be to find new and appealing means to counter a 
Conservative politics finally stepping out of Thatcher's shadow. Cameron's greatest 
challenge, as Macmillan observed, will be events. 
221 
Appendix: Interviewee Biographies 
The Rt Hon Michael Ancram QC MP 
Michael Ancram joined the Shadow Cabinet after the 1997 election, serving as 
Constitutional Affairs spokesman. In June 1998 he became Deputy Party Chairman and in 
October 1998 became Chairman of the Conservative Party, a position he held until shortly 
after the 2001 general election. He was a candidate in the ensuing leadership election, and 
was eliminated along with David Davis after the re-run of the first round of voting (having 
initially tied with Davis for fourth place). The eventual winner, lain Duncan Smith, 
appointed him as his deputy and Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, a position he held until 2005. He retired from the frontbench 
following the election of David Cameron as party leader. 
John Bercow MP 
John Bercow was elected to Parliament in 1997, and joined the frontbench in June 1999. 
He became a member of the Shadow Cabinet under lain Duncan Smith in September 2001, 
resigning in November 2002 over the issue of gay adoption. He returned to the Shadow 
Cabinet under Michael Howard, serving as Shadow Secretary of State for International 
Development between November 2003 and September 2004. 
Douglas Carswell MP 
Douglas Carswell was elected MP for Harwich in May 2005. He is a leading moderniser 
and co-author of the influential Direct Democracy: An Agenda for a New Model Party 
pamphlet published in the same year. He is a vocal Eurosceptic, and has publicly called for 
Britain to withdraw from the European Union. 
The Rt Hon lain Duncan Smith MP 
lain Duncan Smith became the Conservative MP for Chingford and Woodford Green at the 
1992 election, following the retirement from the House of Commons of Norman Tebbit. A 
committed Eurosceptic, he achieved some prominence as one of the Maastricht rebels in 
the 1992-1997 parliament. After the election of William Hague as party leader in June 
1997 he was appointed to the Shadow Cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Social 
Security, and became Shadow Defence Secretary in the June 1999 reshuffle. He became 
party leader on 12 September 2001, having convincingly defeated Ken Clarke in a ballot of 
Conservative Party members. He lost a vote of confidence in his leadership on 29 October 
2003 and was replaced by Michael Howard eight days later. In December 2005, David 
Cameron appointed Duncan Smith as Chair of the Social Justice policy review group. 
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Damian Green MP 
Damian Green became the Conservative MP for Ashford in 1997. In 2001 he joined the 
Shadow Cabinet, serving as spokesman for Education and Skills (2001-3), and Transport 
(200~-4). After the May 2005 election he managed David Davis's leadership campaign, 
and 10 December 2005 was appointed Shadow Minister for Immigration. He professes to 
be a 'One Nation' Tory and is a Vice-President of the moderate Tory Reform Group. 
The Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP 
Michael Howard was a senior member of John Major's government, serving as Secretary 
of State for Employment (1990-2), the Environment (1992-3), and as Home Secretary 
(1993-7). Following the 1997 election he became Shadow Foreign Secretary, a position he 
held until his retirement from the frontbench in 1999. Under lain Duncan Smith he 
returned to the frontbench as Shadow Chancellor, a position he held until his 'coronation' 
as party leader in November 2003. He announced his decision to stand down as leader the 
day after the 2005 general election, but stayed on until the election of David Cameron in 
December. 
The Rt Hon Peter Lilley MP 
Peter Lilley was Secretary of State for Social Security between 1992 and 1997. After the 
election he stood for the leadership of the Conservative Party, but withdrew from the race 
after the first round of voting. In William Hague's first Shadow Cabinet he became deputy 
leader and Shadow Chancellor. Francis Maude became Shadow Chancellor in June 1998, 
but Lilley was retained as deputy leader and remained responsible for policy renewal. In 
the June 1999 reshuffle he was sacked from the Shadow Cabinet. 
The Rt Hon Theresa May MP 
Theresa May was elected as Conservative MP for Maidenhead. She became Shadow 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment in June 1999, a position she held until 
the election of lain Duncan Smith. Since then she has held various Shadow Cabinet posts, 
but it was during her tenure as Party Chairman (2002-3) that she attracted a degree of 
controversy, for her conference speech that commented that the Conservatives had come to 
be seen as the 'nasty party'. 
The Rt Hon Lord Parkinson 
Lord Parkinson became William Hague's first Party Chairman in 1997, a position he had 
last held under Margaret Thatcher between September 1981 and October 1983. Under 
Hague he held this position for a year and helped to initiate internal party reforms. 
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John Penrose MP 
John Penrose was elected Conservative MP for Weston-super-Mare at the 2005 election. 
Since then he has been Parliamentary Private Secretary to Oliver Letwin, who became 
head of the Conservative Research Department and head of the Party's Policy Review 
upon the election of David Cameron in December 2005. 
The Rt Hon Michael Portillo 
Michael Portillo was widely tipped to succeed John Major as leader of the Conservative 
Party, but any such ambitions were thwarted by the electorate at the 1997 general election. 
He re-entered Parliament in 1999 at the Kensington and Chelsea by-election, and was 
Shadow Chancellor between February 2000 and September 2001. After his unsuccessful 
bid for the leadership in 2001, he returned to the backbenches, and retired from the House 
of Commons in 2005. 
The Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC MP 
Malcolm Rifkind joined the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Scotland in 1986, a post he 
retained until Margaret Thatcher's departure from Downing Street. He was a senior 
member of John Major's government, serving as Secretary of State for Transport (1990-
92), Secretary of State for Defence (1992-95), and as Foreign Secretary (1995-97). He lost 
his seat at the 1997 election, returning to the Commons as MP for Kensington and Chelsea 
in 2005. He briefly served as Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and stood 
in the 2005 leadership election, after which he returned to the backbenches. He has been a 
prominent exponent of the need to address the West Lothian Question and has given 
evidence to Ken Clarke's Democracy Taskforce on the issue. 
Gary Streeter MP 
Gary Streeter entered Parliament in 1992 and served as a Junior Minister in the Major 
government. He was a member of the Shadow Cabinet under William Hague, serving as 
Shadow Secretary of State for International Development (June 1998 - September 2001). 
He was co-director (with Oliver Letwin and David Lidington) of the internal 'Renewing 
One Nation' social policy group. In 2002 he edited There is such a thing as society, a 
collection of essays by Conservative MPs, strategists and activists. 
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The Rt Hon Lord Tebbit 
Norman Tebbit retired from frontline politics after the 1987 general election, and entered 
the House of Lords in 1992. He was a prominent critic of John Major's government and 
has continued to voice his opinions on the future direction of Conservative politics whilst 
in opposition. 
The Rt Hon Anne Widdecombe MP 
Anne Widdecombe entered Parliament in 1987 and served as a Minister in John Major's 
government. After the 1997 election she served as Shadow Health Secretary and later as 
Shadow Home Secretary under William Hague. Her vigorously expressed traditionalist 
views ensured that she was widely identified as the Shadow Cabinet's leading 'rocker' 
during this period. She retired from the frontbench in 2001. 
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